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7ATHENS AND BEYOND
our years and four days. The exact amount of time, that is, that has lapsed 
since the day the greek state would sign its ‘memorandum of agreement’ 
with its lenders (the IMF, the EU and the ECB), on May 5, 2010—officially 
making its own way into the era of global austerity and crisis. An entering that 
would come with a bang, and very much stay so: from that moment on, the 
social tension playing out at the greek territory would feature—constantly, it 
seems—in discussions, analyses and reports the world over.
 But what is life like in a city that finds itself in the eye of the crisis-
storm, how does the everyday reality here compare to Athens’ global media 
portrait? What kind of lessons might our city be able to learn from the outbreaks 
of capitalism’s crises elsewhere, and what lessons might the Athenian example 
be able to offer, in return? The volume that you hold in your hands acts as an 
accompaniment to a conference that tried to answer some of these questions. 
‘Crisis-scapes: Athens and beyond’ took place in the city of Athens on May 
9&10, 2014. Over the two days, the conference tried to explore an array of 
the facets of the crisis in the city, divided between five axes/panels, which are 
in turn mirrored in the structure of this book: 1. Flows, infrastructures and 
networks, 2. Mapping spaces of racist violence, 3. Between invisibility and precarity, 
4. The right to the city in crisis and 5. Devaluing labour, depreciating land.
 Five broad axes comprising the vehicles we used to perambulate 
through the dark landscapes of the crisis. A crisis neither commencing nor 
ending here, today. Through these conceptual vehicles taking us through 
Athens, through her spaces and her times, we focused on the particularities 
of the greek crisis; a crisis first of all concerning the structures, meanings and 
processes weaving together what we could broadly label as the greek everyday 
reality. Yet we also believe these particularities ought to be understood within 
the global financial crisis framework: hence this centrifugal “beyond”. Athens 
may now be in a position to offer explanations about phenomena taking place 
much beyond the city’s strict geographical limits. What renders the city a field 
of experimentation are trials and productions of new means of governance. 
And they acquire a new meaning when seen as wider tendencies in crisis 
management.
 Yet these Athenian testing grounds must at the same time be studied 
as traces and as future projections of structural readjustments taking place in 
seemingly disparate locations, but often-times ever so close in their causes and 
consequences alike. The interventions put together in the present volume try 
to take another composite look at Athens and its crisis. They try to comprehend 
the city through crossings and transitions in space and in time.
F
8 CRISIS-SCAPES
Leonidas Economou 
(Panteion University, Athens)
Dimitra Gefou-Madianou 
(Panteion University, Athens)
Yannis Kallianos and Dimitris Dalakoglou
(Manchester University, Sussex university and crisis-scape)
Andreas Chatzidakis 
(Royal Holloway, London)
I.
FLOWS 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
NETWORKS

11ATHENS AND BEYOND
by Dimitris Dalakoglou
Flows, Infrastructures and Networks  
Section Opening
eople, information, labour, vehicles, commodities, waste, water or energy 
are just some of the elements that move around us making up the dynamic 
urban condition. However, it is not only mobile subjects and objects that 
constitute dimensions of the urban everydayness—what are equally important 
are the material infrastructures of flows: the built environment, highways, 
streets, pipelines, tunnels, airports, ports or landfills and various other grids 
synthesize city’s spatial formations and are crucial parts of the multiple urban 
experiences. 
 Since the end of the WWII, Athens has been growing into a city where 
nearly half of the country’s population live; an urban complex that flows and 
grows out of its previous boundaries every few decades. But if the quantitative 
growth of the city has been impressive in these past six decades, the qualitative 
dimensions of that same expansion are equally formidable. It is not only that 
consumption increased, as Andreas Chatzidakis shows us, or that vehicles 
multiplied; it is not merely the emergence of the new suburbs that Leonidas 
Economou tells us about, or the new mega-infrastructures that were built—
such as those studied by Giannis Kallianos (and Dimitris Dalakoglou) or Dimitra 
Gefou-Madianou. As all section authors agree, these processes facilitate the 
shaping of specific socio-material formations and subjects. They imply uneven 
experiences of the urban and materialise—quite literally— urban marginality 
and inequality.
 During the post—2010 crisis, the local project of neoliberalism 
is revealed anew as a failure, for the great majority. This failure in terms of 
infrastructural flows is often translated as slowing down while in terms of 
urban materialities as break downs. The construction and even the maintenance 
of public works and infrastructures has been paused; the flow of commodities 
(and thus waste) has decreased and the number and flow of vehicles, arrivals, 
departures etc. are reduced. Yet as all section chapters explain, these failures 
and interruptions that prevail today are merely the real face of neoliberal urban 
growth that was being applied systemically to some proximate Others until 
the recent past. The ones who were on the wrong side of the grid or the flow. 
Nevertheless, now this model expands affecting almost everyone—leading to 
new social formations and paradigms of staying, building, consuming, resisting 
and Being in the city during the crisis.
P
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by Leonidas Economou
Political and Cultural Implications of the 
Suburban Transformation of Athens
2
I  will use the term suburb to refer to the urban areas, which approximate the notion of the bourgeois suburb, as it is usually defined in the literature of the social sciences. The metropolitan development of recent decades 
has destabilized, to some extent, the notion of the suburb without erasing, 
however, its spatial and social specificity. A number of suburban areas, in the 
above sense, can be discerned in the Athenian conurbation. Their spatial form 
has some distinct indigenous traits (Economou, 2012) and they are perhaps 
more socially mixed than is often the case in other countries, but they are 
nevertheless spatially, socially and symbolically differentiated from other areas 
of the city (Maloutas, 2000, 2013).
 During the first decades after the second World War (1950-1970), 
Athens attracted a large part of the population and the economic and cultural 
dynamism of the country (the population grew from 1,4 million in 1951 to 
2,5 million in 1971). The larger part of the new population was directed to the 
central city (the municipality of Athens), where it was housed in the newly 
built apartment buildings (polikatoikies), and to the working-class districts 
(especially in the western part of the city), which were built through processes 
of self-housing and informal settlement. The great majority of the higher 
socio-economic strata lived in the central city and many had second homes 
in suburban or countryside resorts. The suburban areas, which were formed 
during the interwar period along the Kifisias and the Paraliaki avenues (and 
became later known as the Northern and the Southern suburbs) grew quickly, 
but their population remained quite small as a percentage of the total. Despite 
its great expansion during these years, Athens remained a highly centralized 
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city. The central city gathered most supralocal functions and activities, and 
dominated the whole conurbation. The suburbs depended on the central city 
and were very different from it. They were almost exclusively residential, with 
detached houses surrounded by gardens, and they had a semi-rural character, 
as they were separated by large open spaces from the city and contained many 
unbuilt and green spaces. 
 The Athenian growth slowed down in the next decades and the 
population reached 3,2 million in 1991 and 3,8 million in 2011. A number 
of factors (including the saturation of the center and the deterioration of the 
quality of life due to the model of urban growth of the previous period, the 
expansion of the middle class, the increase of private automobiles, and the 
attraction of the suburban way of life) led to important internal movements 
and rearrangements (Maloutas 2000, 2013). A growing movement of middle-
class migration from the center to the suburbs (and especially those contained 
within the Lecanopedio: the Athenian basin) begun in the seventies. The suburbs 
started to grow faster than the central city and the surrounding working-class 
districts, which during the 1980s had started to lose population. The suburban 
exodus continued and intensified during the following twenty years (1991-
2011), and many central areas lost a large part of their older inhabitants, who 
were replaced by immigrants and refugees. The new suburbanites were directed 
to the established suburbs in the North and the South, but they also started 
to populate new suburban or semi-suburban areas in the whole of Attica and 
beyond. The great infrastructure works constructed in relation to the Olympic 
games in the period between 1995-2005 (Spata airport, suburban rail, new 
highways) connected directly for the first time the three physical components 
of Attica (Lecanopedio, Thriasio, Mesogeia) and reinforced the suburban 
transformation of Athens. The emerging suburban landscape differed in many 
ways from the past. The model of the garden suburb with the detached houses 
was replaced, in most old and new suburbs, by luxurious apartment buildings 
and residential complexes of small two-storey houses (mezonetes). The suburbs 
were progressively absorbed in the continuous urban fabric and became 
“urbanized” as important activities and functions (employment, commerce, 
entertainment, health services, culture) became increasingly decentralized. A 
number of peripheral urban centers and zones emerged in the suburbs, while 
the central areas were largely abandoned and continued to decline.
 Suburbanization was a middle-class reaction to the problems created by 
the growth of the city and the particular growth model and in the same time an 
expression of the attraction of the suburban ideal. The Athenian suburbanization 
of the last decades confirms the received knowledge that the suburbs are an 
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expression of, and reinforce, a retreat from society and social responsibility, 
a consumerist way of life, and an attitude of social and racial discrimination. 
However, as more recent scholarship has shown, suburbanization has been and 
continues to be a very complex and hybrid phenomenon, comprising different 
motivations, values and ways of life (Fishman, 1994; Silverstone, 1997). In 
what follows I try to discern some of the dominant recent trends and practices 
and I do little justice to the heterogeneity and the alternative ways of life and 
political movements that appeared during this period in the suburbs.
 The suburbanization of the last twenty-five years is related to the 
appearance of powerful new media (especially private television) and a great 
advance of consumerism in Greek society and culture. The ethic of accumulation 
and restrained consumption (that prevailed until the 1980s) was replaced by a 
hedonistic morality of consumption, spending and enjoyment based partly on 
credit. A series of new features and trends—including the commodification of 
new aspects of social life, the growing importance of consumption and leisure 
activities, the pervasiveness of advertisement, the desire for luxury, distinction 
and individuality, and the increasing emphasis on the design and style of 
goods and the self—became widely disseminated and found their apotheosis 
in the suburbs. The sites of the new consumer lifestyles were located there. The 
suburban home in a suburban location was presented, by the advertisement, 
marketing and media industries that constructed and disseminated the new 
consumer and suburban ideal, as the necessary prerequisite for the possession 
and display of the goods, and the deployment of the practices and identities of 
modern consumerism. The “temples of consumption” and the “dream-worlds” 
of the metropolis were also transported, to a large degree, in the suburbs. The 
first modern shopping centers and shopping malls, as well as new kinds of music 
halls, dancing clubs and leisure complexes, were built in the suburbs, and they 
have subsequently marked their space, experience and identity (Rigopoulos, 
2003). Some suburban city centers experienced great growth and change and 
a new postmodern landscape was constructed that included stylistic display, 
spectacular imagery and simulation, cultural and material consumption and 
play.
 The recent Athenian suburbanization is also related to important 
shifts in political ideology and practice and the creation of new forms of social 
and spatial control and exclusion. The more recent migration to the suburbs 
was motivated not only by environmental and lifestyle considerations, but 
also by a growing fear of otherness and crime, and a desire for increased social 
and spatial segregation. A landscape of fear is gradually built in many suburbs. 
Houses and residential complexes are now visually separated from the street, 
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often hiding behind high walls and other fortifications, and they are equipped 
with electronic surveillance systems and patrolled by private police services 
(Papadopoulou, 2003). In some cases, new protected and fortified spaces are 
formed that approximate the type of the gated community. The demand for 
greater separation is also reflected in suburban politics. The political scene of 
many suburbs was dominated by conflicts arising from the urbanization of 
the suburbs, and in many cases homeowners’ movements appeared that can 
be interpreted as defending the interests and the separatist strategies of the 
privileged. More generally, suburbanization, in conjunction with electronic 
media and consumerism (with which it is structurally related), can be seen as 
a factor contributing to the disintegration of civic democratic culture and to 
the transformation of political society towards some form of media controlled 
meta-democracy (Whyte, 1956; Habermas, 1989).
 The recent economic crisis in Greece is a local expression of a European 
and global crisis that revealed the structural workings and the failures of the 
market economy, the European Union, and the local economic and political 
system and culture. The suburban transformation of the city is an expression 
and a consequence of the model of urban growth that was established after the 
war and remained largely intact until recently, and the accompanying ideology 
of unrestrained growth and crude modernism. The policies and the practices in 
the land and housing sector during the first post-war decades on the one hand 
provoked the saturation and degradation of the central city—thus triggering 
migration from it; and on the other hand, they prepared the suburban exodus 
by propelling the territorial expansion of the city and the incorporation of many 
peripheral suburban areas in the city plan. The demand for suburban homes 
after the 1980s, and the suburban planning and building provisions and codes, 
permitting the intensive exploitation of the land, secured the robustness of 
the construction industry in the following decades and the continuation of its 
economic and ideological role. If the urbanization of the period between 1950-
1970 was the vehicle for the embourgeoisement of the underprivileged strata 
of Greek society, the subsequent suburbanization enabled and marked their 
transition to consumerism and political complacency. The eager adoption and 
the specific form of the recent suburban ideal seem to be the natural continuation 
of the radical individualism and the unquestioning modernism of the previous 
period. The abandonment of the center is a reaction to the problems of the city 
related to the atrophic civic culture and the “anarchic individualism” of the post-
war period. The suburbanization of the recent decades appears, moreover, as 
the logical outcome of an ideology which privileges expansion, newness and the 
present, instead of preservation, maintenance and the future—and is largely 
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indifferent to the long-term environmental, social and economic viability of 
the city. The massive destruction of the neoclassical city after the war and its 
replacement by the monotonous and indifferent modernism of the apartment 
building stem from the same cultural matrix that led to the rapid devaluation 
and obsolescence of the central city and the creation of a cosmopolitan 
postmodern landscape in the suburbs. In this light, recent suburbanization 
appears as a material and ideological process that reinforced consumerism, 
political apathy and cultural impoverishment and contributed to the survival 
of a destructive and unsustainable mode of urban growth.
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T
Messogia, the New ‘Eleftherios Venizelos 
Airport’ and ‘Attiki Odos’
or, the Double Marginalization of Messogia
3
he 1990s mark a great, aggressive expansion of the city of Athens to the 
whole Attica region. This took place in the context of modernizing and 
development projects, which initiated the neo-liberal ‘restructuring’ of 
Greece and amidst discourses, of Greece’s becoming at last a “fully European 
country”, affluent, strong and important regionally and globally. The climax 
of this process was its undertaking the organization of the Olympic Games 
of 2004 and the numerous, huge infrastructure projects which supported 
this organization, many of them located in the Messogia region. Prominent 
among them are the new Athens ‘Eleftherios Venizelos Airport’ and the Attica 
Expressway (Highway, Freeway) named ‘Attiki Odos’, but also the horse-racing 
and shooting grounds of Athens (which were moved to Messogia from Athens, 
not far from the airport), international hotels and business/shopping centers. 
These constructions have had tremendous repercussions on the organization of 
space, its social and political uses for the entire region of Messogia. 
 The airport in particular became the emblem of success of the then 
modernizing PASOK government and was wrapped with discourses of glory, 
Hellenic grandeur and triumph of Europeanness. Along with the majority 
of the Greek population, most of the local people embraced the project 
enthusiastically because they considered it to be an avenue for a long desired 
access to modernity. As it happens, the Arvanites of Messogia have long been 
‘closed’ communities culturally and politically marginalized by central power 
structures and were considered as backward and uncivilized by the dominant 
Athenian elite (Gefou-Madianou, 1999). For more than a century the Arvanites 
of Messogia were molded into a subaltern community in the service of the 
nearby capital city which got steadily gigantic in terms of population and socio-
19ATHENS AND BEYOND
chapter 3
economic influence. Their language, ‘Arvanitica’, questioned their Greekness 
and this together with the use of ‘retsina’ wine by the locals (which turned 
them into the eyes of Athenians into drunkards) led to violently dismissive 
characterizations, which amounted to mockery and led to political and 
economic exploitation (ibid). 
 Certainly this picture had already started to change in the 1980s, due 
to the gradual expansion of Athens, the industrialization of the area and the 
ensuing internal migration. This process was intensified in the 1990s with 
massive flows of ‘economic’ immigrants, many of them from Albania (first 
wave) and then from Asia (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh), who reinforced 
available work force and increased local productivity in all sectors and especially 
the agricultural one. Yet, the locals’ embodiment of the subaltern status, died 
hard—even if they had themselves become ‘masters’, so to speak. Today the 
Messogia communities have become cities and their population has tripled.
 In this context, the airport construction was perceived as a sign of 
openness (culture and language-wise) to modernization and cosmopolitanism, 
hence it’s enthusiastic reception. At the same time, any critical voices were 
muted. There were more reasons for this positive stance, some material, other 
symbolic, even imagined. The value of land increased making some people 
rapidly rich either through land expropriation for the construction of the big 
projects (the new airport and ‘Attiki Odos’) or through the dramatic changes in 
the uses of land. Land formerly exclusively reserved for agriculture (or forest/
public) was now turned into residential, business and industrial zones. Access 
to the capital city from which many Messogites felt ‘excluded’ became quick and 
easy, at least for the first years. On a symbolic level, locals felt that the capital 
was moving towards them via the airport and they felt they had become “from 
a periphery, the center of Attica”. Messogites have appropriated the airport in 
many ways vividly integrating it into their life-worlds and everyday activities: 
shopping, entertainment, jobs and leisure time activities (Gefou-Madianou 
2010). The fact that the airport was situated on their fathers’ vineyards has 
probably invested it with “ownership” meanings. And all this imaginary of 
progress and modernity have underplayed and suppressed all the dramatic 
changes which the airport construction and operation had generated. 
 First it was the landscape and their relationship to the land, to their 
fathers’ land. The “Messogitic plain” (kambos) was lost forever. Vineyards were 
destroyed; the vine cultivation and wine production, the area’s most central 
and century-long cultural and economic characteristics were irreparably upset; 
small hills were taken down; olive trees were uprooted; agricultural roads were 
deviated or more often destroyed; archaeological excavation sites were ruined; 
little out-churches were moved to other places and in some cases removed 
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altogether. The topography of the area changed radically. All previously 
known signs and markers of places leading to peoples’ properties and fields 
were eliminated, thus making orientation in space and property location very 
difficult, especially for older people. The absence of a central ‘ktimatologio’ 
(cadastre) in the area complicated the situation even more. Old people were 
worried, and still are, that their children would not be able to locate their fields 
and the remaining vineyards (ibid). 
 It was during this period that Messogia region progressively started 
turning into a ‘disordered’ space. The whole process of preparations for the 
new airport and ‘Attiki Odos’ constructions (land expropriation, immense 
digging, uprooting of vineyards, other cultivations, olive trees and forest), the 
flows of workers and migrants moving into an already over-populated area, the 
expansion of industrial zone in the area, the building of villas and other illegal 
houses with no residential plan, all these and the lack of administrative control 
generated pictures of a deregulated space. 
 ‘Attiki Odos’ has split the Messogia region into two, thus making 
inter-community communication difficult and expensive, sometimes breaking 
up a community, therefore making social life hard. Work in the vineyards and 
fields, an everyday activity for some locals became difficult, even impossible for 
older people—for driving in the highway was impossible for them, due to the 
speed, the strong lights in the night, and the traffic signs. Thus, the cultivators’ 
relationship with their land was changed dramatically or even destroyed.
 Many people had pointed to an upcoming environmental catastrophe 
(air and land pollution, affecting cultivation products and food chain) but 
general euphoria silenced their voices. After all, these concerns were problems 
of the less economically privileged Messogites. The wealthier and those 
espousing the modernization agenda at that time, saw and expected only 
benefits and opportunities, envisioning a share of the airport ‘movement’ and 
commotion: of incoming tourists visiting the area and reinforcing consumption 
and commercial activity; of attracting big construction projects such as 
condominiums, hotels, shopping-malls and urban housing-projects, promising 
jobs and wealth for the local population. 
 All movements against the airport and ‘Attiki Odos’ construction 
organized by local activists (archaeologists, environmentalists, geologists, 
artists, school teachers and some local mayors) failed in mounting opposition. 
The PASOK government was very strong at the time and had succeeded to 
attract the support of a large segment of the locals, who were traditionally 
conservative and in favour of the monarchy (traditionally named King’s 
villages—‘vassilochoria’). Local politicians played an important role in the 
negotiations and the manufacturing of consent. 
Messogia, the new ‘Eleftherios Venizelos Airport’
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The airport was inaugurated in 2001 along with the main part of ‘Attiki Odos’ 
leading to it; the rest of it was completed in 2003-04. While during the first 
years of their operation, both the airport and ‘Attiki Odos’ were easily accessible 
to Messogites—hence these images of appropriation and welcoming—just 
before, during and increasingly after the Olympic Games of 2004 the situation 
changed dramatically. It was then that it became clear what this ‘progress’ and 
development implied; what this brutal and neo-liberal modernity was aiming 
at; and how it thoroughly reorganized the logic of public space. Both the airport 
and ‘Attiki Odos’ turned into quasi-private, confined enclaves as ‘barriers’ were 
set up limiting access to them. The airport was controlled and policed for security 
and order reasons; free parking was prohibited, and controlled parking was 
expensive; walking around, window-shopping, and promenading (as was done 
before) was not allowed. Commuting for work or visiting relatives and friends 
from one Messogitic town to the other(s) became difficult, time-consuming 
and expensive. The airport was transformed into an area of strict discipline. At 
the same time, access to and operation of ‘Attiki Odos’ was strictly organized; 
the highway was constantly patrolled; toll-stations increased; driving through 
it was considered by locals complicated and expensive. But most importantly, 
all these generated a sense of alienation. They felt the place was ‘other’ to them, 
or themselves ‘others’ in this place. 
 This neoliberal space-logic became more clear and visible to many 
with the eruption of the recent economic crisis in the country and the area of 
Messogia. Class differences have become more evident, for some locals became 
rich by expropriating land or by turning it into residential plots (oikopeda). One 
can now more clearly discern two groups of people in Messogia. On the one 
hand are those who consider themselves modern and identify with the state 
hegemonic discourse aiming at progress in the community, thus still in favor of 
the airport and ‘Attiki Odos’. They represent wealthy, strong local families who 
had always been able in forcing amnesia and the orchestrating of forgetting 
regarding certain periods of the past, like their Arvanitic past or the Civil 
War. On the other hand are those less economically privileged locals, usually 
agricultural cultivators who are experiencing all these changes with distrust 
and bitterness (Gefou-Madianou 2014). 
 Yet both groups encounter pollution problems—both in the 
atmospheric air and on the ground. These have become more evident in the 
recent years, affecting people and cultivations, and they are attributed both 
to the new airport and ‘Attiki Odos’ but also to the local industries’ chemical 
waste. From recent examinations it was found that the water table in the area is 
contaminated and the air is heavily polluted. A photochemical cloud very often 
covers the whole area and the fields adjacent to ‘Attiki Odos’ are also heavily 
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polluted. The food chain also seems to have been affected by this pollution 
(Stouraitis and Methenitis 2013), thus making agricultural products unsuitable 
for sale. Some areas suffer serious noise problems from air traffic. Shops are 
closing down in the Messogitic cities, jobs are not easily found in the area, 
and as result many immigrants are leaving it. ‘Attiki Odos’ is progressively less 
used by Messogites because of gas cost and the toll ticket, which are considered 
expensive. They prefer to travel by the old agricultural roads or take the bus 
and/or the ‘Metro’ when they visit Athens for work or other business. Only a 
small percentage of the population (mainly the wealthy), still use the ‘Attiki 
Odos’ on a somewhat regular basis.
 For the average-income Messogites or the economically disadvantaged 
ones space is more alienated than ever. Especially for the vineyard owners 
this feeling of ‘otherness’ is more prominent. Their land has become a ‘no 
place’—neither agricultural or industrial, nor urban; they themselves feel 
neither agricultural cultivators, nor urbanites; they do not know what they 
are any more. The new big constructions on their land, namely the airport 
and ‘Attiki Odos’ brought dramatic changes to the area and also generated a 
cultural impoverishment of their lives. They are experiencing a sense of severe 
alienation and feel double marginalized and confined by the whole situation. 
The dream and prospect for ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’, which the new airport 
and ‘Attiki Odos’ have promised seem to have failed irretrievably.
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by Dimitris Dalakoglou and Yannis Kallianos1
Infrastructural Flows, Interruptions and 
Stasis in Athens of the Crisis
4
I n the summer of 2011, representatives of the Athenian elites made a series of biopolitical statements regarding the anti-austerity movement of Syntagma Square2. In order to justify their political opposition to the camp-styled 
protest gathered across from the House of Parliament they argued that the 
protestors posed a risk to public health and to the city’s public image. Following 
the final police attack on the camp in July 2011, municipal cleaning workers 
were immediately brought in, to collect the broken tents and other items of the 
destroyed protest-camp and throw them into the refuse trucks. In yet one more 
sign of social deregulation, the very same people who have been forced several 
times to call a halt to their industrial actions on the basis that their strikes pose 
a ‘public health risk’, were now the same ones who were obliged to finish off 
the police operation which was legitimized based on the same argument. Four 
months later, in October 2011 this story was once again repeated, when these 
municipal workers were forced, by court order, to abandon their strike and go 
back to work, due to the risk to public health.
 The strikes of workers in the city’s cleaning service have proved 
critical moments in the life of the city. It is at these moments when it’s dwellers 
are confronted with their own and their neighbours’ waste. The criticality is 
based precisely on the pause of the flow of refuse. Such interruptions bring 
the less noticeable aspects of the infrastructural flows to the forefront of the 
senses (vision, smell etc.) A process that echoes the argument of Humphrey 
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(2003) who has stressed the value of infrastructure and its flows for social 
order, examining the case of another infrastructural interruption, heat, in a 
post-soviet city. Indeed such ethnographic material confirms once again Mary 
Douglas’ (2008) definition of disorder as the interruption of a pattern. These 
interruptions and disorders materialize in everyday life of the critical mass the 
completely socially embedded—and socially invisible by then—infrastructural 
existence that is based on the flows and their rhythms. Moreover, the disorder 
can be caused by the lack of the infrastructural flow altogether without ever 
starting and so paused, as it has been argued in the case of the highways in 
Albania (Dalakoglou, 2012). Thus, it can also be the material affordances of 
an infrastructure which imply certain flow/activities and thus the pattern’s 
discontinuity and disorder. To extend this argument even further, it is 
also the entire lack of an infrastructural materiality or the promise for the 
construction of an infrastructure in the future that may trigger particular flows 
or interruptions and thus disorders and other socio-material phenomena.
 Overall what is important for our case is the infrastructural flow 
and its discontinuities which then activate, mobilize or challenge other kinds 
of flows in the city ultimately re-defining the urban condition. These diverse 
(non)flows may then become an intriguing point in the study of infrastructures 
and specifically of the infrastructural dynamics which they make possible in 
different contexts and levels. In this sense, the infrastructure per se is not a fixed 
rigid category, it is not even a substratum or medium, it is a matter of affinities 
that take shape (or not) (Mitropoulos, 2013:116). Therefore, an approach to 
the ‘infrastructure of experience’ (Dourish & Bell, 2007:417) or even better 
to the experience of infrastructure, shows that discontinuities and arythmia 
are the rule of the infrastructural (non-)affinities, rather than the exception. 
As such, the question emerging becomes: what are the differentiations among 
the various interruptions and disorders? Before trying to answer this question, 
some ethnographic elaboration is necessary at this stage.
Waste-Money-Water-Soil-Bodies
Four ethnographic observations are clear in reference to waste infrastructures 
and flows. The first three were pre-existing conditions which took on different 
meanings since the outbreak of the crisis and the fourth is directly linked with 
the 2010 crisis. First, everyday life in Fili town (where the landfill of Athens 
is located) is unbearable due to the waste treatment facilities and flows. 
Second, there is an inability and difficulty for the Greek authorities to find 
Infrastructural Flows
25ATHENS AND BEYOND
spaces to situate new waste treatment infrastructures. Third, waste treatment 
is big business and implies big flows of money. Fourth, there are significant 
transformations in everyday flows of waste, starting at the bins in the city. 
 Starting from the latter, an evident fact is that since 2010 there is an 
increasing number of scavengers looking for valuable materials (usually scrap 
metals) within the city’s recycling or mixed garbage bins. Several individuals 
scout the area around bins for things that might come in handy. Additionally 
the number of people who just search for food in rubbish bins has also greatly 
increased. Austerity policies have rapidly created a new level of extreme poverty, 
the most ‘fortunate’ social classes simply consume less (generating less garbage) 
while the lowest classes struggle to survive, sifting through and consuming the 
rubbish of the others. Starvation in Greece and the life of the starving people is 
an entirely separate issue that needs to be addressed, but probably this has to 
happen in political rather than academic contexts. For now, what one can state 
is that the aforementioned phenomena lead to a decrease in the volume of the 
rubbish that flow toward the landfill. 
In the land(of)Fili
During the last two decades and due to pre-crisis economic growth Greece has 
experienced a significant increase in the volume of waste. The predominant 
method for waste management in the country is landfilling. Up until 2005, 90% 
of all refuse was disposed in sanitary landfills and open dumps. Today, almost 
80% of urban waste ends up in landfills3. In Attica, even though more than 
eight dumpsites are in use, only one of these is  operating legally—this is the 
landfill in Fili town4.
 Fili town is almost 20km from the centre of the city. It emerged in 1997 
from the unification of a group of municipalities: Zefyri, Fili and Ano Liosia, 
where the landfill is actually located. The name Ano Liosia or just Liosia often 
exacts negative reactions partly in reference to the Roma people who reside 
there but primarily due to the landfill and the pollution associated with it. The 
name ‘Fili’ is less charged than Liosia, however it has gradually taken on similar 
negative connotations. One of the ethnographic anecdotes accompanying the 
relationship between the city center and Fili is that of teenagers waiting for the 
bus. When they were asked for information regarding their destination along 
the bus route they pretended that they were getting off well before Fili and yet 
they remained on the bus until Fili, which probably fills them with shame. 
 The site has been used since the 1950s as the main dumpsite of Attica 
and has been extended twice to accommodate the capital’s trash disposal 
demands. It is currently burdened with around 10,000 tons of garbage per 
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day, triple the volume of refuse that it has been designed to accommodate5. 
Currently the landfill’s total surface area is over 1,000 acres. The present site 
has a depth of 500 meters, 250 metres underground and 250 metres above 
ground. This is next to the old inactive landfills of Ano Liosia 1 and 2 and the 
inactive Ano Liosa dumpsite. The site is built very near the town, and less than 
300 metres away from residences. Indeed the settlement closest to the landfill 
is the Gennimatas workers’ dwellings (the Greek equivalent of a council estate). 
Some of the last houses built in the area were built in 2012, just before the 
closure of the public organisation that was tasked with building them. 
 The landfill is strictly guarded by threatening security staff and the 
facilities are surrounded by a 3-metre high barbed-wired fence. Despite this, 
one can see vehicles carrying toilet waste entering through the landfill gates. 
Such vehicles are not supposed to unload their refuse in the landfill, but, as 
the cost for disposing of such liquids in purpose-built facilities is very high, it 
is easier to go the ‘other way’. Parallel to the inflows of waste is the inflow of 
money toward the Fili landfill, both formal but probably also informal given the 
aforementioned example. Each municipal authority of Attica (wider Athens) 
pays Fili municipality per ton of waste deposited at the landfill—moreover, 
money from the central state authorities also flows towards Fili. This condition 
likely makes Fili one of the wealthiest municipal authorities in the country. 
No doubt various local micro-contractors receive a share of this wealth via 
small contracts that the municipal or the landfill authorities allocate. However, 
despite this, the town does not look like a particularly wealthy place, certainly 
not one which invests in its public services. Simultaneously the fetid smell of 
rotting waste is present in the air people breathe 24 hours per day.
 There seems to be a wider plexus of socially and/or legally accepted 
but indeed also unaccepted in/out-flows taking place in the landfill. According 
to the official announcement of the inter-municipal authority published on 
20th December 20136, at least six times during that month dangerous medical/
hospital waste was discovered inside the landfill. The incidents involved private 
corporations who illegally smuggle toxic or harmful waste into the landfill 
(hospital or other kind of debris that is not legally allowed to be refused 
there). Moreover from June 2013 until January 2014 the operation of the 
infrastructure has been disrupted and suspended eleven times (this is the 
official number) because of the invasions of scavengers who look for valuable 
scrap and other materials. These are usually the Roma people who live next to 
the site as well as poor immigrants, however, gradually as the crisis progresses 
some people who do not belong to either of these two categories have begun to 
appear. 
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Landfill technology is based on the burial of the waste within the soil. In Greek 
a landfill is colloquially referred to as homateri—etymologically this derives 
from the Greek word for soil, homa=χώμα. However it is not only garbage 
that comes and gets buried in Fili; there are bodies also: human bodies have 
often been discovered in homateri. These bodies originate from two main 
sources. Firstly, the unfortunate scavengers are often accidentally crushed by 
the tons of garbage which come all day while searching for something valuable. 
However, more sinisterly the homateri is also used by criminal organizations 
who apparently make use of the landfill or rubbish bins in the city for disposing 
bodies or body parts. 
 According to the bible soil is the cosmogonical element per se (together 
with water). Thus, according to the Christian Orthodox tradition after death the 
body which allegedly was made out of these two materials must return to the 
soil7. According to local residents in Fili the pollution created by the homateri 
leads to a massive percentage increase of deaths by cancer in the area; that is the 
reason the main term the anti-landfill residents’ initiative uses is cancerlandfill 
(karkinohomateri=καρκινοχωματερή). In addition, not only is it responsible 
for the deaths but the homateri continues to torment the bodies of the Fili 
residents into the afterlife. The current graveyard of the town is built on the 
hill that remains behind inactive cell of the Ano Liosia landfill. Bodies buried 
there do not decompose, due to the pollution in the soil that has destroyed 
the underground flora and fauna which aids decomposition. ‘Dead soil for the 
dead people’ is how one of Fili’s residents referred to it. The only solution has 
been to build cement boxes for the coffins to be put in. Sometimes soil bought 
separately in plastic sacks is poured in the box before the gravestone is put in 
place sealing the bodies, so that at least if and when exhumations occur the 
gravediggers or relatives do not come across practically undecomposed bodies. 
The other cosmogonical element of the Judeochristianic tradition, water, flows 
in the opposite direction to the garbage. Very close the homateri is the channel 
of Mornos River. This artificial channel contains water flowing towards the 
capital city, poorly maintained the cement-made canal has water pouring out of 
its cracks, while at points it is completely uncovered exchanging elements with 
the environment and thus the homateri. The channel’s rectangular cement walls 
echo the small rectangular cement  grave boxes.
Contesting landfills
Over the last decade or so the government has made plans to build two new 
landfills in Attica. The two new sites proposed are next to the towns of Keratea 
and Grammatiko. In the case of Keratea, a small town in East Attica, local 
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opposition against the building of a landfill culminated in a major physical 
conflict between riot police and the community that lasted from December 
2010 until March 2011, forcing the halting of the ‘investment’. Police violence 
in Keratea was extreme and the local residents responded dynamically to what 
was a proper invasion of Special Forces of the police into the town and in its 
periphery. The community blockaded one of the major highway artery and 
almost daily clashes occurred. 
 Generally local residents in both places and others throughout the 
country (e.g. Lefkimi in Corfu) have radically resisted the proposals as they 
expect an environmental and public health catastrophe similar to the one of 
Fili. Moreover, the most notorious—for corruption—private/public works 
contracting company in the country has undertaken the building of the new 
sites8. At the same time the terms of agreement do not appear to be protective 
of the Greek state’s interests. For example, according to a documentary film 
produced by the federation of municipal workers union (POE-OTA 2013) 
the new facilities will be in reality private businesses, while the capacities of 
these planned infrastructures is much larger than the expected generation of 
garbage. Nevertheless the contracts for new landfills signed between the state 
and private contractors instruct that the state will pay the managing companies 
based on capacity, rather than weight of wasted matter (as is the case with Fili). 
For the time being what has flown from the centre of the city towards these 
future landfill areas are riot police officers who protect the private investments 
and try to implement the wishes of the government to make the country an 
investment-friendly territory. Diggers and other machinery has also flown there 
for now from elsewhere, since no local sub-contractor wants to get involved 
in this work. Moreover, money flows from state coffers towards the private 
contractor who is receiving compensation for work delays due to protests. 
Disorder, Crisis and Stasis
The government and corporate media often employ arguments that try to turn 
the residents of the three areas against each other; for example, arguments 
about local villagers who do not care about the common good or who do not want 
Fili to get a lighter or not load of waste are used. The public health argument is 
also employed. The residents of Keratea and Grammatiko as well as those from 
Fili, who protest, are accused of posing a danger to public health and order. 
However, does the government care so much for the environmental impact in 
Fili or even for public order? After all, similarly to Keratea, the use of extreme 
police violence is also visible in Northern Greece, in Chalkidiki, where gold 
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mining ‘investments’ are resisted by the local residents who (rightly) believe 
that the gold mines will destroy the natural and social environment in their 
area. Public disorder prevails and is implemented by rigid political decisions 
which instruct for the investments to be carried out by all means, if necessary 
with illegal arrests, severe injuries of protestors and even with large-scale anti-
terrorist operations targeting local residents. 
 The argument which wants these infrastructures to be necessary for 
wider social and public order and the rhythmic and normal flow of waste (in 
our case) are not convincing. First of all the infrastructures and their flows are 
interrupted, paused and delayed daily. These interruptions are embedded in the 
process, in the regular rhythm and pattern of the flow, they are not exceptional. 
For example when people enter homateri searching for valuable items the work 
of the infrastructure and the flows are paused, when bodies are discovered in 
homateri its function is also paused, when the municipal vehicles stop to empty 
rubbish bin in the city the flow of vehicles behind them is also interrupted, etc.
 On a different scale, everyday life in Fili is a constant interruption and 
disturbance with the stinking air which is probably toxic and lethal, with waste 
tracks speeding daily via the roads of the town and with people dying on mass 
scale due to the pollution. Simultaneously the water of the capital city flows 
next to the homateri. Overall, disorder is the rule rather than exception of this 
large system. When it comes to this waste infrastructure and its flows, disorder 
and arrhythmia are part of the ‘normal’ infrastructural patterns for the people 
who have direct experience of the infrastructure. Perhaps these disorders are 
embedded in a system that wishes to devaluate as much as possible the function 
of the current infrastructure and push towards the new private units. Probably 
Fili landfill has reached its physical and social limits.
 On a larger scale, disorder, disruptions and deregulation are endemic 
characteristics of neoliberal governance—especially in its most extreme 
form, as it is being applied in Greece since the agreement of 2010 with the 
IMF, the EU and the ECB. For example, until recent times the state authorities 
were responsible for a multiplicity of flows, e.g. provision of social housing 
to vulnerable groups, managing waste flows, construction and extension of 
infrastructures etc. However, now in the times of crisis the most social of these 
activities have been paused from above while the most profitable have been 
or are in the process of being privatised. As such, during the crisis all of the 
previously existing patterns have been interrupted but from above. Thus, the 
only flows that remain uninterrupted are flows of public assets towards the 
private sector and the flow of violence against anyone who may resist such 
policies.
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The question hereby posed is therefore what might distinguish these systemic 
interruptions and disorder from the interruptions and disorder that come from 
protests: whether we talk about striking municipal workers, the Syntagma Square 
occupation or anti-landfill struggles, these incidents function as an oppositional 
force to the systemic flows (including their disorders and interruptions). This 
is the reason that representatives of the elites are so harshly against these 
flows trying to protect the disruptions caused from above. So as one needs to 
start thinking anew these disruptions and disorders as qualitatively different 
phenomena, the use of another term needs to be employed, that of stasis. Stasis 
in that sense can refer to non-systemic interruptions of flows and non-systemic 
disorders, which have anti-structural potentialities. Stasis challenges the 
neoliberal normality and its rhythms which include the systemically embedded 
disorders and interruption of patterns.
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(In a World that Evaluates Everyone and Every Place by 
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I
A Consumer City in the Making
 grew up in Athens throughout the 80s and 90s, in the midst of a transition 
period that brought dramatic changes to the Athenian cityscape. In many 
ways, the “ancient city” was in a fully-blown and ferocious transformation 
into a “consumer city”. For despite the ubiquitous view of the Acropolis and 
other ancient sites, Athens began to look more like any other European “future-
oriented” city: introducing some of the biggest shopping malls in Southeast 
Europe, iconic buildings by celebrity architects, bigger and wider motorways 
for ever-so-bigger and wider cars, new museums, urban lofts, retail parks, 
theme parks, and various new cafés, artspaces and multi-purpose buildings 
for an emerging and increasingly confident “creative class” (Florida, 2002). 
By 2004, the year of hosting Olympics, Athens was keen to erase its more 
recent memories and eager to fetishise antiquity in its rebranding as a world-
class destination. Major facelifts and investments in urban infrastructure had 
turned the city itself into an alluring object of consumption: contemporary yet 
rich in history, sophisticated, even as “chic” as Paris1 and as “creative” as Berlin2, 
and above all full of opportunities for consumption catering to all cosmopolitan 
tastes and sensibilities. 
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But the transition of Athens into a city of consumption was far more pronounced 
not in the physical surroundings but in the everyday logics and practices of its 
residents. In the neighbourhood I grew up, and which in many ways epitomised 
the Greek model of urban gentrification, the formation of new subjectivities 
akin to the neoliberal consumer-citizen began to manifest in all spheres of daily 
life. At least for some time, nearly everyone seemed blessed with the freedom 
of experimentation and identity differentiation through the acquisition 
of an ever-expanding list of consumption objects. Soon it became not only 
about what people were consuming but also where, marking the formation of 
neighbourhoods with distinct class identities. Popular songs and TV series, for 
instance, narrated stories of people from different districts of Athens (middle 
versus working class) that were to fall in love and strive a life together despite 
different class-related tastes and sensibilities. For a city that never underwent a 
process of heavy industrialisation and class-stratification, as for example Paris 
or London, this was a remarkable cultural shift. Concurrently, some academic 
studies began to take note of Greece’s transition from a “collectivist” to an 
“individualist” culture (e.g. Pouliasi and Verkuyten, 2011). 
A Contested Consumer City 
The years of the Athenian spectacle ended violently and abruptly in December 
2008, uncovering various underlying tensions and contradictions, not least in 
the consumption-led model of urban development (see Vradis and Dalakoglou, 
2012). Capitalist “cracks” (Holloway, 2010) and “societies within societies” 
(Papi, 2003) began to appear in various parts of Athens and beyond. One of the 
most striking examples, for instance, was what is now known as “Navarinou 
park” or “the park”, a former parking lot that was turned into an open squat 
by Exarcheia-based residents (and other enthusiastic supporters) who, in the 
aftermath of the 2008 riots: “...united to squat on the space and demand the 
obvious, that the parking turns into a park! They broke the asphalt with drills 
and cutters, they brought trucks carrying soil, planted flowers and trees and in 
the end they celebrated it”3. Operating on the basis of self-management, anti-
hierarchical structuring and anti-commercialisation, the park aspired to be: 
…a space for creativity, emancipation and resistance, open to various 
initiatives, such as political, cultural and anti-consumerist ones. At the 
same time, it aspires to be a neighbourhood garden which accommodates 
part of the social life of its residents, is beyond any profit or ownership-
driven logics and functions as a place for playing and walking, meeting and 
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communicating, sports, creativity and critical thinking. The park defies 
constraints relating to different ages, origins, educational level, social and 
economic positioning4.
Consumerist society and atomised logics and practices were at the heart of 
critique in various other “here and now” experimentations with doing things 
differently. There was a collective, for instance, that directly traded with 
Zapatistas and various other alternative trading networks that brought together 
politically like-minded producers and consumers without intermediaries. There 
were also various no-ticket cinema screenings, collective cooking events, time 
banks, gifting bazaars and “anti-consumerist” spaces where people could come 
and give, take, or give and take goods without any norms of reciprocity. For a 
consumer researcher, post-2008 Athens seemed to be an ultimate laboratory 
where alternative tactics of consumer resistance and modes of consumer-
oriented activism were constantly tried out.  
A Failed Consumer City 
Fast forward five years, however, theories and critiques of consumerist society 
and possessive individualism (Graeber, 2011) have to a certain extent been 
made redundant. As Skoros, an anti-consumerist collective put it:
“When we started Skoros... everything was easier. It was much easier to propose anti-
consumerism, re-use, recycling and sharing practices. Later however the economic 
crisis arrived—of course the social and cultural crises pre-existed—and made us feel 
awkward. How can one speak of anti-consumerism when people’s spending power 
has shrunk considerably? How can one propose a critique of consumerist needs 
when people struggle to meet their basic needs?...” 
(leaflet by Skoros, Dec 2011).
Indeed, Athens is now by and large inhabited by people who can no longer fully 
express themselves on the basis of what they consume and where. Their city 
is no longer a “world-class” city for consumption (Miles, 2010) and cannot 
pretend to be so either. After all, it is the capital and by far most populous city 
of the first developed country to be downgraded to “emerging” market status5. 
By 2014, the average Greek salary was reduced by 40%6. In many ways, the 
consequences are far more pronounced in Athens than anywhere else. The once 
well-to-do Athenian middle-classes now parallel the world’s so-called “emerging 
middle-classes” in reverse, experiencing everyday precariousness and the fears 
36 CRISIS-SCAPES
Athens as a Failed City for Consumption
of “falling from the middle” (Kravets and Sandikci, 2014)—and straight onto 
the poverty zone—in an unprecedented magnitude and scale. Increasingly, 
Athenians approximate Europe’s “defective” and “disqualified” consumers 
(Bauman, 2011, 2007), unable to fully define themselves neither in terms of 
what they consume nor what they produce: with unemployment rates hitting a 
record 27% across the entire population and over 50% among the youth7.
 Present-day Athens is the world’s “failed” consumer city par excellence: 
comprising “zombie” retailscapes for increasingly disempowered consumers 
who still mourn the dramatic decline of their spending power and unfulfilled 
consumer desires that seem all the more unreachable. I have seen, for instance, 
various individuals visiting gifting bazaars and desperately trying to revive 
consumer fantasies and a “customer ethos” remnant of a not-so-distant past 
where much of their leisure time was spent around department stores. I have 
heard of others that walk into stores and pay a small deposit to reserve items, 
pretending they don’t know that they know it is no longer possible to return to 
buy them. In a (European) society of consumers, “a world that evaluates anyone 
and anything by their commodity value” (Bauman, 2007, p. 124), both Athens 
and its residents have comparatively little, if any, status.
 To the untrained eye—and a remaining Athenian elite that still lives 
within secluded walls of excess and affluence—it may be difficult to fully grasp 
the depth and the breadth of such failure. After all it is still possible to consume 
Athens subject to (carefully) guided tours and the (fragile) success of various 
“re-thinking” and “rebranding” projects8,9. According to the New York Times, for 
instance, the city is “surging back”, a testament to that “vibrancy and innovation 
can even bloom in hard times”10. Potential visitors are rest assured that various 
neighbourhoods have witnessed a “resurgence”, are “quickly gentrifying” and 
getting a “cultural lift”11. Indeed, some streets of Athens are still buzzing and 
there are various new “entertainment zones” where opportunities for hedonistic 
pursuits and “experiential consumption” (e.g. Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982) 
abide. But the proliferation of new cafés and budget eateries is also understood 
in the context of the heroic Athenian entrepreneur who, facing dire prospects, 
invests in small businesses with low start-up cost and (at least) some potential 
of reasonable profit margins. More profoundly perhaps, they can be understood 
in the context of the (failing) Athenian consumer, who having lost their ability 
to assert themselves through more traditional performances of conspicuous 
consumption, invest in “low-involvement” yet symbolic daily expenditures 
instead. Put differently, these new sites of consumption represent a very last 
but much-needed resort for consumption-mediated expressions of identity 
positioning and differentiation.
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Athens is Calling: From Solidarity Across Difference and Distance 
to “In-Group” Solidarity
“…How can we insist that ‘we are not a charity’ when poverty is next to us, around 
and above us and it is growing massively? How to counterpropose solidarity and 
community when the crisis isolates individuals and makes them turn against each 
other?...” 
(leaflet by Skoros, Dec 2011)
Against such dystopian present, solidarity was bound to surface as a keyword. 
But it is hardly a new word in the streets of Athens. In my first systematic 
photographic recordings of graffiti, posters and various flyers around the city 
(back in 2008), “solidarity” was already everywhere: from calls in support of 
comrades facing juridical charges to supporting under-paid (and non-paid) 
workers; from Athens to Mexico and into Palestine; from race to age and into 
gender. Soon after the crisis, however, discourses of solidarity diversified 
and multiplied. Various social actors began counter-proposing their own 
solidarity logics and practices. The notion itself became a symbolic battlefield 
where even the most accountable for peoples’ misfortunes claimed part of 
the pile. The government, for instance, soon introduced its own version of 
additional “solidarity taxes”. It was now as if all other taxes did not have to 
do with solidarity. Meanwhile, in collaboration with various marketplace 
and religious actors, Sky TV—a pro-establishment broadcaster—launched a 
relatively successful campaign titled “Oloi Mazi Mporoume” (United We Can), 
comprising “actions for the collection of food, medication and clothes for those 
who need them as well as scholarships for those children that want to further 
their education but cannot due to financial difficulties”12. Any willingness left 
to extend solidarity across difference and distance was therefore displaced 
into firmly depoliticised acts of pitifulness, supporting an implicit ontological 
understanding of the crisis as accidental rather than systemic (Harvey, 2010), 
a temporary rather than prolonged state of being (Agamben, 2004). Thanks to 
Sky TV’s campaign Greece’s youth could still further their education had they 
wanted to; and presumably enjoy a life of linear chronological progress (i.e. from 
education to full-time employment) once the painful years of crisis are over. 
 Concurrently the strengthening of ingroup-outgroup categorisations 
and practices of othering undermined universal solidarity. For instance, Golden 
Dawn, a political party with explicit links to Nazi ideology and which won 7% 
of the vote in the last national elections (July 2012), performed solidarity 
through the creation of migrant-free zones (Vradis and Dalakoglou, 2010). 
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Among others, proudly Greek citizens concerned with the rise of migrant-led 
crime could now enjoy benefits such as guarded walks to ATMs. A kind of walk 
that for psychoanalysts like Melanie Klein could be read as the projection of 
paranoid-schizoid mechanisms into the other: including migrants, antifascists 
and homosexuals. Soon Golden Dawn also introduced soup kitchens and 
solidarity trading initiatives ‘from-Greeks-for-Greeks-only’. As I have illustrated 
elsewhere (Chatzidakis, 2013) the struggle was no longer only about urban 
space but also the phantasmic realm of commodities. From Zapatistas coffee to 
so-called “fascist rice” (rice circulated in solidarity trading networks by right-
wing producers) and “blood strawberries” (named after the racist shooting and 
injuring of migrant strawberry pickers by their bosses) the Athenian’s shopping 
basket was full of street-level politics.
 For most Athenians, solidarity therefore failed to channel itself into 
more politically progressive realms. If anything, it was the family institution 
and the notion of intergenerational family solidarity that took centre-stage to 
firefight the gaps left by the dramatic cuts in standards of living and the demise 
of the welfare state. Moving back with the parents and grandparents, having 
extended family meals, sharing salaries and consumption objects and trying 
to get rid of these that once a sign of freedom had now become burdens (e.g. 
expensive cars) became part of daily life. In Athens and beyond, an increasing 
number of people had no choice but to rediscover the pleasures and the perils 
of (extended) family living.
Athens in the Here and Now
“…We are not sorry at all, quite the contrary, that the current socio-economic 
system is in a deep crisis and we try, being part of the society, to put human lives 
above profits. In a capitalist system that is reaching its end, we are not going to feel 
nostalgic about the illusions of happiness offered by consumerist lifestyles but we 
are going instead to seek for novelty. We pose questions around degrowth, issues 
of scale and balance, and we deny the hegemony of financial profits. We propose 
small, “self-managed” communities and not gigantic multinational enterprises. We 
believe in solidarity, social support and collaboration and not in charitable giving. 
We are part of society, not its rescuers. Our suggestion is simple. We produce and 
share goods, services, knowledge. We become independent of the old structures 
and develop new ones. These new structures will cultivate an environment that will 
allow a way out of the current economic, social and cultural crisis. A way out on the 
basis of equality and justice…” 
(leaflet by Skoros, December 2011).
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For those with an alternative vision of public and community life, one less 
mediated by consumption, the crisis represented a threat but also a welcomed 
opportunity for the cultivation of new ways of doing and thinking politics. An 
increasingly popular movement of “de-growth” (Latouche, 2009), for instance, 
called for redefining urban (and national) wealth not in economic terms but 
quality of life, social relations, equality and justice. But present-day Athens is 
far from having entered such “virtuous circle of quiet contraction” (Latouche, 
2009). Consumers of the spectacular Olympics and super-sized shopping malls 
were forced to embrace less materialistic lifestyles but not on the basis of 
voluntary downshifting or some kind of “alternative hedonism” (Soper et al. 
2009).  Their way of living changed drastically but their political (consumer) 
subjectivities proved to be rather less versatile.
 Concurrently, new politics of time and space stretched the Athenian 
antagonist movement to its limits. The utopian “here and now”, which largely 
inspired the formation of various “societies within societies” (Papi, 2003) and 
experimentations with doing things differently, was soon confronted by the 
“here and now” of the crisis: a different kind of spatio-temporal logic focused 
less on ideological imperatives and more on here and now pragmatism, an urge 
to attend to people’s immediate needs. In their attempt to firefight the various 
gaps left by the welfare state and to respond to multiple calls for solidarity 
beyond traditional territories, some social movements went on “automatic pilot” 
(emic term). Ideological principles had to be bracketed off, paying emphasis on 
“urgency”. For example, although alternative and solidarity-based economies 
continued to proliferate the imperative for “fair” and “transparent” rather than 
“low” prices became somewhat redundant. For most people participation in 
alternative trading networks simply made sense in their quest for lower prices. 
It was hard to blame them for doing so whilst watching them nearing (and 
falling below) the poverty line. Likewise, Skoros, the anti-consumerist collective 
who took a conscious decision to provide solidarity for all, soon turned into 
a space of “over-consumption”, catering to an increasing population of failed 
consumers who kept coming back to acquire more stuff they did not really need 
but could no longer purchase in the conventional marketplace.
 There is currently widespread fatigue, anxiety, and an “overwhelming 
sense of futility” (Ross, 2014)13 in the streets of Athens. But some find it hard 
to stop thinking and dreaming rather more dangerously. After all, the history of 
their city reminds that there will always be potential turning points and critical 
junctures that can trigger radical upheavals.
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Mapping Spaces of Racist Violence 
Section Opening
acism is on the rise across Europe—and as of late, Greece has been at the 
centre of attention in this context: the neo-nazi Golden Dawn entered 
the country’s parliament in the summer of 2012; by now, incidents of 
racist violence are no-news, particularly in Athens. Many have tried to explain 
how this racist turn may have happened, over such a short period of time and 
who may be to blame for it: the crisis and its ensuing feelings of despair have 
been suggested by way of an explanation; the seeking of scapegoats by a nation 
already self-defined in an introvert way; neoliberal policies of exploitation and 
exclusion, and so on. This panel adopts a different approach, choosing to focus 
on attempts to map out, rather than interpret this outburst of racist violence. 
Such mapping is not itself devoid of interpretations or meanings, to the 
contrary: it constructs the victims, the perpetrators, the causes and potential 
remedies to racism alike.
 Dimitris Christopoulos notes that until last year, no official data nor 
any system existed that would record racist crimes—while no single perpetrator 
of any violent racist attack had ever been convicted by the Greek state. Police’s 
refusal to acknowledge the existence of racist crimes, let alone to investigate 
them, testifies to the legitimization and internalization of racist motives by 
the police force. The xenophobic tone in the country is therefore set not by any 
extreme or external agents, but by the government itself.
 The crisis-scape collective on the other hand believes that the way 
migrants are represented in the country—whether as criminals or victim—leaves 
no space for another imagining of how we could relate with the ‘other’. The crisis-
scape project sought alternative ways to map violent attacks in Greece—primarily 
in Athens—by making information openly available and also providing a tool for 
the creation of networks of action that depart from solidarity, not pity.
 Sarah Green concludes the panel by introducing a different reading of 
the movement of people within the city: think of transient visitors in Athens 
during the early 1960s or the huge numbers of refugees back in the 1920s. 
Through her historical comparisons, our current ‘exceptional’ experiences 
emerge as a part of a long history of a transnational place. What is different is 
that under neoliberalism, these movements of people are no longer organized, 
nor controlled. State borders acquire new meanings, separations and relations 
change forms, different places and people become knotted together.
 Having acknowledged the complicated ways in which state power is 
entangled with racist violence we could—is the suggestion put forward by this 
panel—move to mappings of spaces that allow us to better understand our lived 
experiences in the city, and to relate differently with those who live beside us.
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“Very Unhappy to Say That to Some 
Point It’s True”1: Fascist Intrusion 
Within Greek Police
6
I n January 2013, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, following a week-long visit in Greece and before publishing his report on the country, stated: “I am deeply concerned with the impunity enjoyed by the 
perpetrators of racist attacks in Greece. Very few have been led to justice and 
even fewer have been condemned... The police does not do its job as it should: 
abuse of authority, excessive use of force, collaboration with Golden Dawn. 
Among police officers, there are undoubtedly ‘rotten apples’, but they suffer 
no consequences—impunity here as well... The international image of Greece, 
and particularly of the judicial system, is in danger. We wish to witness the 
indictment of members of Golden Dawn and police officers. Until this happens, 
anything else is mere words”!
 Finally published in April 2013, the Muižnieks Report2 is an 
unprecedented blow for Greece, bringing the issue of racist violence and police 
impunity to the fore. Its formulations are anything other than discreet. The 
Commissioner “regrets that rhetoric stigmatizing migrants has often been used 
in Greek politics, including by high-level politicians”, and explicitly mentions the 
prime minister, who in November 2012 spoke before his party’s parliamentary 
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fraction of “an on-going ‘recuperation’ by the Greek authorities of city centres 
from irregular migrants who had ‘occupied’ them and subjected them to their 
‘illegal activities’” (para. 23). The report mentions similar statements by the 
political superior of the Hellenic Police, the minister of public order, who said: 
“the country perishes. Ever since the Dorians’ invasion 4 000 years ago, never 
before has the country been subjected to an invasion of these dimensions… 
This is a bomb on the foundations of the society and the State” (para. 24). 
The reply of the Greek government to the commissioner’s report is of equal 
interest. Having acknowledged that Golden Dawn is “an expression of popular 
disillusion and protest against harsh, though necessary, austerity measures”, 
it admonishes the commissioner that “the solutions cannot be a product of 
sentimental reactions that could prove unproductive”, and happily concludes 
that “despite its shortcomings, our country is moving in the right direction”3.
 If one wishes to talk responsibly about ultra-right and racist violence 
tolerated by or—worse—actively abetted by the Hellenic Police, then it is highly 
important to underline what many democratic police officers told us during 
our research: that in the last instance the tone is not set by Golden Dawn, but 
first and foremost by the government itself. After all, “the Dorians’ invasion” 
as a metaphor for immigration was not (only) used by the leader of Golden 
Dawn, but (also) by the minister responsible for the police. This is a message 
that straightforwardly legitimizes racist violence, and at the same time totally 
represses the racist motive as a possible motive of criminal acts. To highlight 
an issue as a political priority, as has been done with immigration in Greece the 
last few years—and most certainly so by the current government—gives fuel 
to arbitrary practices by police and, of course, serves to incubate ultra-right 
political ideology; in its national socialist version, no less.
 Thus, to talk about the ultra-right within the Hellenic Police is 
necessarily to talk about how the ultra-right keeps hostage the political right 
wing itself, at the level of its political leadership. This is crucial. To put it simply, 
if the message sent by the political authorities was not to “recuperate”, surely 
the Hellenic Police would deal in a wholly different manner with the all-too 
real “recuperation” carried out by members of Golden Dawn who beat or even 
murder immigrants on the streets of Athens. Yet while racist attacks climaxed 
between the two 2012 elections, the arrests or detentions of the perpetrators 
by the Hellenic Police were virtually non-existent: nobody was arrested4. 
However, the groups that carried out these attacks were not the abstract Greek 
voters of Golden Dawn, and not even Greek racists in general, but a hard core 
of a few hundred criminals. For this very reason the police inaction was all the 
more blatant. In retrospect, the ease with which the dismantlement of the 
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organization by this self-same Hellenic Police began in the autumn of 2013 only 
highlights the enormity of the earlier idleness. 
 Most of the racist attacks (which for now have virtually stopped, though 
they are likely to resume in the future) were carried out at night by groups of 
young people wearing Golden Dawn t-shirts assaulting people who appeared to 
be immigrants. These attacks often included theft. A wallet, a mobile phone or 
even a few euros carried by the victims are the perfect trophy from the “invader” 
and, of course, a convenient expropriation of others’ possessions. As testified 
in documentations by organizations that systematically record racist crime, 
the detection of such criminal acts usually stumbles upon a dual unwillingness: 
police unwillingness to investigate the criminal act itself, as the immigrant is 
not considered to be a credible source of information; and the unwillingness of 
the immigrant, who usually lives in Greece without papers, to file a complaint 
for the incident, because he or she is afraid that he or she will be deported. (This 
second type of unwillingness must be noted although it is beyond the scope of 
the present study).
 The Hellenic Police’s unwavering denial to accept racism as a motive 
of criminal acts is, first, a “bureaucratic resistance”, a sign of its unwillingness 
to understand a new reality confronted by all police forces in nations that have 
become immigrant destinations. Yet there is more to it than that. To not accept 
racism as a motive and at the same time prevent victims from taking legal 
action (as is well documented by now) is a direct sign of an official subculture 
of acquiescence, tolerance and even internalization of racist motives. The 
“involvement of uniformed and State officers in the attacks” constitutes a 
special category in the 2012 Annual Report of the Racist Violence Recording 
Network5, which finds an explicit “connection between racist violence and 
police violence”. In early 2013, the Departments and Offices Against Racist 
Violence were put to work inside the Hellenic Police. Now, any Greek or foreign 
citizen can report racist attacks by calling 11414. The creation of this service is 
certainly laudable. However, neither the (ostensible) education of its members 
nor its (randomly recruited) staff promise any spectacular results. With an 
institutional framework that by definition does not secure any protection 
either for witnesses or victims of such incidents other than their expulsion, 
many of our interviewees sense that this office mainly responds to the needs of 
good publicity, rather than to any honest attempt at persecuting racist crime, 
which, by the way, is still denied as such by the Hellenic Police. And, naturally, 
the reason for this denial is not that such a crime does not exist, but that a large 
part of the Hellenic Police approves its motives. 
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1  Response by the Greek minister of health, A. Georgiades when he was asked by BBC 
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by Crisis-scape
Strange Encounters
7
M ap.crisis-scape.net is an online map of racist attacks with a focus on Athens, but also including incidents from the rest of Greece. The map was launched in the spring of 2013 and was created using Ushahidi, an 
open source content management system. It allows for anyone to submit an 
incident of racist attacks by adding the location, type and time of the attack, as 
well as additional information. Once submitted, each incident is then verified—
to the extent possible—by the crisis-scape research team, by seeking additional 
sources, before it is made public. Incidents can be added anonymously; only an 
email address is required, in order to clarify any details.
 A map of racist attacks could easily be read as another kind of a 
victimisation project, another representation of the suffering of migrants who 
attempt to enter Europe. This was one of the considerations when starting 
the map.crisis-scape.net project. Since the financial crisis hit Greece, some 
excellent independent blogs and sites as well as national and international 
media have been reporting stories on the rise of neo-fascism in the country1, 
the construction of new concentration camps2, mass arrests of migrants3, 
systematic violence by Golden Dawn and the police4, attacks by employers5 and 
exploitation by the agricultural sector6. Not wishing to reproduce these stories 
and add to the already large stream of information on this topic, the intention 
of the map has been to attempt a different type of representation of a situation 
that is at the same time over-represented and yet invisible. The visibility of the 
migrant is exactly what makes that person the target of mass arrests, just like 
in the Xenios Zeus operations. This visibility is also what makes it possible to 
criminalise an entire group, but, equally, that an entire group is victimised. 
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Each individual story of suffering becomes also a story of the defined group, but 
somehow, rather than producing a clearer understanding of the experience and 
of the conditions that give rise to this situation, these representations usually 
present us with two interpretation options: the migrant is either a victim or 
criminal; every new incident and new story can then only verify one or the 
other.
 A major critique of victimisation is therefore that it denies agency, 
turning a human being or a group of people into passive victims. But a far 
more important problem is that it obfuscates the political causes of a situation. 
Over the easter holidays this year, a delegation of police officers, led by the 
General Inspector of Immigration and Border Protection, visited the section 
of Amygdaleza concentration camp where minors are being held7. They 
brought with them boardgames, sweets and candy. It was reported that the 
minors held at the concentration camp offered them gifts in return: traditional 
easter candles that they had made themselves as part of “creative activities” 
they undertook at the camp—their products being additionally being offered 
for free, “pro-bono”, to a set of organisations and institutions. This strange 
encounter, where agents responsible for the capturing and incarceration 
of migrants engage in an act of reciprocal generosity with these very same 
people—minors held behind fences and barb-wire—somehow presents these 
actors as absolved from responsibility. Incarceration is represented as a natural 
condition for migrants, mass arrests are entirely normalised—a normalisation 
of suffering that extends across forms of representation to include even critical 
representation: The process of victimisation creates a strange of identification 
where the refugee and the migrant is associated with “a person who suffers”. 
A set of expectations about their behaviour as victims emerges, where is 
cooperation is assumed and enforced, and thankfulness for any charity actively 
produced, through for example these encounters.
 The image associated with this easter article was of a group of young 
men behind several layers of barbed wired fences. The imprisonment of these 
men and minors at Amygdaleza was neither questioned nor discussed in 
the article; it was assumed to be inevitable, despite a history of continuous 
resistance from those inside over the past years. Amygdaleza has been an 
infamous concentration camp ever since its construction in 2012. Resembling 
a high security prison, the camp has seen repeated breakout attempts, hunger 
strikes and riots8 against the conditions inside and against the fact that people 
are detained at the concentration camp for up to 18 months while awaiting 
deportation or rulings on their cases. Incarcerated and yet receiving gifts from 
the greek police, the minors are at one and the same time represented as both 
victims and criminals.
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The intention with the map is to insist that there is nothing normal about 
this situation. By inviting anyone to submit a report to the map, the aim is 
to contribute to the development of a network of solidarity that refuses the 
simultaneous criminalisation and victimisation of migration, since both these 
categories lead to the outright characterisation of a category of migrants in its 
entirety. Criminal or victim, both representations feed into current dominant 
discourses of detention and of the supposed necessity of concentration camps.
 The gathering and verification of data is a big challenge through, and 
even the broader network of NGOs of the Racist Violence Recording Network 
has faced difficulties in so doing—including lack of cooperation or outright 
hindrance by the police; the fact that many migrants are afraid of giving 
information because of their immigration status, or unwilling due to skepticism 
of whether it will improve their immediate situation; that the NGOs gathering 
the data are underfunded and overworked and the recording is an additional 
task that they do not always have the time nor capacity to carry; that the data is 
geographically biased, as it is dependent on the areas where the NGOs operate; 
and finally, that it can be tricky to prove that an attack is racially motivated 
when there are neither police records of racist violence nor court records, since 
hardly any cases make it that far. Yet the intention of the map is neither to 
arrive at exact numbers nor to engage in government advocacy—but rather, to 
provide a tool for networks of solidarity and action, and to make information 
openly available and accessible all over. For this reason, it is less important 
for each incident to be proven beyond doubt. The map therefore distinguishes 
between, but still carries information submitted by individuals, eye-witnesses, 
corporate and and independent media—in many instances including incidents 
that are not fully verified.
 It is important to understand that while it is visually quantitative and 
cumulative, the map does not aim for ultimate completeness on the data front. 
Instead of claiming to know exact numbers, exact locations and the extent of 
what is taking place, the intention is to act as a continuous record, gathering 
incidents in one place and in a visual format that can be understood and read 
by anyone, in a matter of seconds. Starting from the assumption, then, that 
fully comprehensive verified data will not be quite possible, the map’s main 
contribution is to provide a place to submit an incident, to have it publicly 
recorded and without putting oneself in danger. Its aim, then, is to provide 
an ongoing record and reference point to spread real-time information about 
attacks, their location and severity, preventing these from being lost in the 
continuous flow of news stories and information. Fundamentally, the map aims 
to be a vehicle and tool for solidarity and action, rather than the production of 
pity or gratitude.
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A thens, 1963. A vibrant city, cosmopolitan city, a city full of tensions, rumblings of revolution, or at least a sense that people were beginning to have enough of the right-wing rulers who had been pushed into 
government by the powers that be in the 1950s—by the USA mostly, which 
was following the Truman Doctrine, trying to ensure strong, conservative 
government to prevent the communists getting in (Clogg 1986: 137-140). 
But it was not only the Americans; others had an interest in Greece, whether 
that interest was based on romantic ideals, cold war ideologies, or realpolitik. 
It was an edgy space in 1963, one that had been built, in its modernist guise, 
on a tangle of partly contradictory, and thoroughly cosmopolitan, aims and 
ambitions. Bastéa (Bastea 2000) says the core architecture of Athens built 
during the 19th century reflects a mixture of transnational and nationalist 
ideals of what Greece and the Greeks should be, and it would be interesting to 
ask, today, in the 21st century in the midst of crisis, whether those ideals were 
ever realised in any meaningful sense. Yalouri, who closely studied the variety 
of uses to which the Acropolis has been put, both symbolically and otherwise, 
also noted the strongly transnational influence on Athens, from the moment 
of Greek independence right up to the present day (Yalouri 2001). Many others 
have said the same about the whole country. Athens is a transnational city 
par excellence—which is to say that transnational political interests have had 
exceptional levels of involvement in the way the Greek state has developed over 
the decades. That holds today as well, but the way in which that involvement, or 
interference some might say, has manifested itself, is rather different now. But 
I am getting ahead of myself.
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I arrived in Athens in 1963 at the age of two, with my English family: father, 
mother and two older brothers. There were many foreigners like us there at the 
time: people who somehow felt a little uncomfortable in their own country, 
whether for social, political, economic or legal reasons. Such people often found 
their way to Athens. It was not an easy city, but it was easy enough to exist there 
as a foreigner without too many questions being asked. Athenians were used 
to foreigners, transients who came and went, and who lived mysterious lives 
doing who knows what. Nobody much cared, really. Certainly not the police or 
any government types.
 Even during the military regime of 1967-74, there was not much 
interest in these transient migrants, the people passing through, or even settling 
in, for a time. That included the poor migrants as well as the more wealthy 
and highly educated political refugees and ex-patriots (note that wealthier 
migrants are usually called ex-patriots). The Greek authorities owed nothing to 
these foreigners, who knew better than to expect anything from the Greek state 
in any case; the foreigners in those days were really a matter of indifference 
in all senses of the word. So long as they were not committing crimes, and in 
particular, selling drugs or getting up to any other kind of behaviour defined 
as troublesome by the Greek police, foreigners were allowed to just exist in 
Athens, and do what they liked. That is not what the law said, of course; it is not 
what the bureaucratic system required, either; but it’s how people lived. It was 
even relatively easy to live without the right visas and other paperwork. So long 
as you did not get in the way of anybody powerful, life went on.
 My family first stayed in Piraeus in 1963, for a few months before we 
moved to the island of Lesvos for several years. Piraeus, as Renée Hirschon 
richly reported in her ethnography, Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe—a book title 
that may well be needed again for another population of Greeks in the coming 
years of the 21st century—was one amongst many areas in and around Athens 
that had experienced a huge influx of refugees from the Asia Minor crisis in the 
1920s (Hirschon 1989). Prosfiges. That was the period when the Greek word 
for ‘refugees’ began to carry particular weight and significance in the country. 
As Hirschon records on the first page of her ethnography, land was put aside 
for these refugees in the outskirts of Athens and in Piraeus. These people were 
officially defined as ‘coming home’, in a sense: Greek Orthodox peoples sent 
to Greece when the Ottoman empire, their former home, ceased to exist, as 
a place. But as Hirschon also records, Greece felt foreign to the newcomers, 
and they confronted significant levels of prejudice. This was not for the first 
time, of course: Bastéa reminds us (Bastea 2000: 21), as do both James Faubion 
and Michael Herzfeld in different ways (Herzfeld 1986; Faubion 1993), that 
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in the early period of the Greek state in the 19th century, there were heated 
disagreements about who counted as a Greek and who did not, which was based 
as much on how recently people had migrated to Greece, and what part they 
played in the war of Independence, as it did on any concepts of blood or soil. The 
1920s arrivals were something of a repetition, then, of migrants who are, to a 
greater or lesser degree, Greeks.
 That 1920s period marked two things about the relation between 
Athens and migrants. The first is that it established a material, embodied link 
between the city and other parts of the world, as well as between the city and 
transnational organizations such as the League of Nations, which oversaw the 
compulsory movement of populations between Turkey and Greece (Hirschon 
2003). And second, it established a social context in which strangers arrived in 
the city in very large numbers, all at once. The sheer quantity of people was a 
major characteristic of the migration during that period. Much the same is also 
true today: a perception of the sheer numbers of the new arrivals to Athens, 
particularly of people who have no safe place to go, has taken many people’s 
breath away.
 Of course, a crucial difference between the 1920s mass migration and 
the current period is that in the 1920s, the influx of population was carried 
out by transnational agencies as an official policy agreed within the Lausanne 
Convention of 1923, which had the explicit aim of exchanging large portions 
of Orthodox and Muslim populations between the new Greek and Turkish 
territories. In the current period, there are no coordinated transnational policies 
that are intended to move populations from one place to another. Rather, there 
is a post-Bretton Woods chaotic scramble for resources and power, an ongoing 
battle, just about everywhere in the world. Some people call that chaos the 
outcome and clear logic of neoliberalism (and in anthropology, Chris Gregory 
and David Graeber are two of the better known ones who call it that) (Graeber 
2011; Gregory 1997). This neoliberal, no holds barred, scramble for resources 
has created multiple regions in the world where life has become so harsh, either 
because of ongoing violent conflicts or because of extreme lack of resources 
or opportunities, that people are driven out to look for something else, some 
way to survive. Many of them head for Europe. And as an outcome of a range 
of border control programs deployed in recent years around the outer edges of 
the European Union, the vast majority of undocumented people trying to enter 
the EU from these troubled places have been trying to enter through Greece 
over the last five or six years. The majority of those people end up in Athens, 
one way or another, at least for a time. As in the 1920s, the sheer numbers of 
migrants has made it feel like a crisis, piled up on top of the financial crisis. And 
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the media helps to encourage that sense, reporting it as a crisis within a crisis. 
The European Union has made the migration crisis worse in Greece, many say, 
through its Dublin II Agreement, which requires undocumented migrants to be 
returned to the country of first entry into the EU.
 Unsurprisingly then, the majority of the Greek border police have 
been deployed in Athens in recent years, for that is where the migrants are. 
It is not really possible to fully patrol the borders at the edges of the territory, 
neither in the Evros region in the northern mainland, nor the multiple areas of 
access to Greek territory by the sea. Even with the additional work of Frontex, 
that EU-commissioned border security organization which carries out various 
operations at the edges of the EU’s territories, huge numbers of undocumented 
travellers still make it onto Greek territory. In truth, most of them do not think 
of it as Greek territory, but as EU territory. That does not matter to the people 
in the Greek population who regard the issue as an ‘invasion’ of foreigners on 
their national land, but it does matter in understanding what kind of border 
work is being done in trying to manage this influx of people: it involves the 
management of a transnational border (an EU border) that has had pressure 
put upon it by peoples driven out of their own places by the chaos created by 
a political economy that has little respect for borders of any kind—political, 
social, environmental, economic. In any case, both for political and pragmatic 
reasons, the border police have to be in Athens, and have to look like they are 
doing something.
 It was different in Athens a few years ago, in 2008, just before the 
financial crisis changed things dramatically. In Syntagma square in August 
2008, the police were the ones who dealt with the undocumented migrants. 
They were dressed like police as well, rather than dressing like armed military, 
and there were not very many of them. The illegal traders would put out their 
stalls to sell their goods—handbags, umbrellas, children’s toys, cigarette 
lighters, household crockery and cutlery, all kinds of things. And the Athenians 
would browse these stalls, looking to see if there was anything interesting in 
amongst all these things that were made in China and arrived into the hands of 
the migrants, who were not from China, by mysterious routes. Then the police 
would arrive, the traders would pack up within 20 seconds and run away at high 
speed. When the police were gone, the traders would come back, and the whole 
thing would be repeated again in a little while when the police patrol returned.
 That’s how it was just five years ago. It’s hard to remember Syntagma 
square in that way now. Omonia was a little harsher, there were already quite 
a few tensions developing there, and in Exarheia too. But the harshness with 
which the border police now deal with the issue is something else again: an 
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order of magnitude different from the earlier period to such a degree that it 
has become a different kind of phenomenon. The cat-and-mouse game of 
2008 allowed a mutual recognition that everyone involved had a job to do. The 
dynamic in more recent years seems to be based on no recognition at all: the 
perceived sheer scale of the problem has made it impossible, it seems, to see 
any of the people involved in it as people. They are migrants or they are border 
guards, and neither category appears to recognize the other one as anything 
other than a category.
 Everyone knows it is not only the borders guards who are confronting 
the more recent migrants. Members of Golden Dawn are out on patrol regularly, 
wearing their uniforms that echo and borrow from the military style of past 
dictatorships. They go out in order to defend Greece and the Greeks, they say; 
they go out in order to ‘sort out’ the migrants, as an act of patriotism. Except for 
their tendency to valorize violence, they remind me of Harel Shapira’s account 
of the Minutemen of Arizona, in his book, Waiting for José (Shapira 2013). 
The Minutemen (named after the men who needed to be ready in a minute to 
defend America in the earlier period of that country’s history) are patrolling 
the US-Mexican border on behalf of their country, they say. The Minutemen 
(some of whom are actually women) are unpaid, unofficial, and their aim is 
to stop migrants from crossing into the United States. Shapira points out in 
his ethnography that many of the Minutemen are much like the rest of the 
population in their political and social views; the difference is not nearly as 
sharp as some of us would like to believe. A similar point was made by Douglas 
Holmes about the growth of the far right in Europe, in his book, Integral 
Europe (Holmes 2000). The reasons that the police, border guards and general 
population end up being harshly prejudiced against people who have left deeply 
troubled parts of the world and come to Europe in search of something better, 
is not a straightforward matter. It is full of moral, social, economic, and political 
knots and tangles that makes it actually quite difficult to disentangle from 
ourselves, to keep ourselves separate from it. Edward Said suggested a long 
time ago (in Orientalism) (Said 1991) that many ideologies have a tendency 
to avoid confronting the negative, dark, side of ourselves by ascribing those 
characteristics to others, to the ones we can legitimately condemn for being 
in some way lacking—usually morally, but perhaps in other ways as well—for 
example, having some deficiencies in modernity or education. Of course, the 
ignorance of prejudice and bigotry must be challenged whenever and wherever 
possible; but there is an equal responsibility to examine whether elements of 
that ignorance and prejudice reappear in the way that the bigotry is challenged. 
It’s a knotty issue.
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Besides the battles going on in the streets and in the ‘no-go’ areas of Athens, 
the areas that ‘decent people’ would never go, there are also other places where 
the migrants can be found, behind closed doors and away from the gaze of 
the heavily armed border guards. For example, there are care workers of all 
kinds working in the homes of the people who possess more money than time. 
Those migrants are protected by their patrons, some say; others say they are 
something between prisoners and slaves, having replaced their own family and 
home for somebody else’s, in the hopes of sending money back and making 
things better for the next generation. Those people might get out on a Sunday 
afternoon, to breath a little in the park, but not always. They are an invisible 
small army, keeping things going in Athens, despite everything else falling to 
pieces. In focusing on what happens in the streets between border guards and 
migrants, the less eye-catching aspects should not be forgotten.
Concluding remarks
There are three main points about this situation with migrants in Athens that 
this short intervention is trying to make.
First: it is not the first time there has been the sudden arrival of large numbers 
of people from elsewhere in this city. Deeper historical comparisons would be 
worth making. Both in the past and in the present, particular forms of relations 
and separations with other parts of the world are as important in understand 
what is going on with migration in Athens as studying the events in Athens 
itself.
Second: one distinctive aspect of the migration on this occasion is that it is part 
of a particular form of political economy, which some call neoliberalism, that is 
nowhere near as focused or organized in its movement of populations from one 
place to another as previous political and economic interventions have been.
Third: the scale of the arrival of migrants in Athens is a key element of the 
current perception of it as a ‘crisis’. This has also changed the nature of the 
border guards’ response, as well as increasing its scale.
Finally: the implication of all of this is that the borders being both crossed and 
policed in this situation are different in quality from the 20th century model 
of state borders for quite some time. In particular, it is one example of how 
different parts of the world are entangled with one another (knotted, meshed) 
rather than being separate entities that are interrelated.
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y learning how to live in the spaces and at the times of crisis, we also 
learn how to communicate about it in specific ways. All sorts of discourses 
around the crisis and its idioms are being produced today; discourses that 
not only impose contents, but also point at forms of thought around its causes 
and its overcoming alike. Forms allured by mega-narratives—which rush to 
draw the limits of acceptable meaning-assignment. Within an environment 
that controls the terms of any question-setting, the invention of forms and 
contents which aim, for this reason, to focus elsewhere, is rendered even more 
challenging and demanding. Nevertheless this change of focus, as Dina Vaiou 
points out, does not mean amplification or diminution of the subject itself; it means 
a change of view about it. And the present section attempts to open up space to 
thoughts on this precise shift.
 Having already undergone some years of tough readjustment, it slowly 
becomes evident that the crisis can nowadays be seen not as some violent 
interruption, but as a structural component of (neo)liberal governmentality; 
as part, in other words, of a political and economic rationality able—as Akis 
Gavriilidis assures us—to capitalise on ostensible ruptures and discontinuities. A 
rationality that comprises, according Giorgos Tsimouris, a particular interweaving 
of representations and interventions. In the case of the Greek particularity, the crisis 
and its management are constituted as a framework of mainstream discourses 
and as a plexus of power relations on the basis of some urgency that nevertheless 
acquires elements of permanence. And so, in this state of permanent emergency 
formed by the still-relentless crisis, policies of (neo)liberal governance take much 
more aggressive forms; forms that are normalised, to a great extent, signifying a 
structural shift in terms of processes of subjectification.
 At the margins of the “big pictures” put together by the obscure macro-
economic discourses, an everyday framework is constituted that intensifies class, 
gendered and racial divisions—and which exacerbates the conditions of precarity, 
rendering entire populations vulnerable. As Athina Athanasiou suggests, the 
contemporary techniques of neoliberal governing—as crisis management 
techniques—bring forth the ways in which subjects are interpellated into crisis 
politics as subjects of vulnerability and precariousness. In the everydayness of urban 
space, indications of the crisis are articulated more explicitly through forms of 
life and embodied subjects that gradually sink into obscurity and are sentenced 
to exclusion. It therefore becomes clear that the comprehension of the idioms of 
the crisis and its city can only be attained through a discussion around visibility; 
around the visibility of the power relations that rearrange meanings, the visibility 
of the vulnerable embodied subjects and the tangible visibility of their resistance.
B
Between Invisibility and Precarity 
Section Opening
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Laissez Faire, Security, and Liberalism: 
Revisiting December 2008
9
I n December 2008, Athens became world news for the first time in recent years, for a reason that was soon overshadowed by the financial and debt crisis that came immediately after. I think it would be useful to revisit this 
event now, when it is not so loaded any more in terms of public attention and 
affect.
 This reason was a totally unpredicted, contingent event: the pointless 
murder of a youngster by a policeman, which sparked a wave of massive and 
angry protests for several days in Athens—including in neighbourhoods where 
no demonstrations had ever taken place in living memory—as well as in all 
major Greek cities, and several minor ones. These consisted in mass rallies, 
mainly by equally young people with no previous experience in social protest, 
occupation of public buildings, “sieges” of police stations, but also considerable 
damage on private property and some looting of shops by the demonstrators 
and/ or others. The difficulty to tell a demonstrator from an “other” was 
precisely an important part of the whole picture, as no political or other body 
or organisation had made any official call for these protests. But this does not 
mean they were “spontaneous” in the usually pejorative sense that this term 
has in the left-wing tradition; many of these actions displayed a high degree 
of efficiency, accurate coordination, and organisational skills. But they were 
prepared, and performed, by a subject-non subject; a subject that did not pre-
exist, it came to being through this very action, only to dissipate and vanish 
afterwards. This dissipation was not the mark of a lack or a failure, but rather 
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formed a constitutive part of the mobilisations from their inception. This 
punctual and circumstantial existence was their only possible form of existence.
What I would like to focus on, though, is a specific aspect concerning the 
response—or lack of it—by the Greek state to these events. 
 In the beginning, the state-controlled (or -affiliated) mass media tried to 
conceal, or misrepresent/ downplay, the event. Soon, as this became impossible 
due to the circulation of the news through the social media, government officials, 
including the Public Order minister and then the Prime Minister Karamanlis, 
tried to appease protests by showing their “understanding” and promising that 
the perpetrators would be arrested and justice would be administered. (Which, 
incidentally, was indeed the case eventually: the killer was condemned to life 
imprisonment, two years later). Almost most importantly, the Chairman of the 
Piraeus Chamber of Commerce, when asked by a journalist what he was thinking 
about the lootings and whether these would have a catastrophic impact on the 
market, replied that “human life is more important than commercial goods”. 
 Of course, what contributed to such magnanimous stance was possibly 
the tactics that the Karamanlis government opted for: they instructed the 
police not to use excessive force or try to totally clampdown the protests, or 
even prevent lootings, and they subsequently compensated shop holders with 
state budget funds for all the damages they had suffered.
 This is a typical liberal tactics. Possibly, it is a liberal-Western “reading” 
of a typical Eastern and, more particularly, Chinese idea. It is useful to 
remember here that François Quesnay, the leading figure of the Physiocrats, 
was also called “the Confucius of Europe” in his time.
 “Laissez-faire” [Let people do], in the first place, was not specifically a 
motto in favour of free market or private entrepreneurship as opposed to the 
state’s economic activity, but concerned in general the way the state should 
react to crises in order to ensure security.
 In this respect, we could refer to some remarks on this notion by 
Giorgio Agamben (who explicitly invokes Foucault’s analyses on the birth of 
liberalism):
If we take the concept of security, which is so much talked about today and 
which is almost the slogan of Western governments, this is a term derived 
from the concept of state of exception: security is “public salvation”. But here, 
Michel Foucault showed very nice which is the origin of this concept: he showed 
in his lectures that security as a technique of governance was introduced by the 
physiocrats on the eve of the French Revolution. What was the problem of 
the time? It was famines; how to avoid the occurrence of famine. Until then, 
Laissez faire, security and liberalism
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people had never thought in this way; they collected cereal beforehand, etc. The 
physiocrats had this perhaps ingenious idea: we will no longer seek to avoid 
famines. We will let them happen, but then we will be ready to govern them, to 
orient, to ensure they go towards a right direction.
  The basic idea [of Western governments] is rather “we will let 
disasters, riots, happen, or even we will help them happen, because this 
will allow us to intervene and govern them towards the right direction”. For 
example, American politics for twenty years is clearly this: it never prevents 
the appearance of disorder, destruction, instead it helps to produce them, 
but afterwards tries to benefit from them in order to direct them towards 
“security”.
  We need to bear this in mind: governments today do not aim at 
maintaining order, but at managing disorder.
(Giorgio Agamben, interview—in French—to the Greek TV channel 
ET3; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2lpRltPG2AY, my translation)
In this sense, the Greek state reacted to this contingent and unpredictable crisis 
by first letting people do, and subsequently trying to turn their doing in its 
favour, to capitalise on the movement and the exodus of people. 
 I think it would be useful to ask oneself whether this is a general 
pattern of the action of states during the last decades, and even earlier, and, 
if this is the case, to what extent this leads us to reconsider the relationship 
between the political and the economic. 
 According to a conventional view, shared or used even by some of its 
proponents, neoliberalism consists in “less state” (it being usually understood 
mainly as “less state intervention in the economy”). This, in turn, gave rise to a 
whole series of criticisms that try to reveal the hypocrisy of neoliberalism, in so 
far as it limits itself to the “economy” and does not extend this “reduction” of 
the state to the police and the repressive apparatuses as well.
 The example of the Greek December 2008 does not seem to confirm 
this simplistic dichotomy.
 The tactics of the Greek state as regards shop lootings, described above, 
does not exactly consist in “less state”. The state is not a substance, whose 
presence can be increased or decreased at will. It is a relationship, an action 
upon actions. Which means it can occasionally consist in a withdrawal, and/ or 
a redeployment of these forces; a de-territorialisation and reterritorialisation. 
But, in this example, both the “political” and the “economic” are present in each 
of the two spaces (the one from which state forces withdrew from, and the one 
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they moved to). Karamanlis did not abandon an “economic” space in order to 
move to a “repressive” one (or vice versa); he undertook certain actions in view 
of a specific assemblage, a situation combining elements of both “politics” and 
“economy”—and, of course, language, communication, and affect, which are 
elements crucial for both of these domains. He did not only make a decision 
settling a private debt, but also a gesture admitting the existence of a public 
one. By compensating merchants for damages that it did not (directly/ visibly) 
induced, the Greek state was making an oblique statement that it recognized 
its responsibility for the murder of Grigoropoulos, giving a “coded message” 
to appease protesters, and, at the same time, with the same move, was trying 
to use the force and the action of the protesters, and the fear it could create to 
the “forces of the market”, in order to “re-launch the economy”, to reassure the 
small-and-medium enterprise holders that it cares about them and won’t let 
them down.
 In addition to the above, it would be also useful to reflect on the 
action—or lack of it—from the part of the people themselves on the basis of 
this example. 
 In the leftwing-antiauthoritarian tradition, (and in Greece even more 
so), the fact that power is able to manage the people’s affect, communication, 
movement, and exodus, was always a source of embarrassment, deep concern, 
even despair; and then, at a second level, a source of mutual accusations and 
contests between radical political groups on who is the most radical. Any 
capture of a popular mobilisation by capital and state is universally read as 
evidence that this mobilisation was “not the real thing”; it was insufficient, 
not well prepared, with a low level of revolutionary theory or organisation, its 
leaders were petty-bourgeois, if not outright traitors who sold off, so we have 
to draw our lessons and next time try to do better.
 This is the horror of “co-optation”, for which in Greek anti-
establishment parlance we use the much abhorred term “ενσωμάτωση”, 
(literally “incorporation”), which marks the irrevocable defeat and extinction 
of any contestation and any anti-systemicity, using the metaphor of recipients 
where bodies are enclosed successfully in their totality without any traces, 
without rests. 
 Such accusations were indeed voiced by certain groups from the left, 
but even from conservative mainstream journalists and commentators, against 
the December protests, and were repeated even more strongly for the case of the 
“Aganaktismenoi” [The Indignant Ones] protesting at Syntagma square a couple 
of years later, and also for the Occupy movement, the Arab springs, etc. Either 
with disappointment or with malignant irony, modernists were very eloquent 
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in enumerating the lacks of such primitive, naïve and irrational manifestations 
of the multitude which had no clear political goals and no hierarchy of priorities 
or set of concrete demands. 
 The point I want to suggest is that this apparently anecdotal, 
fragmentary, non-strategic character of the movements of the multitude is not 
an accidental lack or an imperfection that could or should be “corrected”. It 
is here to stay; it probably was always here. There will always be something 
lacking, and there will never be a perfectly organised, comprehensive action 
of the masses that will take hold of the state and definitely redress all its 
wrongdoings.
 Approaching the movement of people as de-territorialisation could 
be a useful antidote to the paralysing despair and low self-esteem caused by 
the fear of “ensomàtosi”. Precisely this perceived lack is at the same time the 
reason why “incorporation” is never perfect: in the same way, there is always 
something left out of the recipient, something exceeding, or missing, or both; 
and this discrepancy is what makes new actions possible.
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by Athena Athanasiou
Governing For the Market: Emergencies 
and Emergences in Power and Subjectivity 
10
T
States of crisis 
he state of crisis as a mode of neoliberal governmentality raises difficult 
questions about the links between precariousness and action, shame 
and solidarity, dispossession and intimacy. More specifically, it compels 
a consideration of how precariousness might shape political action, how a 
sense of shame might (or might not) trigger practices of solidarity, and how 
dispossession might (or might not) become the occasion for re-imagined and 
re-activated intimacies. Current regimes of neoliberal governing through 
crisis management bring forth the (economized, but also gendered, sexed, 
and racialized) subject as a performative political arena of vulnerability 
and precariousness. They also bring forth the ways in which subjects are 
interpellated into crisis politics as subjects of vulnerability and precariousness. 
 In this context of crisis discourse, new configurations of crisis and 
critique are emerging with reference to questions of what counts as crisis 
and how critical responses are articulated. In other words, the question of 
thinking critically in times of crisis emerges and persists. This question(ing) 
also involves taking into consideration that critique is always already in crisis, 
as it pertains to interrogating the terms which determine what counts as an 
ontological claim. Thus, critique is about provoking crisis to established truth 
claims, including the truth claims of crisis. 
 In this sense, I suggest that we consider Judith Butler’s engagement 
with Michel Foucault’s well-known essay “What is critique?”. They both pose the 
question of critique with reference to forces of subjectivation, self-formation, 
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and de-subjugation. Foucault writes: “Critique will be the art of voluntary 
insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially 
ensure the de-subjugation [désassujettissement] of the subject in the context of 
what we would call, in a word, the politics of truth.”1 And Judith Butler responds 
thus: “But if that self-forming is done in disobedience to the principles by which 
one is formed, then virtue becomes the practice by which the self forms itself 
in de-subjugation, which is to say that it risks its deformation as a subject, 
occupying that ontologically insecure position which poses the question anew: 
who will be a subject here, and what will count as a life, a moment of ethical 
questioning which requires that we break the habits of judgment in favor of a 
riskier practice that seeks to yield artistry from constraint.”2 To echo Butler’s 
formulation, I would like to argue that what is at stake in current regimes of 
crisis is precisely a contested domain where subjects “risk their deformation 
as subjects”, “occupy ontologically insecure positions”, and, at the same time, 
“yield artistry from constraint”. In this text, I propose to explore current 
neoliberal governmentality as a distinct assemblage of power, knowledge, and 
subjectivity. 
Biopolitics and governmentality of crisis 
The current regimes of crisis provide the grounds for a critical re-engagement 
with, and a critical re-imagining of, who counts as part of the public; how the 
political is performed; how and where it “takes place”; what qualifies as political 
subjectivity, and how it is gendered, racialized, and classed; how are bodies 
subjugated and de-subjugated in these times of neoliberal governmentality and 
precarization? 
 In light of this questioning, I argue that neoliberalism is not just a mode 
of capitalist financialization in the strict sense, but rather a more encompassing 
regime of truth and a more diffuse matrix of social intelligibility, which includes 
particular modalities of power, subjectivation, governance, self-governance, and 
self-formation. Such modalities take the interwoven forms of biopolitical (self-)
management, self-interested and competitive individualization, securitization, 
responsibilization, a reconfigured relation between public and private, and a 
particular logic of economy and the market. 
 As “crisis” becomes a complex assemblage of power relations which 
both manage life and expose to death, the “state of exception”, which is usually 
deployed to signify the element of emergency at the heart of the normative 
administrative discourses of crisis, proves to be not exceptional but rather 
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ordinary, systematic, canonical, and foundational. The normative terms of 
subjectivity emerging from such configuration are defined by exclusionary 
norms of gender, capital, and nation. It is through such (un)exceptional forces 
of power and subjectivation that crisis becomes the production of life and death 
as economic and political currency, as an economic and political ontology of 
life-and-death itself. 
 In the analytics of biopower developed by Michel Foucault, if 
sovereignty seeks to rule on death, biopolitics is about administering “life” 
through managing surplus populations. In Security, Territory, Population, 
Foucault suggests that liberalism is the paradigmatic mode of governmentality 
for the exercise of biopolitics. Liberal forms of governing, contrary to the 
police-like political doctrines of Raison d’État, entail a limiting of the power of 
the state. The role of the state and state institutions is to ensure and safeguard 
the pervasive functions of the market. As Foucault writes: “One must govern 
for the market, not because of the market” (Birth of Biopolitics, p. 121). 
 In this context, one must account for and critically engage the 
significant trajectories in Foucault’s method from the introduction of the 
concept as an aspect of his engagement with the problem of sexuality in The 
History of Sexuality (1976) and, especially, from a more totalizing treatment 
of biopolitics as a modern configuration of power in Society Must Be Defended 
(1976) to the lectures of 1978 (Security, Territory, Population) and 1979 (Birth 
of Biopolitics), where different co-present modes, structures, and techniques of 
power (i.e., the disciplinary, the juridical, security, population) are presented 
in their hierarchical correlations, re-articulations and transformations. In 
Security, Territory, Population, biopolitics is interrelated with questions of 
governmentality (the linking of governing [“gouverner”] and modes of thought 
[“mentalité”] and what Foucault calls “apparatuses of security”; in fact, 
biopolitics tends to be analytically displaced by the idea of “governing” and the 
organized practices (mentalities, rationalities, and techniques) through which 
subjects are governed. In this text, Foucault addresses the “pre-eminence over 
all other types of power—sovereignty, discipline, and so on—of the type of 
power that we can call ‘government’” (STP, p. 108). In The Birth of Biopolitics, 
Foucault seems to deploy governmentality to signify power relations in general. 
In this text, he continues to pursue the theme of a governmental rationality 
which seeks maximum effectiveness (in mastering life) by governing less, and 
focuses on a detailed analysis of the forms of this liberal governmentality, 
including the role of neoliberalism in twentieth century politics. 
 So in order to deal with the multiplicity of directions in Foucault’s 
work on biopolitics and his closely connected discussions of governmentality, 
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it is important to account for the ways in which biopolitics, in the form of a 
crisis-oriented normalization, gives the ground for today’s re-articulation 
and re-configuration of governmentality. This perspective runs counter to 
a teleological conceptualization of governmentality as a form of rule which 
gradually displaces those technologies of power, namely sovereignty and 
discipline, that are considered archaic, more “repressive”, “authoritarian”, 
“irrational, and “uneconomic” than governmental technologies. In this light, 
neoliberal rationalities and techniques of power involve an articulation between 
“productive” and “destructive” aspects of power, discipline and freedom, choice 
and competition, authoritarianism and self-determination, subjectivation and 
subjection.
 Neoliberal governmentality denotes an authoritative apparatus of 
producing dispensable and disposable populations, and, at the same time, 
producing and demarcating the normative codes of the human by regulating 
the (economic) vitality, affectivity, potentiality, embodiment, vulnerability 
and livability of subjects. Within the purview of this governmentality, the 
biopolitical imaginary and administration of life and death is reinvented, 
revitalized, and reconfigured, as resources and vulnerability are differently 
and unevenly distributed among different bodies—differently economized, 
racialized, and gendered bodies. 
 Thus, in the Greek neoliberal context of plurality of power 
technologies, steep economic disparities and deprivation, the normalization 
of poverty and the widespread condition of precarity are combined with, and 
supplemented by, various forms of securitization, such as tightened migration 
policies, the abjection of undocumented immigrants, as well as an intensified 
politics of racism, sexism and homophobia. Economic hardship and austerity 
measures required under the bailout, loss of jobs, pay cuts, disposable labour, 
unemployment, pension reductions, poverty, evictions, loss of dignity, and 
the dissolution of the public healthcare system are attended by an overall 
authoritarianism: emergency legislation is deployed to curtail rights; a 
citizenship law repeals citizenship rights for second-generation migrants and 
increases the number of years of residence and schooling that the children 
of immigrants need to prove before they are eligible to apply for citizenship; 
governmental invocation of an emergency law and the “threat of civil disorder” 
forces strikers back to work; the Health Minister targets HIV-positive women 
as a “public health bomb”; and the police detains trans people in order to “clean 
and beautify the city”. 
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Emergency politics, emergent politics 
As crisis management turns into a crucial mode of neoliberal governance 
through a political and moral economy of life itself, at the same time, new 
radical movements are emerging in different parts of the world as well as 
different topologies where these movements are being performed. As people are 
forcefully relegated by the market logic to subjugated subjects and disposable 
bodies with no rights, new modes of agonistic embodied citizenship have been 
emerging, through which challenges to neoliberal policies have been posed. 
 Crisis becomes an arena in which different forms of publicness are 
enacted and negotiated. As emergent subjectivities, affective communities, 
and spaces of non-compliance take shape in various multilayered city-scapes 
of crisis, different forms of civic protest address a range of concerns including 
austerity, the privatization and corporatization of public space, poverty, 
precarity, social injustice, and state authoritarianism.
 In this sense, as present neoliberal regimes increasingly expose to 
death, through differential exposure to the injuries of poverty, demoralization, 
and racism, a performative politics of protest emerges, one which mobilizes the 
radical potentiality of transforming such injurious interpellations. Assembled 
bodies in the street, but also in various collectivities and alternative networks 
of solidarity (often organized in ways alternative to the archetype of the heroic 
activist), reclaim the unconditionality of public space, demanding a democracy 
with demos, and enacting a demos with differences. 
 The tension between, on the one side, the differential distribution 
and regulation of the terms of precariousness as an instrument of neoliberal 
governmentality and, on the other side, the struggle to reclaim the terms of 
a livable life without erasing vulnerability is precisely what I would like to call 
“precarious intensity”. Precarious intensity implies an agonistic (instead of 
antagonistic) way of attending to vulnerability; an agonistic engagement which 
often takes place within a contested public space, or within a contested realm 
of embodying public space. 
 The state of crisis, where people are (differentially) faced with 
economic dispossession, the political violence of authoritarianism, and a state 
of deadly living, has inspired a philosophical critique of neoliberalism based on 
a theoretical reconsideration of Foucault’s conception of biopolitics, especially 
its emphasis on making live and letting die. But how might we rethink 
biopolitics as a performative resource for agonistic political engagement and 
contestation? How might we think together a politics of emergency and a 
politics of emergence?3 And, to further complicate this line of inquiry, how 
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should we reconsider this question taking into consideration that “emergence” 
is also one of the administrative, managerial, and affective modes deployed by 
neoliberal governance? 
 The figure of the emergent resonates with Jacques Derrida’s notion 
of arrivant, as a disposition to the other, and an openness to what lies 
outside of oneself. In this regard, it indicates the moment of the possibility 
of an impossibility: a radical transformation of the social and political (rather 
than merely economic) ontologies upon which neoliberal governmentality is 
founded. Taking up such line of investigation would help make us attentive 
to the manifold, plural, and contradictory ways in which “emergence” might 
signify and complicate the unexpected, the dissonant, and the subversive; how 
it could be reclaimed by an aporetic ethics and poetics and thus be activated as 
a trans-formative critique of the fixed totality and propriety inherent in states 
of emergency that structure and regulate our present governmentality.
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From Invisibility into the Centre of the 
Athenian Media Spectacle: 
Governmentality and Immigration in the Era Of Crisis
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I nvisibility of a certain part of the population may be seen as a preliminary stage to scapegoating, which is what happened to immigrants living in the centre of Athens before the crisis. And yet, they were never entirely 
absent from media or public discourse, as they were regularly portrayed 
to be the problem for the city—a hygienic threat, an non-assimilable and 
therefore dangerous population, ‘a matter out of place’ at best. Even if these 
representations were far from unknown before the crisis, they have multiplied, 
intensified and become more aggressive in the past five years.
 My aim in this paper is to explore and to problematise this 
transformation, which concerns the official representations of immigrants, 
arguing that the management of immigration during crisis sought to ease, to 
comfort and to disorient indigenous anxieties and phobias associated with 
extensive jobs losses and mass income reductions; with anxieties concerning the 
future of employment and with insecurity instigated by popular media around 
immigrant criminality in the city centre and in specific neighbourhoods—such 
as Aghios Panteleimon, Kypseli, Patissia and Omonoia.
 The classification of immigrants as ‘dangerous classes’, associated 
with criminality, is a commonly encountered practice of state policies in the 
history of international immigration. The classification particularly concerns 
immigrants as newcomers—those who are therefore seen to be inadequately 
integrated or assimilated. And yet, the ‘dangerous character’ of these classes 
seems to intensify in face of the shortage of employment opportunities in 
host societies. In the words of Zygmut Bauman, “[t]he new ‘dangerous classes’… 
are those recognized as unfit for reintegration and proclaimed to be unassimilable, 
since no useful function can be conceived for them to perform after ’rehabilitation’. 
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They are not just excessive, but redundant” (Bauman, 2007:69; emphasis in the 
original). Their supposed dangerous character is therefore directly connected 
to their redundancy in a society shaped by neo-liberal perceptions, in which 
unemployment is seen as some personal inefficiency rather than a structural 
characteristic of late financial capitalism.
 I draw on Foucault’s understanding of governmentality, according to 
which sovereignty does not directly activate mechanisms of power—but instead 
comprises “a set of actions or possible action… it facilitates something or makes 
it more difficult”. As he explains, the exercise of power lies more in the order 
of ‘governmentality’ rather than in direct conflict between two opponents; it 
primarily concerns the capability “to structure the possible field of the action 
of others”(Foucault, 1997: 92-93). For Foucault, power motivates, inducts, 
diverges—it makes something more or less difficult, it broadens or restricts, 
it makes something more or less probable: “it is an action over other actions” 
(ibid., 92).
 My main point is that from 2009 on, when the consequences of the so-
called Greek economic crisis became evident in the Greek society, immigrants 
were targeted with some renewed force by state institutions and mechanisms 
alike. By the term state, I hereby understand not merely the government and 
its related constitutional institutions, strictly defined; I adopt, instead, a broad 
notion of the state that may be summarised as the plexus formed by corporative 
interests, political institutions and the media.
 In his analysis of Foucault’s notion of ‘govermentality’, Thomas 
Lemke brings to the fore on the one hand specific forms of representations and 
on the other specific forms of interventions (Lemke, 2001: 191; emphasis in 
the original). Representation is inevitably a political act that constructs and 
creates a certain reality through the use of concepts, images, classifications and 
contextualisations—it is not merely some realistic reflection of a certain pre-
existing reality.
 In this respect, hegemonic representations have constructed 
immigrants—especially the undocumented between them—as some 
threatening, dangerous and un-assimilable group. While the misrepresentation 
of immigrants by the dominant media is far from a new story in Greece, in the time 
of crisis it became systematic and persistent. Images representing the centre of 
Athens as some deserted land, as a supposed result of high concentration of the 
immigrant population were projected regularly—and were directly associated 
with criminality and the insecurity of the indigenous population. The use of the 
term ‘illegal immigrants’ was dominant in these accounts, addressing not only 
those who crossed the borders without being allowed to do so, but also asylum 
seekers, refugees and unaccompanied children.
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These mental images were coupled by claims against the degradation of the city 
centre by the ‘invasion of foreigners’ and demands that Greece should no longer 
remain a ‘fence-less vineyard’, as the Greek saying would have it. Part of the 
same narrative was the fabricated increase in the number of ‘illegal immigrants’ 
and the shift in the dominant terms used to speak about them. Conservatives 
would demand an intensification of police patrols in specific Athenian 
neighbourhoods and more systematic police action as a whole. These were 
coupled by media debates featuring policy makers as guests—predominantly 
from the far-right. It was very rare to see any academics or researchers on 
migration be included in these debates. A rather common conclusion of these 
mediatic encounters was the urgency to oust immigrants from the city centre—
and to reoccupy public space in the name of its older, indigenous inhabitants, 
who were supposedly entitled to it, according to this approach.
 These acts of representation rationalized and made necessary the 
intervention of the police in the eyes of a significant part of the population—
which had been seeking a scapegoat for its present anxieties and hardships. Let 
us not forget that for Foucault, the act of exercising power is closely connected to 
processes of political rationalization and processes of subjectification alike. This 
media hysteria was therefore followed by some broad and extended operations 
of the Greek Police that undertook the task to ‘clear up’ and to sanitize the 
centre of Athens—in the language of their preceding media commentators. 
Public buildings and abandoned houses occupied by immigrants were evicted, 
streets and squares were ‘handed back’ the to the Greeks, always in that same 
language. In addition, these official state activities would significantly broaden 
the space for action and for murderous attacks by Golden Dawn and its neo-
Nazi members.
 One must also account, in these sanitization crusades, the persecution 
of immigrant sex workers working in the streets of Athens. In often-repeated 
media accounts, they have been presented as a ‘health bomb’ in the historic 
centre of Athens and as a threat to the life and the health of its native residents. 
Six days before the elections of 2012, some hundreds of women—many 
among them homeless and drug addicts—were detained all over the centre, 
as part of so-called police ‘sweeping’ operations, and were forced to undergo 
HIV health checks. These operations were orchestrated by the then Minister 
of Health, Andreas Loverdos, who would in several occasions argue in public 
that his intention had been to protect the ‘Greek family’ from a possible Aids 
contamination by HIV positive immigrant sex workers.
 Out of the great number women who were forced to be checked, only 
twelve were eventually found to be HIV positive; most of them were homeless 
and drug addicts—and one of them was under-age. Ten of them were of Greek 
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origin, one from Russia and one from Bulgaria. Even though the way in which 
this extensive ‘sweep’ operation took place provoked furious reactions between 
doctors, lawyers and activists—concerning evident law violations and the 
human rights of these women alike—the media presented the whole operation 
as a major success story for the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the 
Protection of the Citizen; and a proof of care for the Greek male sex clients 
and the Greek family alike. The aim of this operation was not, obviously, the 
medical treatment of these women—but rather, their persecution as criminals 
and their deportation from the country. It is also important to remember that 
the Minister of Health, Loverdos, argued on camera that “in order to face these 
issues we have to close the country’s doors to foreigners”.
 With the help of Lemke, we can locate at the core of neo-liberal 
rationality, “the strategy of rendering individual subjects ‘responsible’… for 
social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc.” as “problem(s) of 
‘self-care’ (Lemke, 2001: 9)—instead of the actual consequences of neo-liberal 
financial policies and structures that lie far beyond the reach or the control of 
individual subjects.
 An inter-cultural approach to the notion of the scapegoat reveals that—
despite different myths and understandings of its meaning across societies and 
cultures—there are certain universal principles underlying its social function 
from the point of view of governmentality. The scapegoat, an eccentric human 
being, an animal or a spirit, is charged for the sins, the misery, the anxiety or 
the epidemics of the community—and because of that, it is expelled from the 
community, killed or destroyed.
 For the purposes of govermentality, undocumented immigrants and 
refugees—the most precarious among them in particular—are ideal scapegoats 
of the late modernity, which is characterised by the extensive, compulsory 
movement of people. In short, the ways in which the crisis has been represented, 
justified and rationalized, has opened up the space for intervention by the 
repressive mechanisms of the state, lashing out against the most precarious 
groups: immigrant women, HIV positive or merely indigenous sex workers who 
are mentally constructed as immigrant HIV positive—as was the case in this 
recent occasion, in the build-up to the 2012 elections.
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I t is by now widely acknowledged that four years of implementing bailout agreements with the IMF, European Commission and the ECB have led to a deepening and multifaceted crisis in Greece. Recurrent memoranda and 
more or less extreme austerity programs do not seem to provide effective 
remedies. On the contrary, they lead to deep recession and social crisis, while 
the promised recovery is postponed to an unknown future. It seems that the 
small and peripheral Greek economy has provided an easier site for neoliberal 
experimentation on a number of frontal attacks: to demolish whatever there 
is of a welfare state and abolish workers’ rights, pension systems, wages and 
salaries, to reform an economy based on SMEs and self-employment and 
discredit informal practices of getting by, to attack the public sector and its 
tight links with family strategies, to marginalize democratic institutions and 
challenge national sovereignty1. 
 As the crisis deepens, lively and often conflictual debates take place 
among politicians and commentators across the political spectrum, with 
arguments which become “obsolete” very fast as the speed of local, European 
and international developments increases2. However, a dominant debate seems 
to consolidate, which focuses on the size of public debt, the re-capitalisation of 
banks, the probability of Grexit, the size and timing of a new loan installment 
etc. This macro-economic approach permits certain aspects of the crisis to 
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surface/occupy central ground while others are hidden or deemed peripheral 
and perhaps “luxury” concerns. Among these, questions of spatial scale or 
the diverging and unequal ways in which the crisis is lived in different regions 
and in particular places and most prominently cities, “where austerity bites, 
[h]owever, never equally” (Peck, 2012: 629). It is even more difficult to bring 
forward the “scale closest in”, i.e the concrete bodies that suffer/resist the 
policies of austerity, or to debate openly the growing appeal of ever more 
conservative attitudes which weave together xenophobia, sexism, homophobia, 
racism, antisemitism, islamophobia, class politics (see also Athanasiou, 2012). 
Analyses which stress the gendered facets of the crisis and its unequal effects 
on women and men are rare and do not permeate the allegedly “central” or 
dominant understandings (among the few are Karamessini, 2013; Avdela, 
Psarra, 2012). It seems that the issue is taboo, even among left-wing analysts; 
it is thought to pertain to a “special”, i.e. less important, matter which may 
detract from the “main problem”3. 
Missing from the picture
This short contribution is part of work that has grown out of my interest in 
the less debated aspects of the Greek crisis. Through a series of examples and 
taking the risk of “strategic essentialism”, I discuss some of the ways in which 
the current crisis, that is also or primarily urban, as Harvey (2012) argues, hits 
women as embodied subjects. I start from the premise that, behind statistics 
and macro-economic calculations, different women (and men) live with 
unemployment, precarity, salary and pension cuts, poverty and deprivation 
or shrinking social rights and mounting everyday violence in the crisis-ridden 
neighbourhoods of Athens. The stories (or “snapshots”) of ordinary women that 
I evoke here are drawn from research in different neighbourhoods of Athens 
(see for example Vaiou, 2013, 2014, Vaiou & Kalandides, 2013). These stories 
of significant changes in women’s everyday lives help to reflect on how concrete 
experiences fit in/diverge from general patterns and common understandings 
of “the” crisis when the spaces of everyday life become test beds for coping/
resisting austerity and authoritarianism.
“Suspended” bodies
A significant part of austerity policies has to do with downsizing the state, 
which practically means the dismissal of thousands of public sector employees. 
Among them, 595 cleaners of the Ministry of Finance and 1700 administrative 
employees of universities. Administrators have fought a bitter and inventive 
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struggle, striking for three months at the end of 2013 against layoffs and 
suspensions and are now in a process of fierce negotiation with the Ministry of 
Education. Cleaners demonstrate in the streets for many months now, repelling 
police brutality and media misrepresentation of their struggle and demands. 
It is seldom, if at all, mentioned that these bodies in struggle are female4—
women of different ages, persuasions and backgrounds. These bodies do not 
passively accept the dictums of the Troika; they claim publicly their right to a 
decent job and to bearable livelihoods.
Exclusion from “the market”
In the years of austerity, the registered unemployment rate of young women 
(under 25) has reached 61% (in 2013). Skyrocketing unemployment, whose 
effects are felt in many neighbourhoods of Athens, excludes young women, 
even with high qualifications, from a whole range of social rights, jeopardises 
life prospects and personal choices, let alone stable careers, and deters from 
even claiming publicly the right to decent paid work. Precarious small jobs 
with very low and irregular wages inhibit economic emancipation, restrict 
emotional and sexual choices and undermine self-esteem, mental stability and 
health—ultimately leading the most dynamic and creative to emigrate to more 
promising environments. 
Lapsing into “illegality”
Cuts in salaries and pensions, along with dismantling of public services, feature 
very high in the critique against memoranda-inspired policies, particularly 
among Left analysts. What is hardly acknowledged, however, is the fact that this 
dismantling hits primarily (a) women as recipients of services for themselves 
and for other members of their households, (b) local women as workers in 
those services5 and (c) migrant women as workers in home care, a sector which 
had spectacularly expanded since the early 1990s. Loosing a job as home carer 
jeopardises not only the livelihoods of migrant women but also their “lawful” 
presence in Greece and the livelihoods of their families elsewhere—pointing to 
the global/local links of the Greek crisis with many “other” parts of Europe and 
beyond. 
Living with violence
The insecurities of unemployment, income cuts and precarity are aggravated 
by everyday fear, particularly in some central neighbourhoods of Athens where 
the Golden Dawn has chosen to claim territoriality and control over space. 
These practices and hate discourse, apart from direct violence, seem to lead to 
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a creeping acceptance of aggression and a fast slide towards more conservative 
attitudes part of which is rising sexism and the adoption and promotion of 
extreme sexist models, behaviours and discourses. In a context where violence 
becomes ubiquitous, violence against women, within families and in public, 
is also on the increase—albeit hidden in a conspiracy of silence. Data is rare 
but very telling: over the past three years, one in five women have experienced 
bashing or beating by their partners, one in two has experienced sexual abuse 
including rape, one in ten serious injury—while verbal and economic violence 
are on the increase6. By the same token, visibility in public space becomes ever 
more difficult and ambiguous.
Solidarity activists
Coping/resisting the crisis is not limited to private arrangements in which 
women assume an ever increasing and more burdensome bulk of domestic and 
care work, in deteriorating and often violent conditions. It extends to women’s 
dynamic, albeit not prominently visible, involvement in the wealth of solidarity 
initiatives which have sprung up in Athens (and other cities)—“an archipelago 
of social experiences” attempting to re-constitute a social tissue and cracking 
social bonds (Espinoza, 2013). These include collective action for immediate 
day-to-day survival (like soup kitchens, social groceries, communal cooking, 
social medical wards and pharmacies, exchange networks…), actions based 
on broader political claims and practices of living together (e.g. social spaces, 
local assemblies, advice and support centres, occupied public spaces, or “no 
intermediaries” initiatives), as well as attempts of making a living collectively 
(employment collectives). The generally acclaiming discourse of solidarity 
misses out a significant “detail”: the particular bodies which put in time and 
passion to keep these initiatives going are female bodies, often excluded from 
“the market” but dynamically fighting back in private and public everyday 
spaces.
Re-visiting the crisis
The passage from general data and theoretical conceptions of “the Greek crisis” 
to concrete place/s and to the experiences of particular embodied subjects—
and back—is not an easy project. But such crossings of scale help carry the 
argument forward in two directions. First, they help understand the multiple 
determinations of an otherwise unqualified “one-fits-all” reference to an 
almost generic conception of crisis. Second, they help shape an approach which 
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consciously oscillates between levels of reference which are usually kept apart: 
on the one hand, discourse/s and explanations constituted by “big pictures” and 
global analyses and on the other hand urban space and the spatialities produced 
through the bodily presence and everyday practices of individuals and groups. 
The uncertainties that the crisis creates seem to lead to more conservative 
behaviours and gender divisions of labour, to a hardening of gender hierarchies 
and to an increasing acceptance and “normalisation” of downgrading women. 
The sexist, racist and homophobic discourse and aggressive macho behaviours 
of Golden Dawn find fertile ground among people personally and collectively 
disenchanted with the “state of emergency” which austerity policies constitute. 
In this context, real or imagined threats settle in and affect everyday practices 
and ways of being in public space and in the neighbourhoods of the city, 
now shaped by insecurity and fear. At the same time, struggles against job 
“suspensions” and practices of living together in the common spaces of various 
initiatives (may) open room for empowerment and negotiations of gender 
hierarchies.
 As the stories of ordinary women also tell us, living with multiplicity 
and mutual engagement and with a plethora of possible trajectories and life 
choices—constituting “a progressive sense of place” as D. Massey (1994, 
2005) urges us—is more than a theoretical conception. It is a major stake, a 
process of familiarisation with difference/s and otherness, which includes 
controversies, requires investment of time and labour, both material and 
emotional, abundantly contributed by bodies which usually “do not matter”—
bodies which move out of isolation and desperation into newly found ways not 
only of coping, but also of resisting the crisis. 
 In this sense, the stories of ordinary women are not an idiosyncratic 
particularity that can be easily ignored when we deal with (understandings of) 
“the” crisis. This choice of scale, linked in multiple ways to many other scales 
(local, national, European, international), reveals areas of knowledge that 
would otherwise remain in the dark, as feminist geographers have forcefully 
argued for many years. The change of focus (like in photography) does not 
mean amplification or diminution of the subject itself; it means a change of 
view about it. Stories which connect concrete bodies with global processes 
enrich our understandings with more complex and more flexible variables and 
inform the “big pictures”—and not only the reverse. Such a theoretical and 
methodological approach is important, I believe, also politically at the present 
conjuncture, because it provides a vantage point from which to re-examine the 
meanings and practices of “doing politics” and re-evaluate claims of access, 
visibility and participation in urban public space/s and discourses.
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Endnotes
1 The harsh austerity measures demanded by the so-called Troika have met the 
unquestioned approval and support of Greek banks and successive governments. Only 
the political Left, in its many facets and groupings, has strongly criticised and resisted 
them.
2 For alternative analyses, see among many Douzinas 2013, Tsakalotos and Laskos 
2013, Papadopoulou & Sakellaridis 2012, Varoufakis 2011.
3 An exception here is unemployment, particularly of young women, to which I come 
back below.
4 One cleaner is a man and less than 25% in the administration of universities are 
men.
5 79% of women’s employment concentrated in the service sector in 2009, which 
absorbed a high proportion of women with higher education.
6 See the recent survey by the Institute of Andrology on men’s sexual behaviour: 
the agressor’s profile is that of a man a little over 40, with intense job insecurity or 
unemployed – but also 17% well-off. These data match the elaboration of results from 
the SOS helpline of the General Secretariat of Equality, as well as more scant data on 
wife killings, collected by the “feministnet” network.
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t is impossible to predict exactly when history is about to take one of its 
turns, but it is entirely possible to feel swivels prior. For such change to 
actually happen, a critical mass is required; a mass of people convinced 
that change is necessary or—perhaps more often so—convinced or coerced to 
believe the existent is insufficient, therefore prepared to allow for such change 
to take place.
 At the moment when this project commenced, in the early fall of 2012, 
it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Greek territory is navigating 
through a swiveling moment—apparent, at least, if you read the global press, if 
you follow the events from afar. Take a birds-eye view of the city of Athens and 
the sweeping change is far less visible. Masses of people still traverse the urban 
web, caught in the urgencies of the everyday. From afar, normality prevails.
 A closer zooming in, a sustained focus on the ground and the depth 
of reshaping quickly reveals itself. Social relationships and political allegiances 
and alliances are swiftly reconsidered and reconfigured. From the “Movement 
of the Squares” of the summer of 2011, to the unexpectedly diverse riots of 
February 2012, to the altering of the mainstream political landscape following 
the elections of May and June the same year... And since? Central Athens 
feels the most deserted it has been in times memorable. A tangible feeling of 
withdrawal lingers. People retreat, but where to? Some, to the secluded safety of 
the domestic. Others chose to take a leap into spaces unknown; into migration. 
In a time of extremes, space can only follow in the footsteps of class and politics. 
Just like them, it is stratified, polarised, divided. One is increasingly either 
working or upper-class; the middle is pushed to the brink of extinction. In the 
political sphere being moderate is most untimely; radical times call for a radical 
stance, for an extreme position. In a city of ever-deepening dichotomies the 
concurrent reformulation of its space is staggering. On the one side rises the 
triumph of the private. A retreat into the dwelling; a conquering of functions 
domestic over public, open interaction. On the other side—and in face of this 
attack—public space is rejuvenated, reinforced, reshaped and extended, often-
times in the most unexpected of ways, in the most unexpected of settings...
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ou are only as good as your opponent, as the saying goes—and so, at the 
exact moment when the devastating, neoliberal forces that had been 
previously leading urban displacement and all-around catastrophe seem 
to go out with a bang during capitalism’s current crisis, the movements against 
find themselves posed with an insurmountable dilemma, a soul-searching 
crisis of their very own: if the powers that had been leading this devastation 
now cease to be, what does this leave these movements on the ground to fight 
against—or for? This is a crisis, then, that is both of the city and of the right to 
it, as the section’s title tries to convey. 
 In an attempt to humbly suggest some ways in which movements 
of opposition might diverge and escape the ill fate of neoliberal urbanism, 
the section opens up by looking at Athens’ own, very particular Southern 
Mediterranean past and present: Lila Leontidou shows us how—in spite 
of its present hardship—this is a city that relishes its southern spontaneity 
and informality. Christy Petropoulou moves on to tell us how this question of 
informality is one that spans much beyond the Mediterranean shores, through 
her comparative study of spontaneity of everyday life and social movements 
in Athens and Mexico City. Then, in an attempt to—for once—find ourselves 
ahead of the curve, we have asked Tom Slater the question of how to fight back 
against gentrification, already during one of the very first steps in the process: 
to fight against, that is, the devaluation and depreciation that typically precedes 
a neighbourhood falling pray to the forces of the market. The question is one 
that had been posed directly by activists in Exarcheia—the neighbourhood 
hosting the conference itself. 
 More than once, the example of capitalist development in China has 
been hinted as a possible direction that economic and social realities might be 
verge toward; and so, it only made sense to understand what this development 
entails in the urban sphere. Facing up to the task, Hyun Bang Shin explains 
how urbanisation is part of the Chinese Dream—a political and ideological 
project directed by the state that leaves even greater an urgency for the right to 
the city to be fought for. Where does this lead us? In the closing intervention, 
Andy Merrifield suggests that resistance to the dominant order must somehow 
hook up the inside of the public realm to the outside: we must look beyond our 
immediate surrounding, beyond the tangible and the present, in order to pose 
a threat to dominant sovereign order—present and future alike. 
by Antonis Vradis
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by Lila Leontidou
The Crisis and its Discourses: Quasi-Orientalist 
Offensives Against Southern Urban Spontaneity, 
Informality and Joie De Vivre
14
T hroughout the 2010s, Gramsci’s basic distinctions and antitheses between hegemonic and coercive power, productive and parasitic activities, his constructivist notions of ‘the South’, and especially his concept of 
‘spontaneity’, spring out of his interwar prison cell and return to the surface 
of the EU political economy. Drawing on these—alongside other concepts 
such as the ‘right to the city’ (Lefebvre 1968, Leontidou 2010, 2012a, Harvey 
2012) and ‘Orientalism’ (Said 1978, Leontidou 2013)—we can conceptualize 
Mediterranean urban trajectories during the present crisis.
 The South has always challenged or even reversed mainstream 
wisdom as recorded in recognized urban development models and geography 
in general (Leontidou 1990, 2012a), and has therefore been marginalized from 
mainstream textbooks. Mediterranean cities have refuted Anglo-American 
urban theory in the nineteenth century, by missing out on the industrial 
revolution and overt colonialism, and going through urbanization without 
industrialization; in the twentieth century, by reversing the Burgess spatial 
pattern through popular spontaneous suburban squatter settlements which 
have spatialized popular demands for the ‘right to the city’; and in the twenty-
first century, by suffering the crisis most acutely, and by contesting it, spurring 
snowballing global upheavals of spontaneous resistance to autocracies and for 
direct democracy against neoliberalism and the democratic deficit in the EU.
 Mediterranean cities have thus become an annoying ‘exception’ to 
Northern models. Not only do Anglo-American scholars tend to define away 
Southern particularities and ignore them in their reasoning, creating a huge 
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gap in understanding these cities (Leontidou 1990); North European power 
elites also now stigmatize Southern particularities, adopting a quasi-Orientalist 
discourse from the standpoint of neoliberalism. Geographical imaginations 
emerge among dominant classes of the EU, close to Said’s (1978) Orientalism, 
castigating ‘the lazy, unreliable, and delinquent’ Southerners (not Easterners, 
right now—Leontidou 2013). Northerners probably or implicitly recognize the 
subversive function of Mediterranean cities in overturning received wisdom 
about capitalist urban development, and defying the social settlement of the 
last 30 years, commonly called ‘neoliberal’.
 This means that the ‘crisis’—a Greek word, between judgement and 
shock, as all Greek scholars tend to stress (Tsilimpounidi 2012: 548, Vradis, 
Dalakoglou 2011: 14)—is not to be limited to the economy, especially finance 
capital and its practices of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2012); it 
is not only manifested in society, with the breakdown of the social democratic 
settlement in the UK and the North and of informal and also popular 
modes of subsistence in the South. The crisis also engulfs broader cultural 
transformations, which include a fierce offensive against Southern cultures and 
ways of life. Through Gramsci’s insightful analysis of ‘the Southern question’ in 
Italy, we can investigate the new dynamics of uneven development in Europe 
(Leontidou 2012b). Northerners sapped the vitality of Southern Italy and at 
the same time accused it as ‘ball and chain’, in Gramsci’s (1971: 71) words, 
blocking the development of the North. This is exactly what Southern Europe 
and especially Greece is accused of today, by EU power elites.
 At the epicentre of this offensive we find spontaneity and informality 
(Leontidou 2012a, 2013). Spontaneity, i.e. popular unmediated action, has 
traditionally predominated in Mediterranean settlements and economies, and 
now in social movements, just as defined by Gramsci (1971: 196):
The term ‘spontaneity’ can be variously defined, for the phenomenon to which it 
refers is many-sided. Meanwhile it must be stressed that ‘pure’ spontaneity does 
not exist in history […] In the ‘most spontaneous movement it is simply the case 
that the elements of ‘conscious leadership’ cannot be checked, have left no reliable 
document. It may be said that spontaneity is therefore characteristic of the ‘history 
of the subaltern classes’...
In the past, we have used Gramsci’s concept of ‘spontaneity’ heuristically, to 
understand historical trajectories of Mediterranean urban development until 
the 20th century (Leontidou 1990). The suburban popular squatter settlements 
of Athens, Rome, Barcelona, Lisbon have been built spontaneously, with the 
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audacity of an informal economy of petty activities, where they belonged. They 
were tacitly accepted by governments as shock absorbers against homelessness 
and social upheaval. By the 21st century, popular squatting has been substituted 
by homelessness and unemployment in the cities of the crisis, without any 
informal arrangements, let alone a formal welfare state and public housing 
outlets, which were always absent anyway. Worse still, urbanites are haunted 
by redundancies and evictions, cutbacks of wages and pensions, and over-
taxation destroying the middle classes. ‘Spontaneity’ is still deeply embedded 
in the cities’ roots, now even more literal and closer to Gramsci’s concept about 
leaderless movements (Leontidou 2012a). In other words, recent alterations of 
‘spontaneity’ consist in its juxtaposition to social mobilization.
 Earlier forms of spontaneity, evidenced in informal housing and petty 
economic activity, have been squeezed by real estate speculation and finance 
capital. In Athens, speculation continues, or rather intensifies during the 
crisis. Large and privileged tracts of land along the urban coasts of Piraeus, 
Hellenico, Vouliagmeni are privatized in the 2010s at very favourable terms for 
investors. The few public funds available for urban development are directed 
not to deprived areas, but to the pedestrianization of the central Athens 
boulevard, Panepistimiou, and the decoration of an already privileged and well-
functioning sector of the city, a linear area from Amalias St. in Syntagma to 
the Archaeological Museum and further North, disregarding the additional 
problems this will create to adjoining urban sectors. The media have unleashed 
an unprecedented marketing for this project and an exhibition promoting it 
took place in March 2014, in the Orpheus arcade, ironically, inside empty shops 
which have been hit by the crisis. Livelihoods destroyed left their derelict spaces 
to host an exhibition of the arrogance of real estate excesses. Exhibits included 
every detail of kiosks and tiles and water springs, but omitted any reference 
whatsoever to expenditure at a time of crisis, to winners and losers, i.e. real 
estate speculators and deprived urbanites.
 In fact, neoliberalism not only entails the greed of bankers and real estate 
developers, but furthermore saturates society, through effective marketing, and 
marginalizes the impoverished people. Modernism has to impose order, and 
undisciplined subjects have to be neutralized by stigmatization and obliterated. 
Ii is already quite obvious that structural readjustments, coming from the 
power elites of Northern Europe, are targeting especially spontaneity and 
informality in their various forms. The state, a ‘big brother’, aims at controlling 
everything, centrally and digitally: every transaction, every mobilization, every 
step, sweeping away popular creativity together with destructive informalities 
of tax evasion by affluent dominant classes. We can discern in this an effort 
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for (neo)colonial de-hellenization of Greece via neoliberal ‘rationality’1. Popular 
spontaneity and informality undergo a destructive critique in accordance to 
Northern Orientalist stereotypes and fixations for ‘proper’ development, and 
are negatively branded as corruption, deceit, delinquency, illegality, shadow 
economy. Certainly, these are traits of dominant classes who speculate on the 
crisis and enrich themselves further, via accumulation by dispossession and tax 
evasion. They have nothing to do with the exploited and their spontaneity as 
defined by Gramsci. The confusion is intentional and politically motivated.
 In parallel, unfortunately, spontaneity is among the Mediterranean 
traits most misunderstood by activists of the Left. Important figures of the 
Left, such as Glezos, criticize the concept (Leontidou 2012a) and scholars 
propose to move beyond spontaneity (Dalakoglou 2012). I would agree that 
we should, in order to pass from leaderless movements to a long-lasting 
emancipatory politics. But this will take time, as it seems, time during which 
grassroots spontaneity which unleashes popular creativity—a precondition for 
urban development—has to be supported.
 Chances are slim, however. Spontaneity and the informal sector are 
not tolerated in Europe. “In these various ways, Mitchell observes, ‘the space, 
the minds, and the bodies all materialized at the same moment, in a common 
economy of order and discipline’” (Gregory 1994: 173). Cities must be squeezed 
into the straightjacket of Northern neoliberal ‘rationality’ and discipline. This 
analogy of a clash between modernity and postmodernity can be transferred 
to the wider Mediterranean urban histories (Leontidou 1993), and in fact at 
present to the EU periphery as a whole, where people are revolting against this 
exploitative ‘rationality’-as-austerity, against the EU democratic deficit, and 
their ‘othering’ by the North. Against all offensives by the power elites, the 
grassroots is reclaiming the city streets and piazzas with massive mobilizations 
as well as performances of anti-austerity protest and solidarity, ‘softening’ 
the city ‘from below’ (Tsilimpounidi 2012: 548, Vradis and Dalakoglou 2011). 
There are spontaneous mobilizations, performances, street art and graphic 
interventions, and there is a much wider cooperative and solidarity economy 
and cultural scene under construction. These radiate to the world an aspect of 
the economic crisis ‘seen from the everyday’ (Kaika 2012). We will concentrate 
on the two most massive instances, those of 2011 and 2013.
 Since 2011 the spontaneous ‘movement of the piazzas’ in Southern 
Europe has been countering Northern Orientalist stereotypes with Southern 
creativity and new imaginaries. Athens constitutes part of a Mediterranean 
mobilized space, consisting of cities of Southern Europe and North Africa. 
The multi-activity and hybrid Greek urban piazzas had their focal point, 
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Syntagma Square, since 2008 (Vradis and Dalakoglou 2011, Leontidou 
2012a). The ‘movement of the piazzas’ lasted long in 2011, and spread rapidly 
to many other Athenian smaller piazzas, town squares in the rest of Greece, 
and as far as Thessaloniki. After sixty days of occupation of Syntagma by 
massive ‘indignant’ crowds, a fierce police assault cleared it in late July 2011. 
Grassroots spontaneous creativity then reappeared less frequently, dispersed 
in fragmented Athens piazzas and squats, and in other towns.
 It re-emerged, however, in the summer of 2013. The ERT courtyard, 
around the building of the Hellenic TV, became the focal point of focal point of 
solidarity and spontaneity when the Hellenic TV screens suddenly went black 
on 11.6.2013. The Greek government branded journalists ‘corrupt’, sacked 
them, and abruptly stopped every broadcast. Even the junta of 1967 had not 
dared to do this. In one night eight TV channels went black, including British, 
French and German ones, seven radio stations and nineteen peripheral ones 
were muted, orchestras including the ERT Music Ensembles and also Hadjidakis’ 
Orchestra of Colours were silenced, film and radio archives were blocked. In 
protest against this unprecedented act of censorship in Europe, spontaneity 
returned to the city in June 2013, with crowds from around Europe and beyond 
gathering in solidarity. The ERT journalists and employees who were sacked 
did not abandon the premises, but kept broadcasting in a co-operative online 
TV, a clandestine ERT channel in Athens and one in Thessaloniki, through web 
sites supporting their cause—like the one of the European Broadcasting Union, 
EBU, which broadcasted from 11.06.2013 and for the next five months2.
 This has had important wider repercussions. Digital literacy was 
growing in the city, because of the thrust for Internet access! Online viewer 
numbers shot to very high levels in Greece after the ERT TV “black screen”, when 
the older generation, too, went online to watch the forbidden channels. This is 
embedded in an overall context of constant relevance of digital communication 
for mobilization in the Mediterranean throughout the 2010s (Leontidou 2010, 
2012a, 2013).
 Throughout the summer of 2013 and until that November, when it 
was ‘cleared’ by the police, the ERT courtyard was packed with a spontaneous 
crowd, creative artists and musicians, international visitors and celebrities, 
who came to speak to the public live and online. The sterile government 
Orientalism against the ‘corrupt’ ERT journalists, was actually an offensive 
against spontaneous communication, free expression, popular gatherings and 
concerts of solidarity. But it was also an offensive against joie de vivre, which 
was negatively branded as delinquency, laziness, and untrustworthiness, all 
along, since 2010. As we approached the ERT courtyard, radiating loud music 
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and announcements of yet more solidarity concerts, with the smell of souvlaki 
and the colors of the crowds, it was a temptation to agree with Raban (1974: 5):
But another, more frightening explanation presents itself: that the victims were 
chosen simply because they seemed to be enjoying themselves, having a good 
time, and that envy is perhaps an even stronger motive for violence than greed.
The offensive was indeed also against joie de vivre in 2011, when the Athens 
centre was vibrant with music and popular assemblies bringing back 
imaginaries of direct democracy, as in the ancient Greek agora (Leontidou 
2012a); and when, in 2013, the shut-down of the Hellenic TV created a new 
round of concerts and public discussions. International reaction and solidarity 
both as the ‘movement of the piazzas’ revived spontaneity and against the 
shut-down of the Hellenic TV, reminds us of the Greek dictatorship, when 
imaginations beyond suppression, coercion and the Orientalism of dominant 
groups developed and sparked solidarity among European citizens, American 
and other people and intellectuals, turning their attention to Greece again, 
speaking to the crowds and performing for them, watching grassroots Athens 
become a creative niche in an autocratic environment. This is one of the urban 
futures to be cherished and sought after.
 As a direct reply to the question of the conference, then, I do not think 
that the city’s spontaneity and its informality will manage to seep through 
structural readjustments automatically and without support by alternative 
political formations. Gramsci (1971: 199) had already foreseen the danger, in 
a chillingly relevant paragraph, which imperatively tells us that Greece has to 
consider the ‘Golden Dawn’ neo-Nazis:
Neglecting, or worse still despising, so-called ‘spontaneous’ movements, i.e. 
failing to give them a conscious leadership or to raise them to a higher plane by 
inserting them into politics, may often have extremely serious consequences. It 
is almost always the case that a ‘spontaneous’ movement of the subaltern classes 
is accompanied by a reactionary movement of the right-wing of the dominant 
class, for concomitant reasons. An economic crisis, for instance, engenders on 
the one hand discontent among the subaltern classes and spontaneous mass 
movements, and on the other conspiracies among the reactionary groups, who 
take advantage of the objective weakening of the government in order to attempt 
coups d’ état. Among the effective causes of the coups must be included the failure 
of the responsible groups to give any conscious leadership to the spontaneous 
revolts or to make them into a positive political factor.
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Readjustments for more state control and coercion will hit hard and further 
weaken the vulnerable grassroots initiatives. On every level, spontaneity and 
informality come under fierce and violent attack whenever they surface in 
the city, as in 2011 and 2013, and will be unable to shape the future character 
of Athens during, but even most importantly, after the crisis. The EU and 
the government offensive has managed to colour informality with sinister 
meanings; as to spontaneity, it has not managed to even convince activists, let 
alone counter neoliberal discourses and practices, which have been destroying 
economies and cultures of the Mediterranean for over four years now. The 
worst impact of the offensive is visible in the empty shops and homes of a city 
which lost half of its population between 2001 and 2011 (within the Athens 
municipality), and is full of vagabonds and homeless people. A country which 
counts one in three of its youth unemployed and suffers an unprecedented brain 
drain of the flower of its youth migrating abroad cannot sustain grassroots 
creativity, which is anyway under attack ‘from above’.
 In the wake of social movements against austerity, spontaneity 
emerges as the par excellence force undermining neoliberal hegemony and 
bringing to the surface instances of creativity of the urban grassroots. The only 
hope that one can express is for the future to be shaped by the emancipation 
of the currently vulnerable spontaneous cooperative and solidarity economy 
and cultural scene under construction. But as spontaneous popular creativity 
is stifled ‘from above’ and discouraged ‘from below’, social movements are 
dormant and the sparks have not lighted up yet.
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1  A direct  analogy can be drawn here with the ‘de-turkization’ of nineteenth-century 
Greece via orthogonal grids in cities to replace the labyrinthine street layout of 
Ottoman settlements (Leontidou 2013).
2  This was at http://www3.ebu.ch/cms/en/sites/ebu/contents/news/2013/06/
monitor-ert-online.html (last accessed in August 2013).
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M
Global shifts, neoliberalism and right to the city movements in 
Mexico and Greece
 
exico and Greece comprise typical cases of the so-called semi-periphery 
where neoliberal policies have been applied (Mouzelis, 1986) but 
also where social movements tried to resist the implementation of 
the policies in question. During the 1960s and the 1970s these movements 
grew first in the build-up to, and then again following the rise to power of 
totalitarian governments (Mexico) and dictatorial regimes (Greece). Yet recent 
history and the movements that flourish within it are characterised by glocal 
processes (Koèhler & Wissen, 2003). Mexico was faced with severe economic 
crisis in 1982 and then again in 1994 that intensified after the WTO order2, 
and despite the veneer of development given to the country in the early 
nineties, at the prospect of it joining NAFTA3 (1994). The intervention, under 
special conditions, of NAFTA and the IMF4, increased the country’s debt 
and its reliance upon those mechanisms—and the so-called “consensus of 
Washington” in particular. In the years that followed and up until the present 
date, these policies would accelerate, in the name of some swift economic 
development, the privatisation of public goods—most of which would take 
place under intransparent, oft-times scandalous conditions. They contributed 
to the increase of social inequalities while at the same time fuelling policies 
of surveillance and control, as well as para-statist organisations (Toussaint, 
2006). Mexico has a long tradition of resistance: revolutions, great revolts and 
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guerilla movements, student and worker mobilisations, urban and peripheral 
movements, artistic movements, and so on. From 1994 onward in particular, 
this tradition was articulated through movements that would not only contest, 
but also put their claims into practice: most telling in this regard are the 
Zapatistas movement in Chiapas, the network of movements of the Other 
Campaign and many other social movements, among others. These movements 
managed to surpass bureaucratic trade unions and party organisations alike.
 During the same time period and following the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) order (1994), Greece appeared to be in a direction of 
development, yet a type of development that was strongly dependent upon 
neoliberal decision-making centres and international organisations that were 
pushing for the privatisation of public corporations. The country’s entering in 
the Euro currency after 2002 initially covered up but then made very evident 
the crisis in 2010, opening the discussion about the structural crisis that had 
been haunting its economy from 1982 already and prior even. The intervention 
of the so-called troika (ECB, EU Commission, IMF) led to painful financial 
measures and the privatisation of public goods comparable, and perhaps more 
demanding even than those imposed by the IMF in Mexico. This situation lead 
to a sharp decrease in the standard of living and provisions in health, education 
and public services; an increase in social inequalities and the emergence of neo-
fascist groups. From 2008 onward in particular, a multiform movement started 
to emerge with major mobilisations (Douzinas, 2013) that far surpassed 
bureaucratic trade unions or party organisations5.
 From the 1950s onward, Athens and Mexico City saw some intense 
urbanisation with serious consequences for the environment and socio-spatial 
segregation, while at the same time maintaining a level of social mix in their 
centres (Hiernaux, 1997, Ward, 1991, Leontidou, 1994). After the 1980s, and 
despite the maintenance of such social mixing in central neighbourhoods, 
these divisions become more intense in the peri-urban space, while their 
centres started to become gentrified. During this time, many Right to the 
City movements (Lefebvre, 1968 and Vradis, 2013) start to emerge, focused 
particularly on the right to habitat—in Mexico City in particular. Yet from the 
1990s on, the most important RttC movements concerned the claims to public 
space and common goods, while at the same time opposing privatisations 
(Petropoulou, 2011).
 Contemporary attempts to impose a Northern-Atlantic way of 
configuring space and the relationships between people through the command 
of the IMF and its local overseers builds on from the attempt to create 
capitalist nation-states under the global watchful eye of the representatives 
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of major capital and its local political-economic allies (Graeber, 2011/2013). 
Perhaps, it then comprises the eventual culmination of the destruction and 
subsequent transformation of nation-states into more totalitarian neoliberal 
repressive regimes6 of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2006). And 
so, capitalism’s great restructuring shifts have played and continue to play an 
important role in the changes that took place and still do so in cities and in 
the development of movements within them—in turn influencing a number 
of housing or environmental policies. Yet this relationship is not linear (cause/
effect)7 and it holds, in addition, some glocal (local-global) characteristics8.
 So far, the response above appears to have carefully omitted any 
reference to the idea of the spontaneous. This idea, it would appear, is 
something widely accepted as fairly hazy and not of particular importance in 
the neighbourhoods of popular self-construction and in the revolts of the cities 
of the so-called “semi-periphery”. In the following pages, I will attempt to tackle 
and overturn this approach.
The notion of spontaneity and its variations in the city and in the 
right to the city movements
As Holloway (2010: thesis 13) says, “the abstraction of doing into labour is a 
historical process of transformation that created the social synthesis of capitalism: 
primitive accumulation”. This period of primitive accumulation gave birth to 
capitalist relationships, and immediately followed the colonial era (Wallerstein, 
2004). It was during this period that the new social relationships were 
established, primarily defined by economic relationships (Polanyi, 1944/2001). 
During this time, the body was the first machine to be invented—even prior 
(Federici, 2004) or simultaneously with the watch or the steam engine.
 The people participating in acts characterised as “spontaneous” (We 
build a house in a way of solidarity, we participate in a revolt in a way of solidarity, 
practising participatory democracy) without rules enforced by any superior 
authorities, simply refuse to define their bodies as machines. They also refuse 
to put their thought to the service of political choices and relationships that 
do not concern them. This fundamental difference makes many thinkers from 
the Western (or otherwise Northern-Atlantic) tradition to see them as non-
compliant to the rules and to name them as spontaneous9, stigmatising them 
as marginal (in order not to say the terrible word “masterless”).
 The limits between the spontaneous and the organised are fairly blurry, 
hence referring to the social construction of difference10 (Bourdieu, 1979) and 
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being related to habitus (Bourdieu,1986). Nothing is entirely spontaneous in 
the world’s so-called spontaneous neighbourhoods (as the UN would define 
them in 1976) and in the so-called spontaneous uprisings: they are merely 
other forms of organising, which may set off as spontaneous manifestations, 
yet they are constituted through acts that are very much organised: it is 
for this reason that I name these neighbourhoods as spontaneously-born 
neighbourhoods. And it was proven that informal economy both played and 
continues to play an important role in the economic development of cities and 
of those spaces, resulting in the dropping of the term “spontaneous” by many 
official documents, too. As I have shown in another text (Petropoulou, 2007) 
the neighbourhoods of popular self-construction may have often-times been 
born in a spontaneous way, yet they developed in many and different ways, 
depending on the role of those acting11 within and beyond these—and they 
were defined by various writers in different ways, depending on the socially 
pre-constructed approach they had for the landscape of these neighborhoods.
 I therefore claim that the notion of the spontaneous way of expression 
is not an outcome of pressure, nor of the politico-economic crisis—but that it 
comprises instead an outcome of the years-long process partially related to the 
“tradition of rebellion” (Damianakos, 2003) that many people around the world 
share; between the many collectives or occasional encounters of residents of 
neighbourhoods of popular self-construction (particularly in the areas where 
RttC movements developed) and later on, of youth who participated in the 
recent uprisings of December 2008 in Greece and in the recent movement “Yo 
Soy 132” in Mexico, in 2012.
 That it is more related to the notion of prattein (of creation, of non-
alienating “labour”) and the culture of resistance that opposes repressive, 
alienating labour; not with some stigmatised “marginal spontaneity” that offers 
nothing and that is supposed to gradually diminish from contemporary society, 
just like writers of the 1950s had claimed when talking about the culture of 
poverty as well.
 That it is more related to people inclined to create relationships of 
solidarity in order to respond to living needs, forming cracks in the compulsory 
relationships of exploitation and of their overall understanding as machines, as 
imposed to them from the outset of the birth of capitalism.
 That it is related even more to dynamic minorities of the “human 
economies”, which can still feed  “nowtopias” (Carlsson & Manning, 2010) and 
comprise possible cracks in capitalism. I explain this further on.
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The relationship between the spontaneous and human economy 
in the city
As noted by Graeber (2011/2013:290-296) the biggest pitfall of the 20th 
century has been so: on the one hand, we have the logic of the market, where 
we think that we are individuals who owe nothing to one another—and on the 
other hand, we have the logic of the state, to which we are all indebted without 
ever being able to pay this debt off. Yet in reality, the two are not antithetical 
to one another: “states create markets and the markets presuppose states” 
(Graeber, 2011/2013: 295). If we were to apply this schema to cities, we would 
see that in the first case we have the private, purchased or rented residencies 
and individuals—all of which must act only out of individual interest, in any 
mobilisation. In the second case, we have the debt toward the state, which 
offers the so-called “social housing” and to the legal trade unions, which are 
there to defend our rights.
 Contrary to the above schema lie  the so-called “human economics”, 
which were only expunged with violence and constant surveillance from 
substantial portions of the planet. Human economics are economies in 
which what is considered important about people is the fact that each of 
them comprises an unprecedented link with the others and that non of these 
individuals can be the exact equivalent with anyone else (Graeber, 2011/2013: 
296). The preservation of such relationships in societies like that of Greece 
or Mexico (bazar, non-precise demarcation of private and public space, 
solidarity economies at the level of family or friends, refusal of unjust debts’ 
payment, neighbourhoods of popular building self-construction thanks to 
urban movements, open solidarity occupations, grassroots unions of open 
assemblies—and so on) has to do with the fact that there is still a tradition of 
human economics deeply rooted in relationships that concern the land and the 
body: a relationship that, despite all major attempts to regulate and to succumb 
them, was never fully enforced on peoples’ everyday lives. In these, the highest 
goods are relationships and quality of life; not the accumulation of money and 
power through it. Cracks are left over, in other words, that may at points create 
revolts and overthrows12.
 On the other hand, the development of a flavour of capitalism lacking 
any clear political or economic adjustment in these countries has led to an 
entire network of clientilist political relationships that reproduce the space and 
often-times obstruct the formation of social movements. Relationships of this 
type are not related to relationships formed on the basis of the spontaneous 
and of solidarity; instead, they are based on the logic of the state—or its 
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political representative, to which we are all supposedly indebted. But how was 
this debt created in the first place? Through this particular way of development 
of capitalism: since the state could not safeguard public goods and peoples’ 
basic rights, this role was taken on by some politicians, for their protégées 
alone. In times of crisis, when they could no longer play this role, their role and 
relationship was revealed to the private sector and the state, through scandals 
that do nothing else than to confirm that “states create markets and markets 
presuppose the states” (Graeber, 2011/2013: 295). Through this process, 
and despite the fact that certain social segments may be turning toward new 
protectors (sometimes even to fascist organisations), there are moments when 
forces are released, directed toward claims over life; it is then that human 
economics are unveiled and flourish, once again—and the so-called “tradition 
of rebellion” (Damianakos, 2003) once again comes to the fore.
 Typical examples of such are the recent RttC movements which 
commenced from mere claims of space and turned into wider political 
movements—such as the movement against the construction of an airport 
and large Mall-like complexes in Atenco, Mexico; the movement against the 
privatisation of the ex-airport of Elliniko in Athens and its adjacent beach; and 
the movements against gold extraction in Chalkidiki in Greece and in many 
parts of Mexico as well. 
 These movements are concerned with claims toward life and toward 
common public spaces; they oppose large-scale works that take place in the 
midst of crisis, during which a policy is heightened, holding as its central 
characteristic the selling-off of public and community lands and the creation 
of large projects without environmental studies and without the study of their 
potential social consequences.
Social movements and spontaneity in the so-called semi-
periphery
Regarding the relationship that politicised, anti-systemic actors may hold to 
these movements that were originally spontaneous, but consequently very 
much organised-from-below, and the discussion that has recently opened up 
(Leontidou, 2012, Dalakoglou, 2012). I will agree more with the approach 
of Zibechi (2010) who extracts his knowledge from the movements of Latin 
America. These approaches would be particularly useful for the comprehension 
of contemporary movements that have taken place in the Mediterranean 
in recent years. According to Zibechi then, the main characteristics of the 
contemporary movements of Latin America are as follows:
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—Territorialisation (grounding) of the movements in spaces they have already 
occupied or retrieved (in this way, the de-territorialisation of labour does not affect 
negatively, as before).
—Claim of autonomy from the state and from parties.
—Re-estimation of the culture and defence of the identity of the popular strata 
(against the notion of the citizen, which would systematically exclude them).
—Creation of their own intellectuals, of their own education.
—New, decisive role of women in the everyday action of the movements.
—Interest in a more meaningful relationship to the natural environment.
—Non-Taylorist relationships—networks of self-organised groups (non- division 
between mind and body labour). Face-to-face relationships. Avoidance of large, 
faceless structures. Use of various social networks.
—Production of their own life, involvement with the everyday, with matters of 
shelter, food and the production of industrial goods—but also with matters of 
culture, education, health, entertainment...
At the time when this article was written, creative resistances that practice 
social economy have been on the rise (Wallerstein, 2008; Tsilibounidi, 2012; 
Petropoulou, 2013). The important thing is for us to follow their action by 
helping in their interaction, the exchange of experiences and actions—and 
not with some violent politicisation that may lead to their breakup or to their 
premature dismantling. The act of these collectives, which sometimes form 
social movements, resembles the movement of the so-called Zumbayllu: “the 
whirligig that transforms fear and poverty into light and hope, according to 
the myths of the indigenous people of Peru. The Zumbayllu means to invest 
toward the empowering of the movement of the flow against the logic of the 
representation that sacrifices everything in the name of order”. As Zibechi 
says: “the whirligig of social change keeps on revolving... The temptation for 
us to push it, in order to accelerate its tempo, may stop it dead on its tracks”… 
(Zibechi, 2010: 337).
Conclusions, thoughts and directions for a most comprehensive 
research
As shown above, major structural politico-economic changes and tendencies 
led the international organisations have played a key role in local change, 
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and vice-versa. Yet the relationship of this interaction to the spontaneous 
is considerably complicated and related to what, by whom and why would be 
included in the discursive category of the “spontaneity”.
 In order to respond to the question more fully, a type of a treatise 
would be required that would pose the following questions:
 1. How was human economy persecuted in Greece and in 
Mexico, and how were the so-called debts13 and the so-called politics of 
clientèlist relationships14 formed? In order to respond to a question of 
this type we would go back to studies on the drawing of the first debt, 
which marked the birth of nation-states in many Mediterranean and 
Latin American countries (Mouzelis, 1986; Svoronos, 1972; Beloyiannis 
1952/2010), and in the processes which followed the first social revolution of 
the world, in 1910 Mexico (Gilly, 1995). The repression of the structures of 
human economy and community structures of participatory democracy which 
were formed during the periods of national-liberation revolutions, and the 
social revolution of Mexico in particular, happened in many and various ways 
exactly following the respective revolutions. And so, these revolutions never 
fulfilled their key demands (among which were matters concerning land, labour, 
housing and real democracy) which were instead skewed by the status quo and 
turned into an instrument of control of the everyday lives of the people. This, 
of course, has happened in most countries around the world.
 2. How anything that would not abide to the dominant new 
order was named “spontaneous” in an derogatory way and was 
identified with remnants of the past that had to be either eliminated, or 
civilized/modernized. This is where we can initially re-read the descriptions 
of the travellers in Greece and in Mexico, who spoke of indigenous populations 
in a very derogatory manner, considering them to be “uncivilised”—and 
systematically tried play down their possible relationship to the ruins of the 
grand material civilisations they were there to record. And so for many years, 
the labyrinthine (organic) tissue of the city, the popular market, the popular 
feast, the popular art were accused of being a remnant of the past—after they 
were first meticulously separated from the scholarly one, which served the 
Western European-leaning status-quo instead. Naturally in Mexico this whole 
process was much more intense, since anything popular would be related to the 
long history of the indigenous peoples (Maya, Mexica, Zapotec, Huichol etc.) 
which had to be shown to be inferior to their conquerors, by any means possible 
(Villoro, 1950).
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 3. How the revolts of 1968 re-opened the matter in another way, 
speaking in different terms about the spontaneity in Europe. Inspired by 
the libertarian traditions of people of the world, these revolts commenced from 
the areas of Western Europe and the USA where the most severe repression of 
the spontaneous had become socially accepted. During this same period the 
critics of Leninist thesis about spontaneity (Lenin, 1902; Luxemburg, 1918) by 
existentialists (Sartre, 1970 and others) and many libertarian authors (Debord, 
1968 and others) are intensified. The question is how the conversation about 
spontaneity was transferred to the countries of the so-called semi-periphery 
amidst great repression (Mexico 1968) and the dictatorship (Greece 1967), 
and how it was used for an analysis of the everyday life (Lefebvre, 1968 a, b; 
Gramsci, 1971). This discussion has since influenced research that focused on 
the cultural characteristics of Athens (Leontidou, 1994; Damianakos, 2003) and 
of Mexico City (Núñez,1990; Canclini, 1995) showing interest for the so-called 
“marginal actors”, the “neighbourhoods of popular self-construction” and the 
hybrid-comparative forms of culture. These analyses showed that there never 
was an actual separating line between the spontaneous and the organised—
but that this border was, instead, a social construction aiming at downgrading 
anything that was culturally different and threatened the status-quo.
 4. How the discussion about the subjection of the spontaneous 
returned through the crisis of the global biopolitical capitalism 
(Castoriadis, 1999; Fumagalli, 2011) and through the interventions of the IMF 
and other global organisations in the social, financial, political, cultural and 
environmental situation of the countries of the so-called semi-periphery—
while at the same time the notion of the spontaneous returns even in the 
primary research projects of financial corporations, which aim to embed 
it through the internet and behaviour prediction averting, in this way, the 
unexpected occurrence, the studies of the emergency, The Impact of the Highly 
Improbable (Taleb, 2007), etc.
 5. How, on the other hand, the so-called spontaneous resistances 
became, or may become, under certain conditions, dangerous cracks 
(Holloway, 2010; Villoro,2007). In this case, we would have to talk about the 
examples of contemporary revolts which were presented as spontaneous, since 
they were not related to parties nor syndicates—yet they were organised over 
a long period of time (e.g. the movement of the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico) 
or other, more spontaneously organised revolts from below, which were then 
turned into an organised social movement (Oaxaca and Atenco in Mexico; 
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Chalkidiki in Greece), or still echo in the minds of the youth (December 2008 
and the Squares Movement in Greece; Yo soy 132 in Mexico). The common 
elements between all these revolts is that they make decisions through open 
assemblies that do not have permanent representatives toward the outside 
(something that destabilizes the normal certainties of the status-quo and 
its politicians), that they have global characteristics, while at the same time 
being rooted in places of resistance where women play a determinant role in 
the organisation of everyday life, and that they continue their activity through 
new, multiform collectives. All of the above call for some further and more 
thorough investigation.
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Endnotes
1 I would like to thank Antonis Vradis for his contribution to the English presentation 
of this text
2 The World Trade Organization (WTO) replacing (1994) the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
3 The North American Free Trade Agreement.
4 The International Monetary Fund.
5 Yet no contemporary social guerilla movements developed, as happened in Mexico, 
which had this kind of tradition.
6  On this matter see: Naomi Klein, 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The rise of disaster 
Capitalism.
7 See the critique by Massey (1994) on the classic linear approach of history, which 
ignores space and leads to wrong views on the level of development of each country or 
each place.
8  A discussion on the previous one takes place in the volume by Petropoulou, 2011. 
This research argues that the big cities of the Mediterranean and Latin America present 
comparable processes of urban development imprinted in their urban landscapes. The 
concept of the urban eco-landscape enables the analysis and comparison of both cities 
landscapes at different spatial and temporal scales.
9  A typical example is the interpretation of the spontaneous as “indigenous” (between 
other interpretations) in an English dictionary.
10 On the construction of difference of the popular as an anti—Kantian aesthetic, see 
Bourdieu, 1986:42.
11 During the period between 1968-1988 the right to the city movements in Latin 
American spread and organised in a Latin-America wide, strong coordination 
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“Habitat” secretary of the ONU “for the right to habitation” in 1976, which called 
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and not to go ahead with destructing them, arguably comprises the most important 
international u-turn on the matter.
12 The fordist model never fully reigned over the lives of people; further back even, 
when capitalism was being born, not all “witches” were burnt... Some escaped them, 
and many turned into guerrillas...
13 In this case I accept Graeber’s analysis of debt.
14  Also see Petropoulou, 2011 :38-50, 175-314.
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by Tom Slater
Unravelling False Choice Urbanism
16
T
[I]t was suggested that revitalization was rarely an appropriate term for 
gentrification, but we can see now that in one sense it is appropriate. 
Gentrification is part of a larger redevelopment process dedicated to the 
revitalization of the profit rate. In the process, many downtowns are being 
converted into bourgeois playgrounds replete with quaint markets, restored 
townhouses, boutique rows, yachting marinas, and Hyatt Regencies. These 
very visual alterations to the urban landscape are not at all an accidental side-
effect of temporary economic disequilibrium but are as rooted in the structure 
of capitalist society as was the advent of suburbanization.
Neil Smith, 19821, p.151-2.
he architect and urban planner Andres Duany is widely seen as the father 
or guru of ‘New Urbanism’, an American urban-design-can-save-us-all 
cult that has gone global. New Urbanists are vehemently anti-sprawl 
and anti-modernist, and typically demonstrate near-evangelical belief in the 
construction of high density mixed-use, mixed tenure settlements with a 
neotraditional vernacular, well served by public transport, and ‘pedestrian-
friendly’ (integrated by a network of accessible streets, sidewalks, cycle 
paths and public spaces). All of these features, if you can afford to buy into 
them, are supposed to nurture a profound ‘sense of community’ that will 
lead to harmonious, liveable and sustainable ‘urban villages’. There has been 
a substantial critical backlash, but New Urbanism, now twinned with the 
fatuous rhetoric of “Smart Growth” (another anti-sprawl movement at which 
Duany has positioned himself at the centre), shows few signs of dissipating 
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(in Scotland, where I live and work, Duany was central to the formation of the 
SNP Government’s Scottish Sustainable Communities Initiative in 2010, and 
his dubious methods of ‘consensus building’ among local residents have been 
widely adopted by aristocratic landowners2 and design consultants). 
 In 2001, Duany wrote an essay for American Enterprise Magazine, 
which is published by the American Enterprise Institute, a right-wing think 
tank. The essay was entitled “Three Cheers for Gentrification”. An obnoxious 
and declamatory rant directed at “the squawking of old neighborhood bosses 
who can’t bear the self-reliance of the incoming middle-class, and can’t accept 
the dilution of their political base”, it contains caricatures, trivialisations and 
myths that are too numerous to dissect in full here. Yet one passage in particular 
serves as a useful point of departure for this essay:
‘Affordable’ housing isn’t always what cities need more of. Some do, but many 
need just the opposite. For every San Francisco or Manhattan where real 
estate has become uniformly too expensive, there are many more cities like 
Detroit, Trenton, Syracuse, Milwaukee, Houston, and Philadelphia that could 
use all the gentrification they can get. The last thing these places ought to 
be pursuing is more cheap housing. Gentrification is usually good news, for 
there is nothing more unhealthy for a city than a monoculture of poverty... 
Gentrification rebalances a concentration of poverty by providing the tax 
base, rub-off work ethic, and political effectiveness of a middle class, and in 
the process improves the quality of life for all of a community’s residents. It is 
the rising tide that lifts all boats.
If we cast aside the provocative tone of these sentences, and the patronising 
trickle-down logic, we see a perspective that is actually very common among 
many observers of gentrification across the political spectrum (whether 
journalists, policy officials, planners, architects, or less thoughtful social 
scientists). In a little piece of mischief back in 20063 I called this perspective the 
false choice between gentrification (a form of reinvestment) and a ‘concentration 
of poverty’ (disinvestment), drawing on these words in an excellent book by 
James DeFilippis:
Since the emergence of gentrification, it has become untenable to argue that 
reinvestment is a desirable end in-and-of-itself for low-income people and 
residents of disinvested areas. Instead, rightfully conceived, reinvestment 
needs to be understood through the lends of questions such as: What kind 
of investment? For whom? Controlled by whom? These processes have left 
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residents of low-income neighbourhoods in a situation where, since they exert 
little control over either investment capital or their homes, they are facing the 
‘choices’ of either continued disinvestment and decline in the quality of the 
homes they live in, or reinvestment that results in their displacement. The 
importance of gentrification, therefore, is that it clearly demonstrates that 
low-income people, and the neighbourhoods they live in, suffer not from a 
lack of capital but from a lack of power and control over even the most basic 
components of life—that is, the places called home4. 
These words lead us to the question of how low-income people can gain power 
and control over their homes, one which DeFilippis addresses via a riveting 
analysis of collective ownership initiatives such as community land trusts, 
mutual housing associations and limited-equity housing cooperatives in the 
United States. Yet since DeFilippis’ book was published a decade ago, the false 
choice perspective has been tabled time and time again; indeed, I have lost count 
of the amount of high-profile statements on gentrification in the last few years 
and months that have succumbed to a tired formula: weigh up the supposed 
pros and cons of gentrification amidst attempts at levity (“Doesn’t that new 
cupcake store have a funny name?!”), throw in a few half-baked worries about 
threats to ‘diversity’ and housing affordability, and conclude that gentrification 
is actually ‘good’ on balance because it represents investment which stops 
neighbourhoods from ‘dying’ during a financial crisis. Take, for example, 
a piece in New York Magazine in February this year entitled (predictably) “Is 
Gentrification All Bad?”5 After opening up with the ambiguous remark that, 
“A nice neighborhood should be not a luxury but an urban right” (what makes 
a neighbourhood ‘nice’, of course, is inherently a class question), the author 
presents a brief history of the neighbourhood of Bedford-Stuyvesant in 
Brooklyn, once an emblem of disinvestment and racial segregation but now 
an arena for outlandish real estate prices, and remarks that “gentrification 
happens not because a few developers or politicians foist it on an unwilling city 
but because it’s a medicine most people want to take. The trick is to minimize 
the harmful side effects”. The piece concludes with the following:
an ideological split [in the 1960s] divided those who wrote cities off as 
unlivable relics from those who believed they must be saved. Today a similar 
gulf separates those who fear an excess of prosperity from those who worry 
about the return of blight. Economic flows can be reversed with stunning 
speed: gentrification can nudge a neighborhood up the slope; decline can roll 
it off a cliff. Somewhere along that trajectory of change is a sweet spot, a mixed 
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and humming street that is not quite settled or sanitized, where Old Guard 
and new arrivals coexist in equilibrium. The game is to make it last.
“Mixed and humming” hides what is a desperately fatalistic conclusion, but one 
very common in writing that reduces gentrification to a moral question (good 
versus bad) rather than a political question6. In sum, the New York Magazine 
article argues that gentrification is here to stay, we have to live with it, but it 
just needs some policy fine-tuning to stabilise or ‘manage’ it and soften the 
blows it inflicts, and the urbanist’s holy grail is the middle ground between “up 
the slope” and “decline”. 
 In order to situate gentrification in a more helpful political and 
analytical register, we must blast open this tenacious and constrictive dualism 
of “prosperity” (gentrification) or “blight” (disinvestment) by showing how 
the two are fundamentally intertwined in a wider process of capitalist urbanisation 
and uneven development that creates profit and class privilege for some 
whilst stripping many of the human need of shelter. No viable alternatives 
to class segregation and poverty will be found unless we ask why there are 
neighbourhoods of astounding affluence and of grinding poverty, why there 
are “new arrivals” and an “Old Guard”, why there are renovations and evictions; 
in short, why there is inequality. Despite many attempts to sugarcoat it and 
celebrate it, gentrification, both as term and process, has always been about class 
struggle. When we jettison the ludicrous journalistic embrace of “hipsters”7, 
reject the political purchase of the enormous literature on the gamut of 
individual preferences and lifestyles of middle-class gentrifiers, and consider 
instead the agency of developers, bankers and state officials, then questions 
such as for whom, against whom and who decides come to the forefront—and we 
can begin to see false choice urbanism as both red herring and preposterous 
sham. Then, we can start thinking about the agency of activists, and strategies 
of revolt.
 After a visit to inner Detroit, to east Glasgow, to Vancouver’s Downtown 
Eastside, or to the so-called ‘shrinking cities’ of eastern Europe, it is easy to 
understand why purveyors of false choice urbanism are so numerous. But they 
are left politically stranded when a theory of uneven geographical development 
is brought to bear on their “gentrification is better than the alternative” 
discourse. Arguably the greatest legacy to urban studies left by Neil Smith was 
the “ingenious simplicity” (as David Ley, one of his main interlocutors, once 
put it8) of the rent gap as part of a broader attempt to trace the circulation of 
interest-bearing capital in urban land markets, and to elaborate the role of the 
state in lubricating that circulation. But rather than focus on the classic 1979 
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paper where the rent gap concept first appeared, it is instructive to revisit a 
less-discussed Neil Smith paper which situated the rent gap within a broader 
articulation of uneven development at the urban scale, entitled “Gentrification 
and Uneven Development”, published in 1982 in Economic Geography. 
There, three aspects of uneven development were articulated by Smith, and 
gentrification was located within each aspect:
1) Tendencies toward equalization and differentiation: with the 
transformation of the earth into a universal means of production via the wage-
labour relation, capital drives to overcome all spatial barriers to expansion 
(equalization), yet a series of differentiating tendencies (division of labour, 
wage rates, class differences etc.) operate in opposition to that equalization. At 
the urban scale, the contradiction between equalization and differentiation is 
manifest in the phenomenon of ground rent (simply the charge that landowners 
can demand, via private property rights, for use of their land), which translates 
into a geographical differentiation (central city versus suburbs, with higher 
ground rent in the latter). Recognising this contradiction, it becomes possible 
to see Homer Hoyt’s famous “land value valley” of the late 1920s in inner 
Chicago not as representative of some sort of residential “filtering” process, 
but rather indicative of capital depreciation, creating a “ground rent level quite 
at variance with the assumptions implied in the earlier neoclassical bid-rent 
models” (p.146).
2) The valorization and devalorization of built environment capital: 
valorization of capital in cities (its investment in search of surplus value or 
profit) is necessarily matched by its devalorization (as the investor receives 
returns on the investment only by piecemeal when capital is ‘fixed’ in the 
landscape). However, new development must proceed if accumulation is to 
occur—so the steady devalorization of capital creates longer term possibilities 
for a new phase of valorization. Here we are talking about speculative landed 
developer interests that David Harvey has since identified as “a singular principle 
power that has yet to be accorded its proper place in our understanding of not 
only the historical geography of capitalism but also the general evolution of 
capitalist class power.”9 Why do rentier capitalists buy up—or grab—parcels 
of central city land and real estate and ‘sit’ on them for years, doing nothing? 
The answer is simple: devalorization of capital invested in the central city leads 
to a situation where the ground rent capitalized under current land uses is 
substantially lower than the ground rent that could potentially be capitalized 
if the land uses were to change. This is a rent gap in the circulatory patterns 
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of capital in urban space. When redevelopment and rehabilitation become 
profitable prospects, capital begins to flow back into the central city—and then 
substantial fortunes can be made.
3) Reinvestment and the rhythm of unevenness: under capitalism there 
is a strong tendency for societies to undergo periodic but relatively rapid and 
systematic shifts in the location and quantity of capital invested in cities. 
These geographical and/or locational ‘switches’ are closely correlated with the 
timing of crises in the broader economy (i.e. when the ‘growth’ much beloved 
of mainstream economists and politicians does not occur). Crises occur when 
the capitalist necessity to accumulate leads to a falling rate of profit and an 
overproduction of commodities (in recent years, these commodities are the 
various financial products that have emerged vis-à-vis the buying and selling 
of debt). The logic of uneven development is that the development of one area 
creates barriers to further development, thus leading to underdevelopment, 
and that the underdevelopment of that area creates opportunities for a new 
phase of development. In spatial terms, Smith called this a “locational seesaw”, 
or “the successive development, underdevelopment, and redevelopment of 
given areas as capital jumps from one place to another, then back again, both 
creating and destroying its own opportunities for development.” (p.151).
Smith’s work was of course subjected to considerable critique over the years, 
sometimes usefully (for example, the work of Damaris Rose on the “uneven 
development of Marxist urban theory”10), other times obstructively (most 
absurd was the argument that the rent gap should be abandoned as it is hard 
to verify empirically, closely followed by the daft bourgeois cry that the rent 
gap doesn’t tell us anything about the gentrifiers, when it was never designed 
to). In relation to false choice urbanism, the critically important point to grasp 
via an analytic absorption of these three aspects of uneven development 
is that investment and disinvestment do not represent some sort of moral 
conundrum, with the former somehow, on balance, ‘better’ than the latter. 
Nor does investment represent some sort of magical remedy for those who 
have lived through and endured decades of disinvestment. Gentrification 
and ‘decline’; embourgoisement and ‘concentrated poverty’; regeneration and 
decay—these are not opposites, alternatives or choices, but rather tensions 
and contradictions in the overall system of capital circulation, amplified and 
aggravated by the current crisis. Rent gaps do not just appear out of nowhere11—
they represent certain social (class) interests, where the quest for profit takes 
precedence over the quest for shelter. Rent gaps are actively produced (and 
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they are certainly being produced now under a crisis that has set capitalised 
ground rent on a downward spiral) through the actions of specific social actors 
ranging from landlords to bankers to urban property speculators, and the role 
of the state in regards to these actors is far from laissez-faire but rather one of 
active facilitator both politically and economically (it is notable that Smith’s 
undergraduate dissertation12, the empirical study that led to the rent gap 
concept, carried the subtitle, “State Involvement in Society Hill, Philadelphia”). 
 This leads to the question of political action and social movements. In 
light of the current conditions of crisis and disinvestment, I was asked, “What 
advice, if any, could be useful for the people of Exarcheia from anti-gentrification 
struggles elsewhere?” This is a demanding question and it would take several 
days to summarise the varied struggles that have taken place in the past ten 
years from Edinburgh to Gothenburg to Toronto to Mexico City to Melbourne, 
and to dissect the links between those struggles, the lessons learned, the gains 
made. When I was writing the final chapter of Gentrification13, I was struck by 
how little scholarship there was on resistance to gentrification. Whilst the Right 
to the City movement has since drawn considerable attention, it still saddens 
me that, at least in the UK, research funding has gone (and continues to go) to 
people who want to study the motives and desires of the middle-classes, or to 
those uncritically embracing the language of regeneration. So my immediate 
response, when I read the question asked of me, was “What can academics learn 
from the anti-gentrification struggles in Exarcheia and elsewhere?!” 
 Immediate strategies, ones that are making gains in cities like Madrid, 
include squatting that goes beyond the standard occupation of empty buildings 
(usually a strategy of highlighting the problems of housing commodification) to 
make a squat a collective provider of welfare and neighbourhood services (e.g. 
daycare, healthcare, adult education) that are being denied to people under the 
violence of austerity. Community land buy-outs are gaining traction in the UK 
now, especially in Scotland, but the barriers are immense, not least because 
of deeply ingrained landownership structures that will take a generation 
to dislodge. In 2001 I spent some time with an organization in Brooklyn 
that declared an entire neighbourhood where widespread displacement was 
occurring a “displacement free zone”, and this involved a ‘pro-community’ 
awareness campaign, whereby the absolute necessity of informal support 
networks to vulnerable local people struggling to make rent was highlighted 
in every possible forum, in conjunction with organised pickets and protests 
outside landlords’ homes, and the public naming and shaming of any landlord 
who slapped a rent increase on a tenant. Evictions dropped by 40% in a three-
year period. 
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I am very suspicious of the view that gains can be made at the level of “informing 
policy”, as many British academics proudly trumpet. Under relentless urban 
growth machine pressures, the leap of perspective required for a policy elite 
to see the world as displaced person is significant. Insofar as states adopt 
gentrification as a housing policy—which they have done all over the world—
they have little interest in research evidence on the extent and experience of 
displacement; such evidence would be tantamount to exposing the failure of 
these policies. Given that all major political parties in so many nations dance 
to the same neoliberal anthem on housing, it is naïve to expect, or perhaps 
even to lobby for, a policy programme of mass social housing construction or 
rent controls (indeed, the Coalition government in the UK appears actively 
committed to making people homeless via its infamous ‘bedroom tax’). Far 
more effective in contexts where gentrification is occurring has been campaigns 
for policy action beyond the scale of the urban, such as living wage campaigns. 
The scandalously high cost of housing in so many nations is consigning the 
poor to financial ruin, so the work of living wage activists is absolutely crucial 
to the right to housing. Policy interventions and even some social movements 
are too often “area-based”, when the differences that could be made at the level 
of the welfare state and labour market are substantial. Unfortunately, attacks 
on welfare states are happening all over Europe because these remnants of a 
Keynesian-Fordist political economy are viewed by the political class (and 
by the oligarchs they serve) as dangerous “impediments to the advancement 
of financialisation”14. To continue the relentless pace of expanding global 
accumulation, it is necessary to monitor and monetize more and more of 
those human needs that have not been commodified in previous rounds of 
financialization. Pensions, healthcare, education, and especially housing 
have been more aggressively appropriated, colonized and financialised. Anti-
gentrification struggles should be—and usually are—unified with broader 
struggles to protect the legacies of the welfare state against the predatory 
attacks by this generation’s vulture capitalists.
 To the extent that we are dealing with a systemic, structural problem, 
it would seem to be a critically important challenge for social movements 
to identify precisely where developers, capital investors, and policy elites 
are stalking potential ground rent15; to expose the ways in which profitable 
returns are justified among those constituents and to the wider public; to 
highlight the circumstances and fate of those not seen to be putting urban 
land to its ‘highest and best use’; to point to the darkly troubling downsides of 
reinvestment in the name of ‘economic growth’ and ‘job creation’; to reinstate 
the use values (actual or potential) of the land, streets, buildings, homes, 
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parks and centres that constitute an urban community. Another crucial tactic 
is to expose planning hypocrisy at any opportunity: when planners speak of 
their desires to create “mixed-income communities” in poor areas (almost 
always cover for a gentrification strategy), there is much to be learned from a 
coalition of public housing tenants in New Orleans that marched through the 
most affluent part of that city in 2006 holding a huge banner that said “Make 
THIS Neighbourhood Mixed-Income!” Another area of concern is to think 
carefully about how to challenge stigmatisation of people and places. Whilst 
such stigmatisation is central to the creation of rent gaps, it is also central to 
their closure, for discourses of disgust and social abjection can pave the way for 
a revanchist class transformation of space (e.g. “We need to clean that area up, 
it’s full of scumbags,” etc.). Unfortunately, even grassroots efforts to advance 
a different narrative of a place can end up backfiring, as an artificial edginess 
becomes appealing to real estate professionals and their “urban pioneer” clients 
suffering from what Spike Lee recently called “motherfucking Christopher 
Columbus syndrome”16. The Columbian encounter was uneven development 
by genocide and false treaty: accumulation by colonial dispossession. Today 
it’s the world urban system of cities competing for investors and creative-class 
gentry on the new urban frontier. It has always been in the “border areas that 
a killing could be made, so to speak, with so little risk of simultaneously being 
scalped.17”
 False choice urbanism, more than anything else, is a pure exemplar 
of what Paul Gilroy has called the “poverty of the imagination”18. It thrives 
on the idea that more and more economic growth (represented by the mirage 
of ‘reinvestment’) is the answer to a crisis created by such greed, and thus it 
deflects attention away from the systemic failures and policy blunders that 
create, widen and reinforce urban inequalities. A mindless commitment to 
reinvestment and growth is the kind of ‘thinking’ that produced the largest 
global credit bubble ever seen, and then crashed in what even Ben Bernanke, 
the former Chair of the US Federal Reserve bank, called the most severe 
financial crisis in the history of capitalism. Disinvestment and reinvestment 
are both at the heart of today’s unequal urbanization of capital. Reinvestment 
represents a second-order derivative of the first round of the appropriation of 
monopoly rents. In the 20th anniversary edition of Urban Fortunes, John Logan 
and Harvey Molotch offer some refreshing insights that might help arrest this 
poverty of the imagination:
For people in whatever type of place, even those at the lowest level of the 
earth’s place hierarchy, the appropriate stance should be critical. Alas, there 
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is least choice for those at the bottom levels, and sometimes resistance risks 
violent reprisal from authorities. But where it is humanly feasible, ‘no growth’ 
is a good political strategy. The status quo should always be treated as possibly 
better than the growth alternative. (“Don’t just do something, stand there,” is 
a slogan we have heard).19
Whilst the status quo is of course unacceptable, “stand there” not only calls into 
question growth-is-great arguments, but strikes a chord with highly effective 
anti-gentrification slogans of the past, such as “We Won’t Move!” from Yerba 
Buena, San Francisco, in the 1970s20. Moreover, these words offer useful 
guidance for ‘right to stay put’ movements that seek to unravel false choice 
urbanism and expose gentrification not as Andres Duany’s “rising tide that lifts 
all boats”, but as a tsunami that wrecks most ships. As important as it is to 
explain the dirty process of gentrification, supported by accounts of destroyed 
lives, evictions, homelessness, loss of jobs, loss of community, loss of place, 
and so on, it’s just as important to understand and fight the system that makes 
gentrification possible21.
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by Hyun Bang Shin
Contesting Speculative Urbanisation and 
Strategising Discontents
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Clearly, everyday domicide is as systematic and widespread as 
the pursuit of economic interest. It has affected and will continue 
to affect large numbers of mostly powerless people, especially 
in the developing world. The murder of homes is an intentional 
act. Domicide violates and terrorizes its victims as bulldozers and 
cranes reduce their homes to rubble. It severs its victims’ lifetime 
attachment to homes and community and deprives them of the 
built environment that has shaped their tradition and identity. It 
also wounds their sense of dignity. Everyday domicide, in other 
words, in many ways cruelly redefines the existence of its victims 
and severely diminishes, if not destroys, the quality of their lives. 
Considering all of the immediate and lingering damage it causes, 
perhaps it is time to think of domicide as something beyond mere 
‘moral evil’ 
(Shao, 2013, p.28)
n her latest book on displacement in Shanghai, Qin Shao vividly reports 
the disastrous effects of China’s urban development that evicts people 
from their homes, demolishes long-established communities and impairs 
people’s psychological well-being. While her findings are largely based on the 
city of Shanghai, the stories of uprooted families and flattened dwellings are 
reminiscent of millions of other similar cases around the world. In China, 
such traumatising human consequences have been facilitated and exacerbated 
largely by the Chinese state’s drive to transform its nation into an urban society, 
resulting in the country’s own version of ‘urban revolution’.
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China’s urbanisation as a political and ideological project
China’s urbanisation is a political project that receives the utmost attention 
from the top leadership. When China’s new Party leadership came to power in 
late 2012, a heavy emphasis was placed on sustaining the country’s stride to 
urbanise. It was openly claimed that China would achieve a 60% urbanisation 
rate by the year 2020 and 70% by 2030 as part of realising the China Dream 
(Kuhn, 20131). This was equated with the addition of another 300 million 
urbanites by 2030. Obviously, this does not mean that all 300 million rural 
villagers are to migrate to existing cities. It is expected that this addition 
would occur through the further expansion of small and medium-sized cities, 
townships and counties and through the conversion of rural villagers into 
urban citizens and their relocation from original villages (as was the case in 
Chongqing). Measured by the share of urban residents in the nation’s total 
population, and official enumeration of urban population obviously faces all 
sorts of limitations and errors. However, what is important is not its accuracy 
nor the possibility of putting this into reality, but the political statement of 
aspiration by the Party State that proclaims the Party State’s commitment 
to continue with the state efforts to maintain the extant processes of urban-
oriented accumulation.
 China’s urbanisation is also an ideological project that envisages the 
urban as the most desirable status quo for the country and population. Vertical 
landscape resulting from the amassing of state-of-the-art skyscrapers and 
high-rise estates becomes the representation of China’s newly found modernity 
and the symbol of its latest economic success as well as global prominence. 
The 2010 World Expo held in Shanghai vividly exhibited this urban-oriented 
political rhetoric. While the Shanghai Expo’s official English slogan was ‘Better 
City, Better Life’, the Chinese slogan targeting its domestic audience had a 
completely different nuance: It read ‘Chengshi, rang shenghuo geng meihao’, 
which can be literally translated into English as ‘City makes (your) life happier’ 
(see Figure 1). While the slogan in English was emphasising the importance of 
improved urban management, the slogan in Chinese was simply an emphasis 
on the ‘city living’ itself. In other words, all that is required for a happy life is to 
live in cities. The question is: who does China’s urbanisation truly benefit and 
who loses?
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Figure 1: The slogans of the 2010 Shanghai World Expo 
(Photographed in 2010 and edited by Hyun Bang Shin)
China’s urban revolution comes with large-scale population sorting and 
displacement. Existing major mega-cities like Beijing and Shanghai go through 
the redevelopment of its inner-city cores as part of their attempts to convert 
the space into a higher and better use and transform the cities into ‘world 
cities’: this endeavour involves the attraction of particular types of urbanites 
(highly skilled professionals and expats) and the displacement of low-skilled 
workers and low-end service industries. One of the two inner-city districts, 
which accommodate the new CBD was announcing in 2012 that it would aim to 
displace 100,000 residents from the district by 2015, with the long-term goal 
of 30% population reduction in the next 30 years (Jin, 20122). The aim was to 
transform the urban space to attract highly skilled migrant workers including 
expats and to rid of low-skilled workers and the poor who do not conform to 
the ‘world-class’ urban image.
Speculative urbanisation: the reinforcing interaction between the 
primary and secondary circuits of accumulation
China’s urbanisation produces urban-oriented speculative accumulation that is 
centred on the commingling of the labour-intensive industrial production with 
the heavy investment in the built environment (e.g. high-speed rail networks, 
airports and metro construction as well as commercial real estate projects). 
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The Chinese central and local states have been particularly proactive in making 
sure that these processes are mutually reinforcing, ensuring that productive 
investments in the built environment are made as a means to facilitate the 
primary industrial production. The investment in fixed assets has been a quick 
speculative solution to ensuring the GDP growth at both local and national 
scales. According to government statistical yearbooks, real estate construction 
has also been growing phenomenally, accounting for more than half of fixed 
asset investment in major cities like Beijing in the 2000s (see also Shin, 20093, 
pp.128-130). The speculative urbanism is also spreading to other second and 
third tier cities and to counties that try to emulate the kind of urbanism 
originally centred on the eastern coastal region.
 In this regard, China’s urban revolution differs from the experiences 
of the post-industrial West that has seen the ascendancy of the secondary 
circuit of capital accumulation in place of the declining industrial production 
(see Harvey, 19784 and Lefebvre, 2003). As Henri Lefebvre states, “As the 
principal circuit, that of industrial production, backs off from expansion and 
flows into ‘property’, capital invests in the secondary sector of real estate. 
Speculation henceforth becomes the principal source, the almost exclusive 
arena of formation and realization of surplus value... The secondary circuit 
thus supplants the primary circuit and by dent becomes essential” (Lefebvre, 
2003, p.160). For China, it is not simply the over-accumulation in the primary 
circuit of industrial production, which facilitates the channelling of fixed asset 
investment into the secondary circuit of built environment. Both circuits 
reinforce each other’s advancement, while the state monopoly of financial 
instruments provide governments and state (and state-affiliated) enterprises 
to tap to the necessary finance.
 China’s domestic regional disparities are turned into advantages for 
capital to further exploit surplus labour. In discussing the logics behind the 
emergence of East Asia and China from a geopolitical perspective, Giovanni 
Arrighi (2009) refers to the ways in which the United States-led reconfiguration 
of East Asian geopolitical economy resulted in the establishment of vertical 
integration of firms in low-cost labour-intensive production network, initially 
led by Japanese firms that exploited its former colonies such as South Korea 
and Taiwan, and later adopted by the East Asian tiger economies to ‘snowball’ 
such practices to other Asian and Chinese economies as the labour costs of 
initial recipients of such production facilities rose (Arrighi, 2009). China’s 
rise and export-oriented industrialisation based on low-cost labour-intensive 
industries is the process of internalising this snowballing process. Labour 
exploitation therefore occurs to ensure the capping of labour costs in industrial 
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production as much as possible. For the foreseeable future, this internal 
snowballing process of industrial relocation seems likely to continue given the 
huge geographical scale of China, but obviously this will face greater frictions as 
years go by.
 Therefore, China’s uneven development fuels this process of 
commingling the primary circuit of industrial production with the investment 
in the built environment. This is epitomised by the gradual infiltration of 
Foxconn, the Taiwanese electronic goods manufacturer, into the central 
region. Foxconn, which is known to be the world’s largest contract electronics 
manufacturer, has been expanding its factory basis from the Guangdong 
province to other locations in the central region, where land and labour 
supply can be acquired more cheaply (Pun and Chan, 20125). The expansion 
is facilitated by the intervention of entrepreneurial local states that ensure 
the timely provision of land and infrastructure to accommodate both workers 
and capitalists. Local states in particular also ensure that capital enjoys access 
to pacified and disciplined workers as much as possible. Such investments in 
both production facilities, infrastructure and housing occur not only within 
existing cities, but also in urban peripheries and rural villages as well as in 
special zones of exception, combined together to produce the urban. The city 
as the container does not become a meaningful unit of analysis, as this process 
of accumulation through the secondary circuit does not limit itself to existing 
urban (administrative) boundaries but spills over onto peripheries (see also 
Brenner and Schmid, 20146; Merrifield, 20137). The urban is also created in 
rural and suburban areas as well as the rural is reborn in urban counterparts 
(see Keil, 2013). In this way, China is urbanising as urbanism spreads to inner 
regions away from the eastern coastal centre. It does this by taking advantage 
of the geographical uneven development of production and reproduction of 
labour power, while controlling for demand (for urban citizens) and for supply 
(proletarianisation to continue to supply cheap labour). China’s construction of 
capitalism therefore is the urbanisation process itself.
The right to the urban as a political project
As the built environment has become both the end and the means of capital 
accumulation, the right to the city remains important in China as a political 
project (Shin, 2013). While some critics may discuss the limitations of the 
right to the city (or right to the urban, given the limitations of the city as an 
analytical unit) to become an effective mobilisation principle for urban social 
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movements, it still remains an important conceptual framework in China’s 
urbanisation, as the country sees the significant position of the secondary 
circuit of accumulation heavily controlled and manipulated by the state and 
capital8. In this process of urban accumulation, urban spaces, old and new, 
increasingly embody the rapidly exacerbating inequalities in society. While 
the fruits of accumulation benefit the top officials, overseas investors and 
domestic industrialists as well as the emerging middle class populace, the 
masses—including rural villagers—experience dispossession of their lands as 
local governments carry out land-grabbing to put this land into industrial and 
commercial use. Homes are flattened as part of land assembled to make ways 
for more lucrative sources of revenue for local governments, who also aspire to 
promote ‘world-city’ landscapes. Workers, most of whom consist of migrants 
from rural hinterlands, face harsh working environments, poor job securities 
and suppressed wages. Affluence rises in major cities as centres of accumulation, 
but the pace of wealth accumulation alienates those who produce it.
Figure 2: Flattened former rural village in Guangzhou 
(Photograph by Hyun Bang Shin, 2010)
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China’s unequal processes of urbanisation and accumulation therefore indicate 
that there is a strong urgency for the country’s masses to claim the right to the 
urban. It is going to be a revolutionary project to organise the urban according 
to inhabitants’ need and desire, aiming at taking the power from the state 
and capital that produce the urban in their own taste (see Marcuse, 20099). 
Claiming the right to the urban is also inevitably a political project as it only has 
any chance of seeing any kind of success when disparate classes experiencing 
exclusion and deprivation come together across regions, which the Chinese 
state endeavours to stop from emerging. Here, for grassroots organisations, 
jumping up the scale to overcome spatial isolation is very important (Smith, 
1992). So are the efforts of regional, national and transnational organisations 
to link up with grassroots organisations to contextualise and embed universal 
agendas in concrete realities.
Constraints on claiming the right to the urban
In China, claiming the right to the urban faces huge constraints for a number of 
reasons. First, claiming the right to the urban directly challenges the state that 
sees urbanisation as the fundamental basis of the country’s development and 
economic engine, for the reasons explained above. Second, the authoritarian 
Chinese state is highly sensitive to any bottom-up struggles to form cross-
class and cross-regional alliances to challenge authority (see Shin, 201310 for 
more detailed discussions). While various socio-economic reform policies have 
been designed and put into practice, political reform is deeply lagging behind. 
While some measures have emerged to enhance local democracy (e.g. village 
and urban community election), democratic experiments still remain isolated 
and heavily influenced by the Party State. Third, as China’s urbanisation is 
also regarded by the state as a nationalist project built on the rise of China’s 
geopolitical power, rights claimants may be seen as hindrance to societal 
progress and national prestige. Socio-economic inequalities and regional 
disparities are often glued over by the logics of nationalism (e.g. China Dream) 
that is increasingly replacing socialism as the ideological basis of running the 
country by the Party State. In this regard, the voices of discontent (including 
voices of separatism in the Western region) are suppressed in order to ensure 
the stability of the country, and nationalism acts as a means to justify the Party 
State’s intervention in society (see Shin, 201211).
 More recently, the state project to build a middle class society provides 
an ambiguous but not so promising situation for any claim on the right to the 
urban by the masses. When the director of the Research Office of the State 
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Council was reporting on the size of China’s middle class in 2007, about 6.5% 
was estimated to belong to the middle class, who enjoy an annual household 
income between 60,000 and 500,000 yuan (China Daily, 200712). Looking at 
the household disposable income in 2006 according to the China Statistical 
Yearbook, the bottom threshold of such an income range refers to mostly the 
highest income decile group that the government was envisaging as being the 
middle class. The middle class that the Chinese Party State envisages is clearly the 
most affluent in China’s urbanising society, whose lives are detached from the 
masses. While the middle class (including managerial personnel, professionals 
and office workers—see Chen, 2013 for this occupation-based classification) is 
known to be advocating individual rights, a recent study by Jian Chen (2013) 
finds that China’s middle class populace tends to endorse state policies and feel 
reluctant to the expansion of democratic rights such as the right to politically 
mobilise and launch popular protests unsanctioned by the state. On the other 
hand, what turns out to be more progressive is the lower class, that includes 
blue-collar industrial and service sector workers, the small-scale self-employed, 
the unemployed, retirees and college students. Nurtured by the state and being 
the major beneficiaries of the state-led urban accumulation and economic 
development, China’s middle class populace is unlikely to be an agent of social 
change; for as long as the state protests their wealth and ensures their current 
economic position, they would be unlikely to join up with the rest of the society 
in what Andy Merrifield (2011) refers to as “crowd politics”.
Strategising discontents
Let me conclude. I have argued in this essay that China’s speculative urbanisation 
is both an ideological and a political project that disrupts and destroys the 
lives of the masses, while it is the few that benefits from it. As the state and 
capital proceed with their heavy investment in fixed assets and rewrite the built 
environment, displacement becomes the norm for villagers and urbanites. As 
China’s urbanisation hinges on the primary circuit of industrial production 
as much as it does on the secondary circuit of built environment, there is a 
potential for workers’ struggles to form an alliance with urban inhabitants’ 
struggles to protect their neighbourhoods and communities. In other words, 
China’s particular trajectory of urbanisation requires the right to the urban 
struggles to be inclusive of the struggles by the new working class, who are 
fighting for their access to the ‘redistribution’ of surplus value and for their 
‘recognition’ as legitimate citizens and not simply migrants (Han, 2013; see 
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Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 for the emphasis on ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’). 
The cross-class alliance of the type above, which had emerged and prompted the 
brutal oppression in 1989, would be something that may not be established in 
the near future but remains to be a political imperative if the hegemony of the 
dominant interests is to be subverted. The alliance is in need of further inclusion 
of village farmers whose lands are expropriated to accommodate investments 
to produce the urban, and of ethnic minorities in autonomous regions such as 
Tibet and Xinjiang whose cities are appropriated and restructured to produce 
Han-dominated cities.
 What else is to be done to challenge the state and capital in China? 
Here, I refer to the proposition of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe who 
wrote in November 2000 for their preface to the second edition of Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy:
To be sure, we have begun to see the emergence of a series of 
resistance to the transnational corporations’ attempt to impose 
their power over the entire planet. But without a vision about 
what could be a different way of organizing social relations, 
one which restores the centrality of politics over the tyranny 
of market forces, those movements will remain of a defensive 
nature. If one is to build a chain of equivalences among 
democratic struggles, one needs to establish a frontier and 
define an adversary, but this is not enough. One also needs to 
know for what one is fighting, what kind of society one wants to 
establish. This requires from the Left an adequate grasp of the 
nature of power relations, and the dynamics of politics. What is 
at stake is the building of a new hegemony. So our motto is: ‘Back 
to the hegemonic struggle’ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.xix)
It will be important for the discontented to educate themselves and others to 
reveal the underlying logics of China’s capital accumulation, how it produces a 
hybrid of developmental statism and neoliberalism, how it evades the Chinese 
state’s own legitimacy (by constantly deviating from the socialist principles 
and by producing prosperity at the expense of the masses’ economic hardship), 
and how the fate of urban inhabitants is knitted tightly with the fate of 
workers, villagers and others subject to the exploitation of the urban-oriented 
accumulation.
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by Andy Merrifield
Against Accountancy Governance: Notes 
Towards a New Urban Collective Consumption
18
I n 1977, when Manuel Castells’ classic book, The Urban Question, was first put into English, I’d been a year out of secondary school, in Liverpool. It was five years after its original French publication, four years since an OPEC oil 
embargo had sent advanced economies into giddy noise dives, and a year on 
from the Sex Pistols’ début hit, Anarchy in the UK. They were heady times, the 
1970s, full of crises and chaos, a post-1968 era of psychological alienation and 
economic annihilation, of Punk Rock and Disco, of Blue Mondays and Saturday 
Night Fever. The decade was also a great testing ground for a book bearing the 
subtitle, A Marxist Approach. Indeed, the same year as The Urban Question: A 
Marxist Approach became available to Anglophone audiences, the Sex Pistols 
were screaming, “THERE’S NO FUTURE, NO FUTURE FOR YOU AND ME!” 
 I didn’t know The Urban Question back then, nor much about Marxism; 
I was eighteen, hardly read anything, and remember most of all the candlelit 
doom of Callaghan’s “Winter of Discontent”. Power cuts, strikes and piled up 
rubbish seemed the social order of the day. And the Sex Pistols’ mantra of NO 
FUTURE seemed bang on for my own personal manifesto of the day. I became, 
largely without knowing it, something of a fuck-you anarchist, not really 
knowing what to do, apart from destroy—usually myself: “what’s the point?” 
Johnny Rotten had asked. I didn’t see any point. The decade was dramatized 
by sense of lost innocence. I watched my adolescence dissipate into damp 
Liverpool air, into a monotone gray upon gray.
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It was only in the early 1980s that I first learnt to read and write to survive. 
By then, Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister and I’d discovered something 
never encouraged at school: I loved to write, loved to write about things I’d read, 
about things I’d done, people I’d met. Before long, I’d gained access to the local 
Polytechnic as a “mature student,” as a second-chance scholar, as a scholar-
with-attitude. That as the Thatcherite project was in full flight dismantling 
welfare statism; multiple levels of local and national government felt Thatcher’s 
“free market” heat, got abolished, abused, and recalibrated to suit the whims of 
an ascendant private sector. 
 This posed some pretty tough intellectual and political questions for 
my friends and I at Liverpool Polytechnic, as we passed our time wondering 
how to intellectually fill the post-punk void. We hated the bourgeois state with 
serious venom. We wanted to smash it, rid ourselves of its oppressive sway. So 
when Thatcher started to do just that, we were left wondering where to turn? 
Did we want that nanny state back? Life had been boring and programmed with 
it, but maybe things were going to be much worse without it? 
 In retrospect, 1984 seems a watershed, the significant year of 
contamination: Ronald Reagan had begun his second term and the Iron Lady 
had survived the Brighton Bombing; the IRA’s attempt to finish Thatcher off 
had the perverse effect of only setting her more solidly on her way, propelling 
her full-kilter into dismantling the post-war social contract between capital and 
labor, taking on (and taking out) organized labor and organized opposition in 
the process; Arthur Scargill and the miners took it full on the chin so marking 
the defining moment in a power shift between organized labor and an ascendant 
(postindustrial) British ruling class. With the miners defeat, Thatcher’s central 
government was able to push through, and further consolidate, its aggressive 
policies of fiscal conservatism.
 Thatcherism was duly borne and a strange, almost inexplicable, act of 
incorporation and co-optation, of universal reabsorption, had thereafter taken 
place. The Sex Pistols’ “NO FUTURE! NO FUTURE FOR YOU AND ME!” had, by 
1984, been squashed, beaten down, morphing into Michael Jackson and USA 
For Africa’s harmonizing refrain: “We are the World.” From wanting the world 
in 1967, as The Doors had demanded, there was no world worth having by 1977: 
the music was over; and yet, as we hobbled into the 1980s, suddenly we were 
told that somehow we now were the world. That NO FUTURE had been thrown 
back in our faces: we were this no future, this TINA, and we’ve all been living 
with it ever since.
152 CRISIS-SCAPES
Maybe 1984 signaled the real end to the 1960s, sealed its fate. 1984 heralded 
the beginnings of the post-political, of the formal subsumption of Thatcherism 
and its apotheosis and real subsumption under neoliberalism. Maybe 1984 
meant the end of continuing the old tradition of radical politics, using the 
same mindset, the same workerist politics, the same frames of reference and 
militancy. Making a racket 1960s style, or even 1970s and 1980s style, seems 
no longer tenable today, no more the required politics to tackle a capitalist 
beast that has absorbed us within it, wholescale and wholesale, lock, stock 
and barrel. Something else is needed than the desperation of Zoyd Wheeler, 
Thomas Pynchon’s hippie anti-hero from Vineland—which, remember, is also 
set in 1984—leaping through plate glass windows, breaking on through to the 
other side, trying to cling on to his government stipend as a mental degenerate. 
There is an innocent charm to Zoyd’s antics, as well as touching fatherly concern 
about his teenage daughter Prairie, about how she’s going to grow up in a world 
whose value system is all bad karma for Zoyd. Yet the problem is that there’s 
equally something pathetic about old Zoyd, too, trapped in his dope-hazed 
past, paranoid about the Reaganite present, paralyzed about thinking of a post-
Reaganite future. Beneath the cobblestones there is no longer any beach; and if 
there is, its waters are now too polluted to permit nude bathing1.
 1984 was also the year I discovered Castells’ The Urban Question. The 
thing that immediately struck me, I remember, was its cover: Paul Klee’s Blue 
Night. Only recently—very recently in fact, this past January at a London 
Tate Modern Klee retrospect—did I eventually see for myself Klee’s enigmatic 
canvas, from 1937, one of his last, an unusually expansive (50X76cm) work in 
an oeuvre characterized by intricacy and smallness. For a long while Blue Night 
was one of my favorite paintings. I’d always wondered whose choice it had been 
to have it adorn a book about Marxism and the city? Castells’ own? I still don’t 
know. The other thing that intrigued me about The Urban Question was its heavy 
Althusserian Marxism. I’d borrowed Louis Althusser’s For Marx from the Poly 
library, trying to figure out what was going on. Little made sense initially. Only 
a lot later did I recognize how Castells mobilized in original and idiosyncratic 
ways twin pillars of Althusserian formalism: ideology and reproduction. 
 Unlike Althusser, this was Althusserian formalism applied to the real 
world, to the conflictual urban condition of the 1970s, to the fraught decade 
when capitalism attempted to shrug off the specter of post-war breakdown, 
the decade when I attempted to shrug off my own crisis, a coming of age in 
an age not worth coming of age in. Moreover, although this urban system was 
declining, was in evident trouble everywhere, collapsing entirely it wasn’t. 
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Castells wanted to know why. “Any child knows,” Althusser had said in his 
famous essay “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” “that a social 
formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same 
time as it produced would not last a year.” The citation, a paraphrase of Marx, 
in a letter to Dr. Kugelmann (July 11, 1868), summed up the whole point of 
Volume Two of Capital: without reproduction there could be no production; 
without the realization of surplus-value, no fresh surplus value could ever get 
produced; production is predicated on extended and expanded reproduction. 
And yet, given inevitable ruptures in the “normal” functioning of capitalist 
production, how come capitalism survived then, still survives?
 Althusser actually passed over all the stuff about reproduction of 
capitalist relations of production from Volume Two of Capital, passed over 
those political-economic “reproduction schemas” that Marx conceptualizes, and 
beds his vision down in the ideological reproduction of labor-power, in his own 
particular notion of ideology: “an imaginary representation of an individual’s 
real conditions of existence.” Consequently, in The Urban Question, Castells 
attacked urban studies precisely because of its ideological content. Erstwhile 
research on “the city,” he’d said, had formulated “imaginary representations,” 
framing the city in terms of “urban culture,” in narrow sociological and 
anthropological terms. Such approaches focus on “dimensions of the city,” on 
“densities,” on “size,” on the idea that the city exhibits a particular specificity, 
its own of organization and transformation; a logic which, Castells said, pays 
scant attention to broader dynamics of capitalist political-economic and social 
relations, particularly to their reproduction. 
 So in The Urban Question Castells said the urban isn’t really a unit of 
production at all; production operates at a bigger scale, at least on a regional 
scale and increasingly international stage. Production isn’t the right analytical 
entry point into the urban question. Rather, it is, à la Althusser, reproduction 
that counts most, the reproduction of the urban system and its links to the 
overall survival of capitalism. The urban, Castells insisted, typically awkwardly, 
is “a specific articulation of the instances of the social structure within a spatial 
unit of the reproduction of labor-power.”
 From the mid-1970s onwards, around the time the Sex Pistols 
announced “NO FUTURE,” Castells began to define and refine his notion of 
the urban as the spatial unit of social reproduction by coining the concept 
“collective consumption”. Collective consumption is implicit in the reproduction 
of “unproductive” collective goods and services outside of the wage-relation, 
outside of variable capital, items like public housing and infrastructure, schools 
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and hospitals and collectively consumed services. “The essential problems 
regarded as urban are”, Castells said, “in fact bound up with the processes of 
‘collective consumption’… That is to say, means of consumption objectively 
socialized, which, for specific historical reasons, are essentially dependent for 
their production, distribution and administration on the intervention of the 
state”.
 And yet, what arose over the decade was an awkward predicament 
for progressive people, and for Marxist theoreticians: items of collective 
consumption so vital for reproduction of the relations of production, so vital 
for freeing up “bottlenecks” in the system, so vital for providing necessary (yet 
unprofitable) goods and services, so indispensable for propping up demand 
in the economy—were now being cast aside. How could this be? What once 
appeared essential ingredients for capitalism’s continued reproduction—for its 
long term survival—now turned out to be only contingent after all; the state 
began desisting from coughing up money for them; and soon, as the 1980s 
kicked in, would actively and ideologically wage war against them.
 The Left has never really come to terms with the shock waves this 
earthquake engendered; the seismic tremor that registered big digits on the 
neoliberal Richter scale. The 1980s bid adieu to social democratic reformism, 
to an age when the public sector was the solution and the private sector the 
problem. The former now needed negating, pundits and ideologues maintained, 
required replacement by its antithesis; now the private sector was the solution 
and a shot and bloated public sector the problem. Managerial urbanization—
when state bureaucrats dished out items of collective consumption through 
some principle of redistributive justice or vague notion of equality—had given 
way to an urbanization in which the market was the panacea. Writ large was the 
beginning of the privatization of everything, the outsourcing of democracy.
 Thatcher’s assault on welfare provision and blatant class warfare 
created a generation of lazy entrepreneurs in Britain, capitalists who had no 
need to innovate or even become entrepreneurial because business was handed 
to them on a Tory silver platter. And those remaining urban managers no longer 
concerned themselves with redistributive justice; most wouldn’t even know 
what the phrase meant. Instead, their working day began to be passed applying 
cost-benefit analysis to calculate efficiency models, devising new business 
paradigms for delivering social services at minimum cost; services inevitably 
got contracted-out to low-ball bidders, and whole government departments 
were dissolved or replaced by new units of non-accountable “post-political” 
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middle-managers, whose machinations are about as publicly transparent as 
mud. The Urban Question was rapidly becoming an old urban question.
 Maybe what was most entrepreneurial about the 1980s was the 
innovative way in which the private sector reclaimed the public sector, used the 
public sector to prime the private pump, to subsidize the reproduction of capital 
rather than the reproduction of people. Any opposition was systematically 
and entrepreneurially seen off, done in, both materially and ideologically. 
In 1986, Thatcher abolished a whole realm of regional government—the 
Metropolitan County Councils—at the same time as she bypassed municipal 
authorities (frequently Left and/or Labour-run) with a new species of urban 
growth machine: so-called quangos, alleged public-private partnerships, 
bodies like Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), which spearheaded 
London Docklands, as well as redevelopment of Liverpool’s deindustrialized 
waterfront. By this time, though, I’d gone up to Oxford to do a PhD with the 
famous Marxist geographer David Harvey, who suggested I summarily went 
back down to Liverpool, back to its ruins and ruination, back to talk to Militant, 
back to look the negative in the face and tarry with it.
 I’ve been tarrying with negativity since then, trying to convert it into 
something positive. Yet several decades on, after a lot of reading, a lot of talking 
and listening, after a lot of political hope and a fair bit of disillusionment, after 
a lot of wandering around the world, I finally got down to writing my own 
version of Urban Question, entitled, somewhat unoriginally, The New Urban 
Question. It’s a short, polemical book, a hopeful book that nonetheless tries to 
cover a lot of ground. It goes back to the source in order to move through and 
beyond the times, our times right now, when any “Marxist approach” to the 
urban question demands hard answers; not least because now the dialectic of 
the urban as a site of capital accumulation and social struggle has changed. As 
the Thatcherite 1980s gave way to the Blairite late-’90s, and as it stands today, 
extended reproduction of capital is achieved through financialization and 
dispossession, through dispossession and reconfiguration of urban space. The 
urban is no longer an arena where value is created so much as extracted, gouged 
out of the common coffers, appropriated as monopoly rents and merchants’ 
profits, as shareholder dividends and interest payments; the urban, nowadays, 
is itself exchange value. Quite recently, teaching a graduate class at Bartlett, as 
part of my visiting fellowship there, I tried to figure this dynamic out, with the 
aid of a synoptic diagram, conceived as follows:
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CITY & DYNAMICS 
OF CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION 
(Reproduction of capital)
CITY AS ARENA OF 
SOCIAL & CLASS 
STRUGGLE
(Reproduction of relations 
of production)
1970s
(Castells’ 
The Urban 
Question)
Predominance of primary 
circuit of industrial 
production; some secondary 
circuit investment 
(investment into real estate 
and property)
Social and class struggles at 
workplace (unemployment) 
and city-based “collective 
consumption” issues
1980s Privatization, 
financialization and 
deregulation; investment 
flows into secondary circuit 
of capital (cf. Big Bang & 
London Docklands); mergers 
and acquisitions; quangos; 
Enterprise Zones
Social and class struggles at 
workplace (union bashing) 
and intensified city-based 
collective consumption issues 
(housing, poll tax, etc.) and 
regional democratic concerns 
(Metropolitan County 
Councils)
1990s Financialization and rentier 
extraction (land rents and 
interest-bearing capital); 
Private Finance Initiatives 
(PFIs); accumulation 
by dispossession and 
repossession; shareholder 
capitalism
Urban-based global struggles 
around economic inequality 
(cf. Global Justice Movement, 
Seattle 1999); anti-WTO and 
IMF
2000s 
(post 
9/11)
(The New 
Urban 
Question)
Rentier capitalism; secondary 
circuit of capital as fictitious 
capital; accumulation by 
dispossession; austerity; 
land grabs; predatory 
loans/parasitic extraction; 
creditocracy; parasitic mode 
of urbanization and “neo-
Haussmannization”
Urban expression of 
democracy struggles, urban-
based struggles against 
economic (neoliberal) 
authoritarianism and 
political authoritarianism (cf. 
Occupy); struggles against 
financial capital; debt resistor 
and anti-austerity struggles
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In the table, I am really periodizing the urban as an accumulation strategy and 
seat of resistance against this accumulation strategy, placing each in a decadal 
dialogue. The column on the left emphasizes the reproduction of capital while 
the right one emphasizes social reproduction. We’re essentially moving from 
Castells’ 1970s era, when the urban found its definition as a spatial unit of 
collective consumption, to our era when the urban gets defined by new forms of 
predatory dispossession, by what I call in The New Urban Question, “the parasitic 
mode of urbanization”, a process undergirding “neo-Haussmannization.” 
 Now, insofar as risk management goes, insofar as addressing glitches 
within the overall reproduction of capital in the economy, the state is a first line 
of defense, a veritable executive committee for managing the common affairs 
of a bourgeoisie and aristocratic super-elite, stepping in at the first signs of 
crisis—baling out the bankrupted corporations, the too-big-to-fail financial 
institutions. One way it gets away with it is through “austerity governance”, the 
latest form of ruling class manufactured consent, something fitting neatly with 
the material needs of those in state and economic power—the two are largely 
inseparable. Austerity enables parasitic predilections to flourish by opening 
up hitherto closed market niches; it lets primitive accumulation continue 
apace, condoning the flogging off of public sector assets, the free giveaways 
of land and public infrastructure, the privatizations, etc., all done in the name 
of cost control, of supposedly trimming bloated public budgets. What were 
once untouchable, non-negotiable collective use-values are now fair game for 
re-commodification, for snapping up cheaply only to resell at colossally dearer 
prices. 
 The net result, thirty years since my initial encounter with The 
Urban Question, is that collective consumption items have morphed into 
individualized consumption items. By this I mean that as the state has divested 
from its apparent systemic requirement to subsidize and fund public goods, as 
it has divested from its role of ensuring extended social reproduction, erstwhile 
public goods have become accessible to people only via the market, hence at a 
price. Thus people themselves willy-nilly pick up the tab of the price of social 
reproduction; we’ve taken care of our own lot, achieved it through borrowing 
money, self-reproducing as the private sector cashes in, quite literally at our 
expense. Returning, then, to the Castellian conundrum of how is it possible that 
the state can back away from funding collective consumption whilst ensuring 
the capitalist system continues to survive, we can answer this urban question 
quite categorically: via a debt economy.
 According to a Bank of England Financial Stability report (November 
2013), household debt in Britain has now soared to record levels. Individuals 
owe a total of £1.43 trillion. Families, we hear, are borrowing to deal with higher 
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costs of living, using credit finance to pay household bills. The bulk of the debt 
is in mortgages, which are steadily on the up, reflective of inflated house prices. 
The debt economy flourishes, both publically and privately, because it is at once 
profitable on supply and demand sides. On the one hand, cities experience 
budget cuts, workers get laid off, services cut, libraries and sports centers 
close, education funding is slashed; public facilities are sold off to private, 
for-profit interests, for-profit vultures who valorize knockdown price public 
infrastructure. Municipalities need to borrow money in order to raise money. 
Public services are then run and maintained by private interests, invariably 
declining in quality afterwards. On the other hand, people are compelled to 
pay more, more on council tax, more on education, more on healthcare, more 
on services that are now driven by accountancy exigencies rather peoples’ 
real needs. It’s no coincidence, then, that all those major items of collective 
consumption that Castells identified in the 1970s—education, housing, and 
health—are now items featuring on the ever-growing list of household debt 
burden. People are falling prey to predatory loan sharks to fund basic human 
needs.
 Loan sharks complement the apparently paradoxical proliferation 
of subprime predatory loans, of lending money and mortgages to vulnerable 
people who can little afford to pay these loans or mortgages back. In the 1960s, 
poor people were denied credit, couldn’t get bank loans and financial aid because 
they earned too little or lived in the wrong part of town; whole populations 
and neighborhoods, invariably minority populations and neighborhoods, were 
written off as high-risks, redlined, starved of financial aid for property ownership 
and small business development. One of the great popular American successes 
of this era was the implementation of the Community Reinvestment Act of 
1971, outlawing redlining practices. Now, though, in a cruel twist of fate, in a 
savage contraflow, poor people can’t get enough loans, frequently at exorbitant 
rates, with all kinds of hidden fees thrown in; the US’s subprime mortgage 
bubble was hyper-inflated by predatory loans; its bursting necessitated housing 
foreclosures galore—3 million, in fact, between January 2007 and August 2010 
alone—and repossessions by the lender offenders who’re eventually bailed out 
by federal government.
 For good reason do activist-scholars like Andrew Ross now stress how 
“capital owners in pursuit of profit have long moved beyond the workplace 
and into the ‘social factory’ of everyday life…the debt burden is felt more 
intimately than workplace exploitation, if only because it cannot be cordoned 
off as the contractual tie we owe to our employers”. Little wonder, too, that 
there’s now a debt resistors’ movement gathering steam. Citizens on both sides 
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of the Atlantic are striking out at this vulture capitalism in our midst, and 
are participating in a debtors’ movement called “Rolling Jubilee”. Organized 
by Occupy Wall Street’s roving “Strike Debt” group, war hasn’t just waged on 
the debt collector (US college tuition debt alone stands at $1 trillion); it’s also 
bailed out the people, raising $600,000 to buy back a cool $15 millions’ worth 
of household debt, at a knockdown price on the secondary debt market (where 
bad debts are exchanged between wolves and sharks), a lot emerging from 
subprime mortgage foreclosures. Rolling Jubilee has liberated debt at the same 
time as highlighted the grand larceny and absurdity of our burgeoning debt 
economy. 
 Accompanying all this—to be sure, administering all this—mediating 
the dialectic between the reproduction of capital and social reproduction are 
accountants. Accountants somehow rule the political-economic roost in Britain. 
In the 1990s, we saw how their emergence involved nifty role switching, a 
certain morphing, revolving doors between accountants seconded into politics 
and politicians seconded into accountancy; and always the twain met over 
policy. Public welfare managerialism had somehow transmogrified into private 
welfare middle-managerialism. These days, accountants dominate the whole 
scene around so-called PFIs, or Private Finance Initiatives, the brainchild of 
John Major in 1992. PFIs have helped themselves to urban infrastructure—
ports, roads, schools, railways, electricity grids, seemingly the entire National 
Health Service (NHS), and God knows what else—not only in Britain but 
throughout the world. 
 In 1997, Blair’s inaugural Labour government was, on principle, dead 
against PFIs; a year or so on, they had a change of heart, realizing they were a 
principled government—indeed, they had many!—and soon began to peddle 
PFIs more gung-ho than even the Tories themselves. When the going’s good, 
PFIs—government-sponsored private companies, managed by accountants 
with zero public accountability—amass considerable booty; when things go 
belly-up, the government steps in to bail them out because they serve a vital 
public necessity and can’t go under. It’s an all-win situation for everybody, 
apart from the ordinary taxpayer and consumer. Meantime, the big four 
accountancy firms—Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (PWC)—have reputedly pocketed a cool billion pounds from their 
interests PFIs2.
 Accountants have a massive and growing stake in the delivery and 
management of Britain’s public services, though always back scene. Take 
Capita, a giant IT, cleaning and refuse collection subcontractor, a company that 
dominates municipalities’ public services up and down the country. Ernst & 
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Young secures Capita’s local authority contracts—in return for a fat commission. 
Capita was itself the brainchild of a former local authority accountant, Rod 
Aldridge, back in the deregulated 1980s. (The company has a £3 billion turnover 
with pre-tax profits for 2013 of £425 million.) In Birmingham, Capita’s contract 
is worth £126 million a year, yet few councilors have a clue how that money is 
spent. The actual contract document, crammed with dense price structuring 
equations and abstruse financial calculations and projections, runs to over a 
thousand pages, and is purposefully complex—or so believes local Labour 
councilor John Clancy—incomprehensible to all but the savviest accountant. 
Capita’s wheeling and dealings are shrouded in secrecy, utterly beyond public 
remit, let alone elected representatives. “I’ve lost control of the future,” admits 
Clancy. Rest assured it’s all in the hands of Ernst & Young. We can sleep well 
at night. Only one thing is less murky: Capita capitalizes on councils making 
drastic cuts to save millions of pounds each year.
 This split within the state between time-served councilors like John 
Clancy and private sector-imposed technocrats reflects the kind of rift that 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu identified as left and right hands of the state; 
a drama played out between, on the one hand, the left hand, a dwindling bunch 
of experienced politicians answerable to their constituents and who still try 
to uphold local democracy; and, on the other right hand, a “state nobility” of 
elite technocrats and cabinet plutocrats, finance ministers and public-private 
bankers who no longer even pretend to want to change anything significant. 
The rift marks an ever-widening cleavage between left-leaning rank-and-
file representatives who care about the public, and right-leaning senior civil 
servants who care only about the private, about budgets and bank balances. On 
the left side, we have publicly-employed progressive councilors, social workers, 
community organizers, primary and secondary school teachers, health and 
housing officers, local government officials and progressive magistrates, care 
assistants and crèche workers; on the right side, we have a nobility of largely 
unaccountable agents propping up the upper-echelons of the Ministry of 
Finance and its regime of Accountancy Governance.
 “This opposition,” says Bourdieu in Acts of Resistance (1998), “between 
the long-term view of the ‘enlightened elite’ and the short-term impulses of 
the populace or its representatives is typical of reactionary thinking at all 
times and in all countries; but it now takes a new form with the state nobility, 
which derives its conviction of its legitimacy from academic qualifications and 
from the authority of science, especially economics. Not only by divine right, 
but also by reason and modernity does the movement of change lie on the 
side of these governors—the ministers or ‘experts’; unreason and archaism, 
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inertia and conservatism are on the side of the people, the trade unions and 
critical intellectuals.” Bourdieu insists on the winning back of democracy 
from technocracy; the latter has “kidnapped” the state, he says, preached its 
withering away, made public goods a private fancy, the consumer the citizen. 
“We must put an end to the reign of ‘experts’ in the style of the World Bank 
and IMF,” says Bourdieu, “who impose without discussion the verdicts of the 
new Leviathan, the financial markets, and who do not seek to negotiate but 
to ‘explain’.” We must break with the historical inevitability, professed by the 
doyens of neoliberalism; “we must invent new forms of collective political work 
capable of taking note of necessities, especially economic ones, in order to fight 
them and, wherever possible, to neutralize them”. 
 How to reinvent the future of public services and restore a re-
enlightened definition of what constitutes the public realm? Of housing 
and health, education and public transport, work and play—of collective 
consumption? “In the work of reinventing public services”, Bourdieu says, 
“intellectuals, writers, artists and scientists have decisive roles to play”. It is us 
who can help break “the monopoly of technocratic orthodoxy over the means 
of diffusion”; it is us who can “help draw up rigorous analyses and inventive 
proposals about the major questions that the orthodoxy of the media and 
politics makes it impossible to raise”.
 If there is a job for radical urban research and politics—though 
who might fund it, I wonder?—it is to analytically and politically point the 
critical finger at this new nobility, of its select committee of accountants and 
administrators, the middle-managers who reside over our privatized public 
sector, and who pull the strings in our fast-emerging rentier and creditor 
society3. These managers fulfil public duties and undertake public roles, but 
do so within a more expansive and invasive private sector. They have become 
the right hand—and right turn—of the capitalist state. At a larger scale, we 
have a strange hybrid species of public-private sector bureaucrats, the nobility 
of Troika bureaucrats, the Euro technocrats and international fonctionnaires; 
not so much effete Euro MPs as indomitable European Central Bankers, for-
profit public sector venture capitalists who determine the life-chances of Euro-
crisis zones, of Greece especially. Here, let us cast our critical analytical and 
investigative eye over their doings, let us name names, make them accountable 
to “the people”; let us scrutinize their behind-close doors middle-management 
machinations, their austerity plans, expose their hidden ideological leanings.
 Ditto those managers and accountants who preside over Moody’s or 
Standard & Poor and affect the life-chances and fortunes of whole cities and 
regions; their “specialist” financial opinions condition the credit worthiness of 
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metropolises, holding the latter hostage to global bond markets. One condition 
for getting the coveted Aaa long-term rating (or short-term “Prime-1” 
rating) is usually that the municipality applies the holy writ of accountancy 
governance, that it trims its budget, that it sells off the family silver, the 
city’s public infrastructure. Ditched assets have been gobbled up cheaply by 
another sort of manager, the Hedge Fund manager, who, after preying on 
wounded corporations over the past decade, now devotes predatory attention 
to wounded municipalities, especially across America, revalorizing the public 
domain for private gain. (Cogsville, a New York-based private equity firm, has 
been buying up fire sale and repossessed private properties across the US; in 
Chicago, notably in Portage Park, Cogsville is now effectively the neighborhood 
landlord. Meantime, Blackstone, another Big Apple Hedge Funder, owns large 
swaths of repossessed and knockdown housing stock in Phoenix).
 Other types of managers lurk typically anonymously and unaccountably 
at the micro level, at the household level, a new kind of middle-managerial class 
and social gatekeeper. They determine peoples’ ability to get a mortgage, to rent 
a property, to get hooked up to utility services, to have an Internet provider, a 
mobile phone, a regular phone line—to have all the accoutrements you need to 
lead a regular life on planet earth. Indeed, these managers determine peoples’ 
entire financial and social life-chances because they prop up the numerous 
Credit Rating Agencies that assess our “credit worthiness”. Firms like Experian, 
Equifax and Callcredit are self-avowed “global information service companies” 
whose credit reports and scores, profiles and ranks predict a person’s present 
and future liability and ability to service a debt. Such credit agencies ensure 
the financial surveillance of everyday life. But they’re completely beyond public 
scrutiny, a law unto themselves, profiting in Britain because of hopelessly 
outdated regulation (The Consumer Credit Act of 1974).
 We urgently need financial accountability and transparency around 
private sector middle-management and mismanagement. We need some 
citizens’ global registry of financial assets, together with a list of which 
accountants are cooking their books. We need greater democratic knowledge 
of who owns what, as well as who tots up the figures for those who own what. 
Something along these lines appears to be getting explored in suggestive ways 
with the “Citizens’ Audit,” an international network of local groups pressuring 
for an opening up of the state’s books, scrutinizing the shenanigans of shadowy 
accountants and the partisan administrators therein. It’s a program warranting 
consolidation so that widespread audits might be conducted by ordinary 
people—not by professional accountants already on the payroll of those 
they’re meant to be auditing—restoring democratic accountability around 
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common resources and public assets, while there’s still some left. Struggling 
for democracy means loosening the diktat those anonymous, unaccountable, 
behind-closed-doors middle-managers have over our culture, those in both 
the private and public sector, those bankers and accountants, technocrats and 
creditocrats who orchestrate the financial repossession of our society. Breaking 
this mediating and obfuscating link implies struggling against the massively 
complex bureaucracies that rule over us. To do so we need to redouble mass 
civil disobedience, insist upon transparency around public affairs, and link 
institutional investigation with insurrectional outrage. 
 Resistance to the dominant order must somehow hook up the inside 
of the public realm to the outside; “official” representatives in government, in 
the council chambers, must be kept on with their toes by shouts in the street, 
by direct action democracy, by a social movement exerting its pressure from 
without, in the civic squares, in the alternative media, across clandestine 
airwaves, in the citizens’ agora, forcing the right side of the state to respond to 
the left side. This may even give the subdued left side the courage to step out 
of the shadows cast by the right side, prompting it to come out of the council 
closet, emerge again into the accountable public light of the day. Meanwhile, 
probing researchers—inside and outside the university—can ally themselves 
with militant activists, transforming themselves into probing militants and 
activist researchers, vocalizing joint dissent in brainy and brawny ways.
 Along the way, this alliance might also want to consider the degree to 
which Manuel Castells’ vision of the urban still lives on. Indeed, Castells’ idea 
of the urban as a unit of “collective consumption” continues to say bundles, 
although not so much as an analytical category as a normative construct: the 
urban ought to be an arena characterized by collective use-values, by goods and 
services consumed in common, consumed by a public, by “the people”; the urban 
ought to be a form of human sociability, a collectivity, beyond any kind of profit 
logic, beyond speculative exchange-values; the urban ought to be a site for social 
reproduction, a space where people can freely encounter one another, under 
circumstances in which a different, non-marketized definition of value prevails. 
Here we might heed Oscar Wilde, who remarked that a cynic knows the price of 
everything yet the value of nothing. Over the past few decades, we’ve had lots 
of cynics in our midst, lots speculators and rentiers, lots of administrators and 
middle-mangers who seem to know the price of everything, obsessively and 
cynically calculating the price of public culture; but they sneer at the real value 
of things. We, on the Left, need to affirm another value yardstick, free from 
the cynics’ speculative grip, another form of human solidarity, one that might 
enrich urban life beyond wealth.
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Endnotes
1 Interestingly, when Christopher Lasch wrote Minimal Self in 1984, Pynchon’s 
Vineland wasn’t yet published. But what Lasch said about other Pynchon books 
that had appeared—Crying of Lot 49, V., and Gravity’s Rainbow—equally holds for 
Vineland: “Pynchon’s ambitious but intentionally inconclusive novels dramatize 
the difficulty of holding the self together in a world without meaning or coherent 
patterns, in which the search for patterns and connections turns back on itself in 
tightening solipsistic circles... as Pynchon implies, the only feasible alternative to 
paranoia seems to be resigned acceptance of irreversible decline: the gravity that 
pulls everything irresistibly down into nothingness”.
2 The accountancy profession seems to single-handedly manage Britain’s NHS; it’s 
hard to keep track of those spinning doors, between private plunder and public 
health. In 2002, a PWC accountant, Simon Leary, got seconded to head up strategy 
at the Department of Health. Once on the inside, Adrian Masters, another PWC 
man, followed him, becoming Director of the Health Team at Blair’s Delivery Unit. 
Masters has since gone on to run the health service regulator, Monitor, illustrating 
how even the regulators need regulating—just as Marx thought the educators 
needed educating! In 2009, moving in the opposite direction, Gary Belfield, Head 
of Commissioning at the Department of Health (under Gordon Brown), joined 
KPMG, soon followed by his former colleague at the Department of Health, Mark 
Britnell; the latter is now hotly tipped to return inside the government and head of 
the NHS.
3 Such an intellectual project would need to put a new spin on sociologist Ray Pahl’s 
old “urban managerialism” thesis. Now we need its beefed up “urban middle-
managerialist” counterpart. Those public sector managers that Pahl pinpointed 
back in the 1970s, who gate kept scarce housing, education and health resources, 
now conspire as private sector bureaucrats who affect the whole allocative process 
around public goods and services—and hence the “life chances” of ordinary people 
everywhere. This is what Pahl said in Whose City? and which still holds with respect 
to those urban middle-managers: “We need to know not only the rates of access 
to scarce resources and facilities for given populations but also the determinants 
of the moral and political values of those who control these rates. We need to 
know how the basic decisions affecting life-chances in urban areas are made…
The controllers of the urban system seem to control more completely than the 
controllers of the industrial system.” 
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by Dimitris Dalakoglou
Devaluing Labour, Depreciating Land 
Section Opening
he most recent developmental and ‘modernising’ boom in Athens 
and Greece started in the early 1990s and peaked with the Olympic 
Games of 2004. Behind the shiny lights of shopping malls, the brand 
new infrastructures and the urban growth of the period hid an enormous 
privatisation project of public and common land. Ten years later, during the 
‘crisis’, this project takes the form of widespread land-grabbing by private 
companies, as Costis Hadjimichalis analyses in the opening of the section.
 At the same time, other neoliberal strategies such as flexible—and 
therefore devalued—labour were immaculately rehearsed during that pre-
Olympic period, thanks to the major public works that supposedly had to be 
built quickly, for the sake of the big event. The absolute devaluation of labour 
was best signified through the eighteen workers killed in the building sites of 
the Olympic infrastructures. The modern and developed Greece required new 
materiality—and so, the construction sector saw enormous profits in the 1990s 
and through the 2000s. The sector’s employment practices (underpayment, 
zero safety for workers, temporality and precariousness) are generalised and 
exemplified now, at the time of crisis. 
 Yet it is also true that during the 1990s and 2000s, a great proportion 
of the country’s population did buy into the ideas of so-called ‘modernisation’, 
‘Europeanization’, and so on. With the aid of corporative media, economic 
growth was elevated to the dominant ideology of the country. Consumerism 
saw unprecedented peaks, while any voices critical to the neoliberal fiesta were 
ignored or outright suppressed. This condition produced a silent majority ready 
to sacrifice everything social movements had achieved through a century of 
struggles. As David Harvey explains further in the section, such processes were 
ideal for alienating people not only from their labour and its product, but from 
their own position within the production process and their political collective 
and individual selfhood. 
 What is reflected today through the case of Athens is a new stage of 
capitalist history being shaped in Western Europe—and further beyond. The 
post-WWII social provisions—that ostensible break in the history of European 
capitalism—are being replaced by a brutal form of governance. However, as 
Filippo Osella tells us, the message coming from that Global South is that the 
process of devalued labour has far from ended. The overarching question of this 
panel, as framed by Bob Caterall, is—simply and complicatedly enough—what 
is to be done? David Harvey sets a departing point for that discussion, proposing 
that we first acknowledge the consequences of alienation before we discuss the 
overcoming of the system that produces it.
T
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Crisis and Land Dispossession1
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T he debate around land and unearned incomes that derive from it returns with a vengeance in national and international headlines alike: not as some remnant of archaic relationships, but as what is at stake in face of the 
new investment options imposed by financial capitalism—sometimes through 
real estate investments and other times through the violent dispossession of 
thousands of hectares of land around the world. Let us not forget that the crisis 
we experience today in the global North, in Southern Europe and in Greece, 
commenced from precarious investments in land and from the housing bubble 
in the USA. The exploitation of land, but also of natural elements linked to it—
such as water, forests, the subsurface and biodiversity—nowadays comprise 
investment targets for local and international speculative capital at some 
unprecedented extent, intensity and geographical spread; an operation that is 
nevertheless difficult to discern, since it is not systematically accounted for, in 
the global South in particular. Nevertheless, NGOs and progressive research 
centres have located hundreds of cases that strongly resemble three well-known 
Greek examples.
 In Chalkidiki, from 2010 on, local communities have been resisting 
the transformation of their land into an open cast gold extraction mine for 
the Canadian company Eldorado Gold, following an internationally increasing 
interest in extractions (known as extractivism, see Velegrakis, 2013). Chalkidiki 
is known for its wonderful beaches, which attract millions of visitors from 
around the world. Yet it is also historically known for its gold and silver extraction 
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mines—and from 1950 up to the present date, consecutive companies continue 
the extraction of gold in caves; despite numerous environmental problems, 
mining activity was tolerated by local communities, as it created employment 
locally. Yet the present case is different. The Greek government, hungry for 
foreign investment, agreed to long-term contracts for the exploitation of the 
deposits for a ludicrously small sum—ceding 317.000 stremmata (31.000 ha), 
ignoring both the devastating impact upon the environment and the health 
of the residents from the open cast mining. These irreversible and negative 
consequences have mobilised thousands of residents who protested, tried to 
occupy the premises of the company, clashed with the Riot Police, all the time 
while villages encountered tear-gas for the first time and while tens of school 
pupils were accused of being “terrorists” (Avgi, 4.2.14).
 At the other end of the country, in southern Crete’s Cape Sidero, a large 
stretch of land of approximately 25.000 stremmata (2.500 ha) is targeted by 
the English company Itanos Gaia (ex-Loyalward) for the creation of combined 
tourist units which, according to the initial proposal, would include luxury 
hotels with a capacity of up to 7.000 beds; three golf courses; a conference 
centre; two marinas and a large number of summer residences, which will be 
made available through leasing and time sharing. The investment was originally 
announced in the mid-1990s; it had been supported by all governments since, 
yet it has faced strong opposition by parts of the local population, by the Left 
and by Greek and international environmental organisations—and it was 
eventually cancelled following appeals to the Constitutional Court in 2010. 
Today, it returns under a new name, Itanos Gaia, with 1.936 beds and a single 
golf course, but with the same area and the insertion in legislation of large-scale 
investments put forward under the so-called ‘fast-track’ regime—allowing, that 
is, limited regulations and controls. The area of the investment comes under 
the disputed ownership of Moni Toplou, the monastery that had conducted the 
negotiations with the English company at the first place. It includes the renown 
palm forest of Vai, while its largest part is under a status of archaeological and 
environmental protection, since it is a NATURA 2000 area (Melissourgos, 
2008).
 At the coastal front of Attica, the area of 6.200 stremmata (620 
ha) that includes the old airport of Elliniko and the Agios Kosmas beach is 
being advertised as the largest urban plot in the Mediterranean—with some 
formidable building facilities. It comprises the jewel in the crown of the 
privatisation program being materialised as part of Greece’s commitments 
through the Memoranda. A key role in the readjusted institutional system 
is held by the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF), while a 
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special law was introduced setting land uses and building regulations for the 
drafting of the Plan of Integrated Development of the Metropolitan Pole of Elliniko 
and Agios Kosmas.
 The airport ceased to operate in 2001; some permanent Olympic 
facilities were constructed in the area since, which remain inactive up to the 
present date—even though neighbouring municipalities have protested 
this. Despite the lucratively low price tag placed by the state, and despite the 
numerous development plans and potentially monopolistic location of this 
area, Elliniko has attracted only a handful of investors—out of which Lamda 
Development, which belongs to the Latsis ship-owning family, made an offer of 
75 euros/sq.m. The offer was accepted by the HRADF, even though neighbouring 
plots of land have an objective land value of 1.100 euros/sq.m. On the other 
hand, the neighbouring municipalities, tens of organisations and initiatives 
and the Left have all been resisting and mobilising by all means against the 
privatisation and the cutting off of free access to the shore by future “investors” 
(Vatavali & Zifou, 2013).
 Similar examples at even larger scales exist everywhere around the 
world. The violent interventions of large international companies in Latin 
America and in Africa aimed at the grabbing of cultivatable land, water and 
biodiversity from the locals are well-known—and they are just like the 
colonialists used to do. In southern Asia and in Polynesia, luxury tourist 
complexes assert exclusive claims over vast coastal areas and small islands, 
violently replacing the traditional economy. Real estate investments surpass 
even the wildest of imagination in the Emirates of the Gulf, which compete with 
one another in the creation of luxury, unashamed constructions in the middle 
of the desert. And in Europe, one only need take a careful look at London, Paris 
or Berlin to locate the importance of land and property in the attraction of 
investments.
 In the western Mediterranean, the tourist prototype of the combined 
unit including real estate and golf facilities—just like the one at the Toplou 
monastery—with the aid of scandalous spatial policies by local regional 
authorities, has grabbed vast areas of cultivatable land and water resources and 
has contributed to the present housing bubble in Spain. In the countries of the 
formerly existing socialism such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, we see the 
contemporary violence exercised for the privatisation of land, both urban and 
agrarian2. In ex-Eastern Germany in particular, privatisations are materialised 
by Treuhand, a company whose coordinator was Wolfgang Schäuble, a person 
well-known to us by now3. The experience of Treuhand has crucially inspired 
the founding and the operation of the HRADF in Greece.
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I approach the previous examples as land dispossession because they outline a 
shrewd act that takes place through violence and deceit. In the case of land, what 
is of utmost importance is the status of social relationships and the balance 
of class and political forces that define, at any given historical period, the 
relationship of the society in question with that land.
 In the pre-capitalist period, land dispossession was synonymous to 
the violent enclosure of common areas by landowners and feudal power. These 
common areas included crop fields, forests, lakes and rivers used in common 
by the landless—and whose violent enclosure therefore deprived them from 
access to common resources necessary for their survival—such as the produce 
of cultivation, the prey, the produce of the forests, water, etc.
 In certain parts of the global South today—and despite the collaboration 
of national governments—one could use the notion of the enclosure of common 
land for the violent interference of international or national companies, for the 
purposes of extractions, deforestations, mass cultivations, etc. In these areas, 
capitalist relationships have not fully developed and/or there is no detailed 
recording of property. In the global North, the development of capitalist 
relationships and the operation of cadasters has safeguarded the individual/
private and public ownership of land; there is no longer any “common land” in 
the sense this used to have before, and enclosure as a notion may now only be 
used indirectly.
 The grabbing of private land takes place from one private entity at the 
expense of another private one, and falls under civil law. The grabbing of private 
land may exist even in cases of compulsory, unfair dispossession for the benefit 
of the public or for private entities, under the pretext of productive investments, 
when these take place for a demeaning fee. We are also aware of violent and 
vindictive state forfeiture of the property of communists both during and after 
the end of the Spanish and Greek civil wars—while the confiscation of real 
estate belonging to Jews during nazism and fascism was also widespread.
 In Greece, the most important target of dispossession is public land 
when (a) there exists unauthorised and illegal occupation, building on and use of 
public areas; (b) when transactions of public land take place (selling, allocation 
or lease) under terms and fees that cause loss to citizens; when public land, 
building, infrastructures and services are privatised and (d) when institutions 
are altered or formed to facilitate the trespassing, privatisation or selling off of 
public land (declassification of protected areas/buildings, change in land uses, 
decrease in the thresholds of land segmentation, etc).
 Greek and international examples set out the questions that have led 
me to write the book of which this text is part of the introduction: the quest for 
the thread connecting on the one hand, the strong interest in land investments 
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after 2000—and on the other, financial capital and neoliberal policies the 
world over; where and how such land grabbings take place, and what the role 
of land may be in crisis-ridden Greece. The last question may also be the most 
important one.
 From 2009 on, the crisis in Greece has decisively contributed to the 
devalorization/depreciation of the exchange value of land, decreasing monetary 
values by 15-30%—depending on the area—when compared to the 2005 
prices. The special status imposed as of 2010 forms a lucrative environment for 
speculators-investors, dramatically altering the legal, constitutional order and 
imposing something of a protectorate status upon the country.
 Consequences on everyday life, with the 1,5 million of unemployed, 
with the collapse of public health and education, with the constant lay-offs and 
wage and pension decreases are all “justified” by the ruling classes as a price that 
is necessary to pay in order for Greece to exit the crisis. This irrational domestic 
devaluation, leading to the reproduction of recession, keeps the matter of public 
land and real estate dispossession afloat in public news and debates, as some 
supposed solution for the paying off of public debate—which however happens 
to increase, instead of decreasing. Hundreds of examples from across all of the 
country’s peripheries, apart from the three aforementioned ones in this text, 
tell the same story. The areas grabbed may be smaller than corresponding ones 
in the global South, yet they comprise an application of the same international 
practices, adjusted to Greek society’s local characteristics.
 According to the Troika analysts, Greece experiences some “delayed 
mobility” of land values when compared to the rest of Europe—and a 
“normalisation” of the “Greek exception” is therefore required. Land and 
real estate must therefore follow the path of what has happened in the rest 
of Europe: privatisation of large public areas, land ownership centralisation 
and curtailing of small ownerships, an “obligatory capitalist modernisation”, 
according to the supporters of the Memoranda. And when the above are 
combined with the forthcoming opening-up of auctions of houses and shops, 
the increase of taxation and the selling off of the rights of “red” mortgages 
from banks to third parties (to specialised international hedge funds), then an 
explosive mix is formed with unforeseen social and political consequences. The 
people who lost out from the devalorization/devaluation of the exchange value 
of their land and real estate due to the crisis may now possibly lose their use 
value itself—that is, their homes.
 We therefore stand witness to an unprecedented attack taking 
place at many different levels; what is at stake here is land and, at another 
level, the building stock—primarily public buildings, commercial real estate 
and residencies. What had been won through generations—materially, 
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institutionally but symbolically also—is now lost over a small amount of time, 
through the dispossession of land, of public property and of small ownership 
alike.
 It was Marx who had analysed land dispossession through the 
enclosure of the commons by landowners during the 18th century and through 
primitive accumulation, while the notion was also developed—on different 
levels—by Rosa Luxemburg and the anarchist geographer Peter Kropotkin. 
The dispossession of land and common resources associated with it was the 
driving force behind colonialism, and it is nowadays reproduced in a number of 
different ways. Earlier on, Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) had referred to land 
dispossession and to unearned income deriving from it, as has the economist 
Michael Hudson in many of his books, including recently (2010). Among 
those who extensively refer to it are geographers such as David Harvey; agro-
economists and sociologists such as White, Borras, and others (2012); ecologists 
such as Gouson and Fletcher (…) and “autonomous” marxists who propose a 
contemporary application of the theory of the commons and enclosures, such 
as Hardt and Negri (2009), de Angelis (2010) and others. In the international 
bibliography, the term used is “land grabbing”—while Harvey (2010, 2012) 
uses the term “land dispossession”.
 Land dispossession in Greece, however did not commence with the 
crisis—and it shall not end with the exit from the Memoranda. It comprises 
a timeless characteristic of Greek society, with the thousands of grabbings 
of public land by individuals, businesses, the church, monasteries and 
municipalities through all sorts of illegal constructions, the invocation of non-
existing ownership titles and the timelessly severely lacking interest in the 
safeguarding of public interest in public property. Grabbings of public land and 
public space take place at multiple scales: from the large areas used for extraction 
and illegal quarries, tourist real estate with golf courses and the infringement 
of seashores, all the way to the illegal woodland clearing for cultivation, the 
thousands of illegal constructions, the occupation of squares and pedestrian 
streets by restaurant and café tables and chairs, or the extension of our garden 
wall at the neighbour’s expense. These tactics enjoy an extended presence 
all over Greece and affect political mentalities and the everyday behaviours 
of citizens and authorities alike, at all levels. They also affect, however, the 
development and planning of Greek cities—with the constant legalisation of 
illegal constructions and the stretching of city plans, with a parallel attempt to 
put to order previously dispossessed areas. The status of land dispossession in 
Greece changed dramatically, and enjoyed a renewed boost from the 1990s on, 
with the country’s “modernisation” governments and the 2004 Olympiad—and 
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following the 2009 crisis in particular; all of these connected local processes of 
capital accumulation with the global hegemony of financial capitalism.
 This short book—to which this text will act as an introduction—was 
written heatedly in the fall of 2013 and the spring of 2014, in parallel with the 
developments of that time. Here, I try to trace the continuities and ruptures in 
land grabbing processes, particularly focusing on the international and domestic 
developments after 1980. I am aware of the difficulties of the project and I warn 
demanding readers that they shall not hereby find any thorough historical 
analysis and documentation of land grabbing neither internationally nor in 
Greece. The book’s aim is different: it is to reignite interest on matters of land 
and land rent; to connect them with the new terms set by global sovereignty of 
financial capital and to relate them to the present international conjuncture of 
the financial and social crisis. More than anything, it aims to reveal the key role 
of land—materially as well as symbolically—at multiple scales: from restaurant 
tables (occupying pavements) to coastal tourism, all the way to the mines of 
Chalkidiki.
 Under the present conditions of the country’s total deprecation 
(financial, geographical, social, political and moral) there are two main valuable 
resources targeted for exploitation/grabbing by lenders and speculators alike: 
the educated young generation and land. The appropriation of surplus value 
from the excellently educated youth happens through unemployment and 
migration: apart from the extraction of surplus from their specialised labour, 
their places of reception and their employers additionally have no expense 
as a society—since they have not paid a single euro for the cost of social 
reproduction of the thousands of doctors, nurses, engineers, artists, lawyers, 
social workers and so many others already residing and working at the lender-
countries4. Land, the subject of this book, is of course immobile and the crisis 
contributes to the devalorization/depreciation of its exchange value, while the 
special conditions that we suffer are necessary in order for its dispossession 
to take place in situ, at such an unprecedented scale and in such a small time-
frame, by Greek and foreign capital alike.
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1    Excerpt from the volume by Costis Hadjimichalis (2014) Crisis and Land 
Dispossession, to be released in Greek in the fall of 2014.
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struggles in Europe, Hands off the Land, European Coordination via Campesina, April 
2013.
3 At the time when he was president of Treuhand, Mr Schäuble was shot and 
seriously wounded by a German citizen who had lost their job and house due to the 
privatisations; an attempted assassination that grounded Schäuble in a wheelchair. 
Thanks to Ares Kalandides for this piece of information.
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by Bob Catterall
What is to be Done? Redefining, Re-Asserting 
and Reclaiming Land, Labour and the City
(Draft notes, drawing on work in progress)
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1
A. What is to be done? Epigraphs and Epitaphs
‘[A]ll that remains for the socialist, as such is… to conduct propaganda 
solely among the urban workers, while these workers will be continually 
drowned in the peasant mass which... will be thrown on to the streets of the 
large towns in search of a wage’.
2. ‘It’s a thing that can fire one’s energies over a whole lifetime’.
3. ‘We were right’.
4. ‘Forget the West!’
5. ‘Our task is to open up a theoretical terrain wherein Afghan women can 
demonstrate openly against Islamist laws that would fetter their autonomy. 
Without this action being sucked into the ruling hegemony of the West. We will 
not succeed if we continue to read only Western writers or only writers from 
the non-west who enter into our debates on our terms. It will not happen if 
we remain within the comfort zone of any civilisation into which we have been 
born’.
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6. ‘How does a global financial crisis permeate the spaces of the everyday 
in a city?... “Privatised” explores the legacy of mass privatisation 
projects that preceded the 2004 Olympics, placing them in the context 
of present day privatisation schemes. “Devalued” gazes at the ever-
shrinking spaces of migrants in the city and the devaluation of their 
lives that comes as a result. “Militarised” shows how, in face of the 
crisis, this devaluation turns into a generalised condition.
7. ‘GREEN SHOOTS, DEAD ROOTS. Austerity has worked apparently. House 
prices are soaring and George Osborne is proclaiming that the British economy 
is thriving. But look below the surface and it’s a very different story...’
8. ‘You wanted to know my name, but I have no name other than what I appear 
to be... You’ve seen who I am. There is nothing greater than mankind and 
womankind. I am she who appears before you, who loves and is loved’.
The quotations above are at this stage deliberately unattributed so as to 
encourage thought about them and their possible interaction. Their authors and 
sources and their possible significances will be introduced in their presentation 
at the conference. For the curious/and or impatient all but 3, 6 and 7 will be 
found in the extract below and conference goers should be able to identify 6.
B. ‘Towards the Great Transformation: (11) Where/what is 
culture in ‘Planetary Urbanisation’? Towards a new paradigm’. 
[Extract from a draft for the next article in a series appearing in City. 
Endnotes and references are minimal in this version]
Abstract
The present dominant paradigm in much writing on ‘planetary urbanisation’ 
with its exclusive emphasis on ‘ the urban’ and consequent neglect/denial of ‘the 
rural’, thereby of the planet itself, and its minimal deployment of the humanities, 
reflects the somewhat ramshackle condition of urban studies and socio-spatial 
sciences with their uncritical and under-theorised notion of interdisciplinarity 
(sometimes incorrectly labelled recently as transdisciplinarity). Where and what is 
the planet itself in much of the work on ‘planetary urbanisation’? Where featured at 
all it is reduced to dehumanised and apparently nonsentient (mainly male) actants. 
It cannot do justice to the nature of life on the planet and therefore cannot 
provide an adequate account or critique of planetary urbanisation. It is, in fact, 
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in danger of becoming an accomplice in that imperial(ist) project. An alternative 
paradigm, outlined here, is one in which the biosocial and gendered nature of 
culture, including its relationship to agriculture and ‘the rural’, is central to its 
explorations of the full geo-spatial field and their implications for action.
 To achieve justice with and for sentient beings and the planet, that 
misrepresented biosocial entity has, first, to be earthed, materialised, gendered, and 
cultured. (subsequent episodes reconsider the city in this neglected context and then 
science as partly normative notions). This series, developing a multidimensional, 
transdisciplinary (rather than interdisciplinary) approach, providing some necessary 
infilling and new/old orientations to the now outmoded paradigm, sets out a claim 
for this new paradigm for the biospatial sciences and the humanities
 It seeks, in this episode drawing particularly on Marx’s studies of the 
Russian commune and beyond (in space and time), Chernyshevski’s work, particularly 
his novel What Is To Be Done?, and earlier work in the series, to contribute to the 
identification of a partly agrarian and fully ‘encultured’ path to the reclamation of 
the now acutely over-urbanised planet.
 Continuing, then, with the apparently fanciful and playful, there is 
Marx’s mole as ‘discovered’ by Keiller’s ‘Robinson’, as a plant, an apparently 
animate lichen who/which is ‘becoming animal’ as a mole (Deleuze’s preference 
was for a serpent). An exceptionally literate animal, the mole/lichen is perhaps – 
to extend the fanciful and playful approach—engaged in a still heretical reading 
of the agrarian dimension in the last phase of Marx’s work. Such a reading in 
these pages has included the work on ecologies of the significantly extra-mural 
intellectual-activist Guattari, of a philosophically-inclined naturalist, David 
Abram, engaged in grounding Deleuze’s talk of ‘becoming animal’, of a sorely 
victimised Soviet poet Osip Mandelstam seeking to understand the promise 
and horror of both the Russian revolution and revolution itself (a task currently 
aided by Badiou’s re-reading of communism) through the horror and imperilled 
promise of a vertebrate creature, both victim and possible hero, and of a young 
Palestinian writer, Nasser Abourahme, seeking to understand the promise, 
waywardness and horror of the current Egyptian revolution.
 The move from Badiou’s emphasis on the crucial importance of the 
communist experience to revolt and revolutions in an area where Islam is 
powerful in one sense endorses Susan Buck-Morss’s1 definition of the truly 
radical task:
Our task is to open up a theoretical terrain wherein Afghan women can 
demonstrate openly against Islamist laws that would fetter their autonomy. 
Without this action being sucked into the ruling hegemony of the West. We 
will not succeed if we continue to read only Western writers or only writers 
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from the non-west who enter into our debates on our terms. It will not happen 
if we remain within the comfort zone of any civilisation into which we have 
been born (80).
Abourahme’s understandably impatient response to this latter tendency was 
‘Forget the West!’ But extending Buck-Morss’s insight now to any civilisation 
in which we have been schooled, directly or indirectly,one needs to hold on to 
both ends of this journey and keep travelling between and beyond them. The 
communist experience is not within ‘the comfort zone’ of our civilisation. In 
many ways it ‘went wrong’, disastrously wrong, but it has also been distorted 
and ‘disappeared.’ This episode in the series makes a small contribution to 
rescuing an early phase of the communist, and overlapping communalist, 
experience from its burial by neoliberalism, and the Marxist tradition from 
its burial by various brands of ‘Marxist’ and non-Marxist orthodoxy restoring 
it, not uncritically, to but also beyond ‘the disciplines’ and eventually to 
transdisciplinarity.
 In seeking to understand the neglected sources of these two (perhaps, 
in a sense, significantly successive) ‘modern’ revolutions, communist and ‘Arab’, 
the anarchistic lichen/mole may find herself/himself returning not only to 
some natural/ cultural/intellectual roots of the original Soviet experiment, but 
also to a sense of the need to acknowledge the wholeness of the dismembered 
being(s) and smashed vertebration not just of communist victims but also of 
those struggling for transformation within the heartlands and peripheries 
of capitalism , seeking to oppose and supersede the massive human and 
planetary dismemberments already imposed and now accelerating under ‘the 
status quo’ of neoliberal capitalism and attendant academic disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity. Also aware, like Mandelstam, of the need for welding, the 
mole/lichen may well have a vision of geo-social transformation.
 One postpositivist, but sadly as yet non-paradigmatic, interpretation 
of planetary urbanisation, properly literary/humanistic at one stage, that of 
Merrifield, deploys, following Lefebvre, the science fiction of a writer, Asimov, 
vastly curious but submerged in the physical sciences and in urban isolation2, 
matched in the hands of others (for whom he is not responsible) by the 
presentation of a somewhat tarnished image of the city-planet of Trantor in 
which the people are pulled, to use Mandelstam’s words, into ‘captivity/In order 
to begin a new world’.
 The temptation, shared by most mainstream contemporary 
commentators and historically and currently by some anarchists, is to 
blame such negative/negated projects on Marx and/or Marxism and/or the 
revolutionary spirit and its various manifestations. Some parts of the story 
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have, though, to be retold. As Kropotkin for example, as noted by Atkinson, 
undertook the significant studies in the 1880s, later published in Fields, 
Factories and Workshops of Tomorrow (1899), Marx was no longer,if he ever was, 
the dismissive critic of ‘rural idiocy’ (idiocy is not an accurate translation of 
the term used, and the remark refers both to a specific situation and specific 
circumstances)3 nor had he ever been dismissive of cultural criticism and 
activity.
 By the 1880s he had learned Russian, studied Russian cultural and 
socio-economic affairs , including agriculture, met and corresponded with 
members of the Russian intelligentsia, and was involved in theoretical and 
practical debates about Marxism that were to influence the revolution in 
a positive sense that cannot be reduced to the purely negative dimension 
exclusively asserted by contemporary apologists for the increasingly destructive 
‘status quo’ of neoliberal capitalism as characteristic of ‘communism’ and indeed 
communalism, of any plans that they see as a threat to their profit margins 
and expectations. He had also, as shown below, sought to extend advanced 
Western intellectual and empathic horizons towards historically foundational 
and spatially global roots and routes.
 One may discover, then, in late Marx (with some commonality with 
but also divergences from Engels) and some anarchism, crucial intellectual 
preoccupations, insights and resources for a transdisciplinary paradigm. The 
range of the work of late Marx—its holistic implications and tendency should 
be emphasised—has been indicated by John Bellamy Foster4 who points to
the more familiar work on the origins of the family, private property and the state 
with its less familiar connection to ‘the revolution in ethnological time that began 
in 1859’
‘concerns about the development of agriculture, that is, the long-term relation to 
the soil’
and ‘about the direction of Russian development’
‘the roots in historical development of the materialist conception, which needed 
now to be extended back before ancient Greece, before written history, before 
philological analysis’
the attempt ‘to break out of the literature of colonialism, through which he had 
been compelled to view the development of the rest of the world...’
But such work is effectively crucial only if it is conducted and read in the light 
of scientific, cultural, communal/communist, ‘womanist’5 struggles, agrarian 
as well as urban contexts—reversing the present myopic and exclusionary 
urban perspectives of much socio-spatial academic work, including ‘planetary 
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urbanisation’, and established political priorities)—in late nineteenth Russia, 
but now worldwide.
 Seeking to do justice to do such struggles, previous episodes of this 
series located those aspects of the planet at best marginalised by much work 
on ‘planetary urbanisation’, instead earthing the planet, revisiting aspects of 
it, the soil, music/art, spring, birth, love, hope and fear, the lichen, the wild-
flowering earth, in fact its culture.
‘…Citizen, how interested are we in Your opinion’
 A major link, symbolic and actual, between these two dimensions, is an appeal 
in 1881 from the Russian revolutionary activist Vera Zasulich—who had shot in 
1878 (without killing) the St Petersburg governor for flogging a prisoner , and 
in a great political trial had been acquitted—to Marx in February 1881 asking 
his opinion about the destinies of the Russian rural commune: ‘...Citizen, how 
interested are we in Your opinion’ (VZ to KM, 16 Feb, 1881—p 98-99).
 Marx clearly had great difficulty in answering. It should be pointed out 
that his drafts were not just a theoretical exercise. They provide elements of a 
comprehensive and relatively detailed consideration of internal and external 
aspects of the Russian commune.
 He wrote four drafts, amounting to twenty printed pages, in February 
and early March, replying with a five paragraph letter on 8 March. His two 
concluding sentences provide a succinct conclusion: ‘…the commune is the 
fulcrum for social regeneration in Russia. But in order that it might function as 
such, the harmful influences assailing it on all sides must first be eliminated, and 
it must then be assured the normal conditions for spontaneous development’ 
(124).
 The first sentence and the latter half of the second one are challenging. 
The utmost importance is attributed to the qualitative dimension and promise, 
including ‘spontaneous development’, of the commune. But then the harmful 
influences are seen to threaten that promise:
What threatens the life of the Russian commune is neither a historical 
inevitability nor a theory; it is state oppression, and exploitation by capitalist 
intruders whom the state has made powerful at the peasants’ expense. (p. 
104-5)
How had the positive part of Marx’s conclusion—‘social regeneration’, 
‘spontaneous development’—come about and how could it subsequently 
disappear, be ‘disappeared’? This is a major question relating particularly 
to later developments after 1900, the endpoint of the present stage of this 
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analysis. Within this period Marx has pointed, above, to state oppression 
combined with capitalist oppression. Within and beyond this period Theodor 
Shanin—in his seminal collection (seminal both for Marx’s developing analysis 
and prognostication and as an example of mature sociological enquiry), The 
Late Marx and the Russian Road—points to a number of crucial positive and 
negative forces within the wider movement: ‘It had been no accident that it 
was from Russia and the Russians that Marx learned new things about global 
‘unevenness’, about peasants and about revolution, insights which would be 
valid in the century still to come. The triple origin of Marx’s thought suggested 
by Engels—German philosophy, French socialism and British political 
economy—should in truth be supplemented by a fourth one, that of Russian 
revolutionary populism.
All that is easier to perceive when looked at late in the twentieth century, 
but the massive brainwashing of interpretation initiated by the Second 
International is still powerful enough to turn it into a ‘‘blind spots’ (p.20).
Shanin’s analysis has been challenged by Derek Sayer and Philip Corrigan 
( whose essay is reproduced in Shanin’s book), as ‘special pleading with a 
vengeance’ (The Late Marx and the Russian Road, p80) and by Jim Heartfield:
 
‘Marx was dependent on Chernyevsky as a source for his writings on 
the Russian commune. Chernyevsky exaggerated the extent of the 
survival of communal landownership, as Lenin later showed in On 
Capitalist Development in Russia. In practical terms the peasants did not 
constitute a secure basis for the revolution..
But Marx did not claim that the peasants constituted a secure basis. He noted 
(see above) that the peasantry were threatened but nevertheless promising. 
 For Nicholai Cherneyshevski’s view I turn here to a particularly 
seminal example of the other dimension of this account, Russian communal 
experience, imaginings and writings, in this case the world portrayed and 
examined in his work but particularly his novel,‘What is to be done?’ (1863) 
and its massive subsequent influence. It is here that we come most evidently 
to aspects of culture neglected by ‘properly’ professional urbanists and socio-
spatial analysts: the flowers, birdsong,‘heroes’ of various kinds, elements that 
we have so far touched on, and now, additionally, a ‘heroine’ (Vera Pavlovna), 
a goddess, dreams, a palace, and hints of a civilisation organised on a different 
basis.
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‘What is to be done?’
Vera touched Pavlovna has a dream...
 The field glimmers with a golden tint; the meadow is covered 
with flowers; and hundreds upon thousands of blossoms unfold on bushes 
surrounding the meadows. The forest that rises up behind grows greener, 
whispers, and is decked out in bright flowers... Birds flutter in the branches 
of the trees, their thousands of voices float down from above with all the 
fragrances... ‘At the foot of the mountains, on the outskirts of the forest, 
amidst the bushes flowering in tall, thick avenues, a palace looms up. (360-
361) 
 The palace looms up as Vera and a goddess fly towards it. At this 
point, the curious social or sociospatial scientist/reader may find, if he gets 
that far, that his ‘willing suspension of disbelief ’ somewhat challenged. 
A dream, flowers, a forest, bird song, mountains, a palace, a goddess flying 
with the ‘heroine’? At this point, such a reader may find himself running for 
cover. And that cover is readily available in the increasingly marketised but 
already threatened palaces of academe where sociology by definition excludes 
the earth, geography tucks the earth away neatly into a realm inhabited by 
‘physical’ practitioners far from that more vocal realm patrolled by ‘human’ 
practitioners, and both sociologists and geographers (physical and human) 
largely isolate themselves from the increasingly denuded humanities ( now a 
luxury, it would seem, like social provision for the sick and poor that ‘we’ can no 
longer afford). Something more than an interdisciplinary approach is required 
if we are find a sure path across such a sundered and exploited landscape. 
There are of course exceptions to such foreshortened understandings and 
misunderstandings. Lefebvre followed by Merrifield provide a distinguished 
one, but not one articulating a new paradigm that can enable ‘the marriage of 
true minds’ across the chasms between these three academic empires. Both 
Lefebvre and Merrifield make that journey but return together only in this 
context in the company of the undeniably significant Joyce and the somewhat 
conveniently myopic (particularly for urbanists) Asimov. But without 
Chernyshevsky.
From the brief extract quoted above it is apparent that the novel What is to 
be done? ’presents difficulties for contemporary readers. In his important and 
influential book All That is Solid Melts into Air Marshall Berman put forward 
a largely unsympathetic account of What Is To Be Done?, ultimately preferring 
Cherneyshevsky’s rival, Dosteovsky, though he does point out the novel’s 
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emphasis on the symbolic significance of action in the street and on some of 
the specificities of a particular city, St. Petersburg. A more contextualised and 
comprehensive reading is provided by Richard Freeborn in his major study,The 
Russian Revolutionary novel. He notes: ‘In its political effects, as a fundamental 
text of Russian socialism, this novel has probably changed the world more than 
any other. The vision of the socialist future projected by the novel is usually 
assumed to be the Crystal Palace constructed of aluminium, with conditions 
of controlled humidity and a surrounding hydraulic civilisation... Freedom and 
equality, based on principles of rational egoism, here reign supreme. But the 
anthropocentric form of this vision, which appealed more to Cherneyshevsky 
than the institutional or technological... is epitomised in the deliberate idealism 
of the heroine, Vera Pavlovna, in her fourth dream. The ideal of emancipated 
womanhood becomes clearly identified with the creation of myth’ (244-5).s
 Chernyshevski is, then, seeking to bring together a number of items 
of which some may appear to be incompatible: technology, freedom, equality, 
rational egoism, idealism, a heroine, and myth—and, one should add, a 
goddess. He does, though, bring them together except for those governed by the 
a priori principle that they are irretrievably incompatible. To take, for example, 
a palace, technology and the last three items listed here—a heroine, myth and 
a goddess—, it should be noted that they are brought together in an original 
way. The heroine is both an initially isolated individual and, increasingly, a 
person, representative and symbolic, deeply attentive to new ideas and to their 
relationship to practice, both in her personal relationships and in her work (she 
forms a cooperatives of seamstresses). The goddess is apparently a mythical 
figure but also a symbol representing emerging comradeship:
You wanted to know my name, but I have no name other than what I appear 
to be...You’ve seen who I am. There is nothing greater than mankind and 
womankind. I am she who appears before you, who loves and is loved (245).
The palace, as Freeborn implies, refers in part not only Paxton’s Crystal Palace 
in London but also, more importantly, one attuned to a ‘surrounding hydraulic 
civilisation’. He elaborates a little: 
In material terms, the basis of the new life... would seem to be hydraulic: field 
irrigation, drainage, the maintenance of humidity (25).
What is to be done? is, then a novel of an unfamiliar kind. Marx does not 
seem to have read it, but he was familiar with Chernyshevsky’s philosophical 
work and economic and social commentary. Despite its considerable length 
chapter 20
188 CRISIS-SCAPES
and ex-centric nature (approximately 400 pages in the Katz edition), in 
part, it is at times,almost a critical compendium for living, with a narrative 
element,and provocation of the reader with Brechtian estrangement devices 
and playfulness. It was a book taken up by peasants and by students, both when 
working with peasants and in their own personal and urban contexts, in the 
search for fundamental social transformation. There is an autobiographical 
statement by Lenin that conveys the difficulty, force and impact of the book: 
‘Chernyshevsky’s novel is too complicated, too full of ideas, to understand and 
evaluate at an early age. I myself tried to read it when I was about fourteen.. 
That was an utterly pointless, superficial reading. But after the execution of my 
brother, knowing that Chernyshevsky’s novel was one of his favourite books, 
I set about reading it properly and sat over reading it not just a few days but 
whole weeks. It was only then that I understood its depth. It’s a thing that can 
fire one’s energies over a whole lifetime’ (24).
An Interim conclusion
It has been argued in this series that the present dominant orthodoxy in much 
writing on ‘planetary urbanisation’ with its exclusive emphasis on ‘ the urban’ 
and consequent neglect/denial of ‘the rural’, and its minimal deployment of the 
humanities, reflecting the somewhat ramshackle condition of the socio-spatial 
sciences, cannot do justice to the nature of life on the planet and therefore cannot 
provide an adequate account or critique of planetary urbanisation, in fact is in 
danger of becoming an accomplice in that imperial(ist) project (a point to which 
I give detailed attention later in the series). An alternative paradigm,presented 
here, is one in which the biosocial nature of culture, including its relationship 
to gender, agriculture and ‘the rural’, is central.
 This episode, drawing particularly on Marx’s studies of the Russian 
commune and Cherneyshevski’s novel What Is To Be Done?, seeks to contribute 
to the identification of a partly agrarian and ‘encultured’ communalist path, 
one ultimately related to the full spectrum of life and sentience on the planet. 
‘The spectre of democracy’ is, it has been asserted and will later be fully 
argued, is the reality behind capitalist/imperialist urbanization and its 
accelerating domination and destruction of the ‘wild-flowered planet’. 
Communism played a major part in that domination and destruction 
but its one time predominantly spectral aspects have long been fading 
and its relationship to communalism has been emerging within a larger 
appreciation of sentience and the planet. ‘Back to Marx?’, then, but to a 
Marx and companions, plant, animal and human, we scarcely know and 
can but scarcely know within an outmoded paradigm and embedded 
practice. Among the more surprising companions included in this episode are 
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heroines and heroes that link back to the discussion of lichens, moles, serpents 
and vertebrates in earlier episodes, an exploration intended to contribute to 
notions of leadership appropriate to the reclamation of the now acutely over-
urbanised planet. 
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1  Buck-Morss, S (2010) ‘The Second Time as Farce...Historical Pragmatics and the 
Untimely Present’, in Douzinas, C and Zizek, C, eds (2010), The Idea of Communism, 
London: Verso, p.80.
2  Merrifield notes: ‘In Asimov’s Foundation saga, there’s no alien presence, no non-
human life, save humanly made robots: his vision of the universe is all the more 
interesting because it is all-too-human. (Merrifield, A. 2013. The Politics of the 
Encounter: Urban Theory and Protest Under Planetary Urbanisation.’ (p.88) All- too-
human? Or all too inhuman ( and non-animal or even in-animate?)
3  ‘Rural idiocy’. Idiocy is not an exact English equivalent for what Marx had in mind. 
But there probably isn’t one. The remark referred both to a specific situation and a 
general condition. From Marx’s training and continued interest and deep interest 
in the ‘classics’ (one fundamental point about Marx in this series is that Marx is a 
profoundly literary writer and to a significant degree his work cannot be understood 
without this recognition) and was fully aware of the fact that “the meaning of ‘idiot’ in 
ancient Athens came from ‘Idiotes’, a citizen who was cut off from public life, and who 
viewed... public life from a narrow, parochial viewpoint, hence ‘idiotic’” (JBF, p.136). 
The problem with the usage of this word is how much one relates the latter dismissive 
use to the former more explanatory ones. The latter explanatory use refers both to 
behaviour in specific situations, such as the peasants reactionary class identification 
in mid-century France (as discussed in the 18th Brumaire), and to a general condition, 
the division between town and country (as discussed in the German Ideology and the 
Communist Manifesto).
4   It should be clear that this is not just his Russian phase nor one of the flickering 
of a once great mind. It is a new phase in his work in which he is reconsidering earlier 
in the light of new evidence, experience and possibilities (theoretical and actual) The 
complexity of late Marx JBF (218-219).
5   Alice Walker introduced the word “womanist” into feminist parlance in her 1983 
book In Search of Our Mothers’ Gardens: Womanist Prose. She cited the phrase “acting 
womanish,” which was said to a child who acted serious, courageous and grown-up 
rather than girlish. Many women of color in the 1970s had sought to expand the 
feminism of the Women’s Liberation Movement beyond its concern for the problems of 
white middle-class women. The adoption of “womanist” signified an inclusion of race 
and class issues in feminism.’ Free Women’s History Newsletter!
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Labour Migration, Brokerage, and Governance in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council countries
21
I mmigrant labour has played a fundamental role in the economic development and nation-building endeavours of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. By 1985, following the oil-boom decade, the number of 
foreign labourers in the six GCC nations as a whole stood at 4.4 million. A little 
more than two decades later, that number had nearly tripled, increasing to 11 
million by 2008. According to the latest data, the proportion of foreigners in 
the labour forces of the GCC countries is an average of 67% (3). Saudi Arabia 
is at the low end of that range, with 50%, while Qatar, with 87%, is at the high 
end. Even with concerted government efforts to support employment of GCC 
nationals reliance on foreign labour is expected to increase yet further in the 
coming years, as the region continues to pursue ambitious plans for industrial 
and infrastructural.
 Management of labour migration across other GCC countries entails 
regulations limiting residence to short-term employment contracts, while at 
the same time encouraging and facilitating international labour mobility. As a 
consequence, members of the immigrant labour force typically move repeatedly 
between their home and host countries in a pattern akin to what in sociological 
literature has been referred to as “circular migration”. The nature of their 
employment is almost always temporary, but recurrent—normally, repeated in 
contracts of three or four years long—so that they are engaged simultaneously 
with both their country of employment and their country of origin over long 
periods of time. The flow of migrants’ remittances back to their home countries 
has contributed much-needed foreign exchange and played a substantial role in 
the economic life of labour-sending nations.
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Circular migration to the GCC area has acquired a degree of continuity. Migrants 
might spend their whole working lives moving back and forth between the 
Gulf and their country of origin, so that in many sending countries, it has 
been normalized as part of everyday life. But a migrant’s social class, ethnicity, 
and profession lead to different outcomes. By-and-large, middle-class migrant 
professionals and entrepreneurs can secure, over time, a measure of long-
term stability in employment and residence in the GCC countries that remains 
beyond reach to most unskilled migrant labour. At the same time, employment 
in the GCC area is characterized by various degrees of segmentation in terms 
of occupation, gender and nationality, so that certain sectors are dominated 
almost entirely by Gulf Arab citizens—typically the public sector—and others 
by labour migrants: domestic help, the service sector, and the construction 
industry, for instance. Whilst this segmentation of employment has driven 
the sustained economic growth since the oil boom of the 1970s, it has also 
contributed to creating a substantial socio-legal and economic divide between 
citizens and migrants across the GCC region. Wages and working conditions, 
for example, are better in the citizen-dominated public sector than in sectors 
where migrant labour is pervasive.
 The process of migration itself has been largely informal. Migration 
to GCC countries is seldom an individual project: webs of kinship and 
friendship are the building blocks of complex social networks that provide 
migrant labourers with the funds, know-how, and contacts that enable people 
to circulate across borders. At the same time, these networks provide various 
degrees of social protection for migrants and their families in case of failure 
or hardships. Migration brokers with links to those webs of kinship—big-
men, fixers, go-betweens, middle-men, agents—are often at the centre of local 
migration networks. Private and public recruitment agencies normally rely on 
the contacts, networks, and financial resources of these brokers. In other words, 
the boundaries between formal and informal channels of recruitment are 
extremely porous and blurred, so that multiple and overlapping actors facilitate 
the migration process: licensed recruitment companies, unlicensed individual 
operations, village heads, traders, teachers, religious leaders/institutions, state 
officials, and migrants themselves.
 Both brokers and agencies—whether informal or formal and 
government-approved—are key actors in the migration process. Operating 
at various points in that process, they smooth relationships between would-
be migrants and local bureaucracies in the often difficult task of acquiring 
migration documents, provide loans to finance migration, negotiate jobs, and 
guide migrants through the labyrinth of sub-contracting that characterizes the 
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current global labour market. However, whilst migration agents and brokers 
mediate between the demand and supply of labour, their (often unregulated) 
practices might lead to substantial exploitation of migrants. Hefty fees, 
corruption and outright cheating are all too common, often leaving migrants 
and their families to shoulder substantial debts.
 Many within and outside the GCC area argue that the current migration 
regime—whose hyper-exploitative practices have circulated widely and globally 
in the media—needs substantial reform, and wide-ranging consultations are 
taking place with an eye to a substantial reformulation of immigration and 
labour policies. An apparent consensus is emerging between the governments 
of countries sending labour and those receiving it in the GCC area, as well as 
international labour organizations and NGOs, and employers. This consensus 
envisages that adequately regulating the cross-border migration of labour 
will bring multiple benefits. For instance, it will produce a more efficient and 
reliable labour market, simplify the policing and governance of migration, 
and also substantially reduce the exploitation of migrant labour by recruiters 
and employers. In Qatar, for instance, the outcome of this consensus is the 
progressive introduction of policies fostering a shift toward delegating the 
recruitment (at the point of origin) and employment (in the place of destination) 
of all migrant labour to government-approved “ethical agencies” that would 
guarantee contractual fairness and transparency to migrants and employers. 
The eventual phasing out or redefinition of the current ‘sponsorship’ (kafala) 
system, and a substantial curb on informal networks of migration brokerage 
underpins these reforms.
 In the meantime, labour-sending countries favour reforms to ensure 
a control of the flow of migrant remittances—nowadays openly recognized as 
central to national development—whilst providing a degree of (social and legal) 
protection for their migrant population. In the last twenty years, attempts 
to regulate migration to GCC countries have taken the form of bilateral 
agreements between sending and receiving countries, and more flexible modes 
of ‘migration diplomacy’—migration policy as an indirect form of foreign 
policy (see, for example, early migration policies in Saudi Arabia). Although 
this process is by no means straightforward—for instance, there have been 
temporary bans on sending Indonesian domestic servants to both Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia, ostensibly because of violence against migrants—there is an 
increasing harmonization of such inter-state policies and bilateral agreements, 
leading to new forms of regionalization. In many sending countries, such as 
India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, policies have been introduced, for instance, 
with the apparent aim of sustaining and protecting migrant mobility, thus 
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transforming these countries into labour brokerage states that proactively send 
their citizens abroad. With the growing demands for documentation in most 
sending countries (in order to issue passports and non-objection certificates, 
for instance), and the regularization of channels of migration recruitment, the 
role of state actors in the migration process has become more extensive.
 Yet despite the bevy of efforts currently underway in the GCC area to 
formalize and regulate the recruitment and employment of migrant labour, the 
question arises of the tension between the intents of regulatory policies and the 
complexities of actual practice. The logic behind emerging migration policies 
is that the introduction of ethical policies of recruitment and employment—
unfettered access to information regarding conditions of employment, 
transparency in contracts, controlled fees and costs of migration, and so on—
will inevitably lead to fairer working conditions for migrant labour and a more 
efficient labour market. But the reality is certainly much more complex. The 
actual overlap of formal and informal networks of brokerage, the important role 
that the latter play in labour migrants’ everyday lives, and the complex system 
of sub-contracting that underpins the workings of Qatar’s labour market might 
all hinder effective reforms. By regularizing informal channels of migration and 
brokerage, GCC nations might not necessarily see a generalized formalization 
of the (migrant) labour market. Instead, the outcome might be a ‘formalization 
of the informality’ of migration and employment that, instead of providing 
security and fairness, simply hides away existing abuses and exploitation, and 
creates new ones. Indeed, attempts to regulate and formalize recruitment of 
migrant labour in the GCC nations have had, to date, mixed results. Regardless 
of formal contracts signed with government-approved recruitment agencies, 
migrants still have to renegotiate wages or employment on arrival in the 
GCC, wages are often lower than what had been agreed, kickbacks continue 
to be necessary to smooth migration, employers have not ceased to retain the 
migrants’ passports, and so on. In other words, the formalization of recruitment 
has not yet lived up to the promise of eliminating abuses and exploitation of 
migrant labour to the GCC countries.
 At the same time, many labour migrants view the formal recruitment 
structures that have been introduced in their home countries as yet another 
layer of inefficient and rapacious bureaucracy obstructing the path towards a 
better life. Informal brokers and networks remain their main source of support 
and socialization, helping them to navigate the everyday predicaments of 
work and life in GCC countries. Consequently, formal, government-approved 
migration brokers will inevitably need to continue to rely on the services of 
informal agents to recruit perspective migrants. Indeed, going against the grain 
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of conventional understandings of brokerage as withering away under modern 
capitalism, evidence from the GCC states indicates that growing regulation and 
formalization will actually expand the role (of various modalities) of migration 
brokerage, even within extensive and well-established migrant networks, and 
in countries where, to date, only a small proportion of migrants use formal 
channels of migration.
 With their move toward formalization of migrant labour, the GCC 
countries are not looking to phase out circular migration, but rather to continue 
to capitalize on it whilst responding to media accusations that they favour a 
system of neo-slavery. Whilst proponents of circular migration present it as a 
“win-win-win” situation—receiving countries are guaranteed a steady labour 
supply, migrants are ensured employment and control of wages, and sending 
countries are promised increasing flows of remittances that support local 
development—it is evident to many—migrant labour in particular—that strict 
controls render migrants vulnerable, restrict to long-term settlement, and the 
reproduce labour segregation and exploitation. More importantly, attempts to 
regulate and formalize recruitment and employment not only will criminalize 
informal networks of support central to migrant labour’s lives, but also do 
not address the root causes of current forms of hyper-exploitation. The main 
drivers of exploitative practices are the system of sub-contracting that defines 
employment, and, more importantly, the absence of a labour market. Even 
with introduction of ‘ethical’ forms of employment and recruitment, migrant 
labour will not be able to choose the best employer offering the higher wages. 
Breaking employment contracts remains highly problematic—often entailing 
substantial loss of earnings, as a high proportion of wages are paid at the end 
of contract—and to shift from one job to another requires leaving the GCC 
countries, re-applying for a visa, and so on. Significantly, the introduction of a 
labour market is not on the agenda for reform.
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by David Harvey
Alienation and Urban Life
22
I n recent times a pattern of popular protest has arisen in many parts of the world that calls for some explanation. Many of these protests have occurred in cities and while in each instance the trigger was particular there seem to 
be some commonalities among these diverse irruptions of popular discontent. 
In Brazil, to take one example, the trigger was the rising costs of public 
transport but the protests quickly expanded to encompass everything from 
excessive investments in the mega-events of the world cup and the Olympic 
games to corruption and excessive police violence. The protests occurred not 
only in Rio and São Paulo but also in many other cities from Florianopolis to 
Salvador. In Istanbul, to take another example, the initial protest was over 
converting a park in the symbolic centre into a shopping mall but it quickly 
and unexpectedly morphed and spread to many other cities like Ankara and 
Izmir as a protest against excessive police violence and the arrogance of a 
regime gone autocratic. In London, Stockholm, Athens, Paris and elsewhere, 
major disruptions arose that were supplemented by an ‘Occupy’ movement 
that began in the US but then spread to many cities in several countries. The 
recurring and sometimes massive anti-austerity protests across all of Southern 
Europe in particular (from Spain to Greece) also had a common theme and an 
urban focus in the squares. Movements that began as pro-democracy in North 
Africa, Bosnia as well as in Syria and Ukraine initially exhibited some similar 
urban characteristics (particularly in Cairo) before they later got tangled up 
with geopolitical rivalries, ethnic, religious and nationalist struggles.
 So what do these volatile sometimes explosive and often short-lived 
protests and movements betoken?
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The idea I want to explore here is that the commonality between them can 
best be captured through an examination of the widespread and growing sense 
of alienation from not only the harsh realities of a capitalism gone corrupt, 
brutal and rogue and a daily life gone wonky, but also from all the institutions 
that in prior periods had helped corral diverse forms of popular discontent 
into acceptable paths of negotiation and compromise to sometimes produce 
ameliorations to living and working conditions in meaningful ways. So what 
role can the theory of alienation play in explaining current events? 
The verb to alienate has a variety of meanings.
1. As a legal term it means to transfer a private property right to the 
ownership of another. I alienate a piece of land when I sell it to another. 
Alienation is, therefore, inherent in all commodification and market 
exchange. It is, however, redeemable to the degree that an equivalent 
value can be acquired to that which has been traded away—sellers may 
have been separated from a specific use value but can receive in return the 
value equivalent (usually in money form). The possibility exists for what 
Marx called “reciprocity in alienation”. But the exchange can also be one-
sided such that one party exploits the other and under capitalism such 
extractions of surplus value are systemic rather than conjunctural. Non-
reciprocal alienation can occur through market mechanisms or through 
accumulation by dispossession.
2. As a social relation alienation refers to how affections, loyalties and 
trust can be transferred to or stolen away from one person or institution to 
another. The alienation (loss) of trust (in persons or in institutions such as 
the market, law, the banks, the political system and above all in the money 
form) can be exceedingly damaging to the social fabric.
3. As a passive emotive state alienation means to become or feel cut off 
from some valued connectivities in irredeemable ways. It is characterized 
by a sense of loss, of sorrow, grief and melancholia, a mourning for real or 
perceived losses that seem difficult if not impossible to recapture and for 
which there is no substitutable value. The passivity is typically reinforced by 
a sense of powerlessness and of helplessness in the face of overwhelming 
forces. Insofar as this form of alienation founds an expressive politics, it 
is prone to produce sudden and unpredictable outbursts of sometimes 
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violent anger and protest that quickly subside back into passivity.
4. As an active condition, alienation means to be overtly angry and hostile, 
to act out at being deprived or dispossessed of value and of the capacity 
to pursue valued ends. Alienated beings vent their anger and hostility 
towards those identified as the enemy, sometimes without any clear 
definitive or rational reason. Or they may plot and plan, construct political 
organizations and movements aiming to recuperate or redeem that which 
has been lost (such as the surplus value stolen from workers by capital) 
or that which is being unfairly denied (such as adequate remuneration for 
housework). Alienated beings may, finally, seek to build a world in which 
alienation has either been abolished or rendered redeemable or reciprocal. 
A movement to recuperate the right to the city on the part of those who 
have been dispossessed is such a claim.
This last form of alienation is sometimes called “estrangement” (cf. Berardi) 
to clearly differentiate its active qualities from the passive forms. But I find 
the diversity of overlapping meanings useful. The worker legally alienates 
the use of his or her labor power for a stated period of time to the capitalist 
in return for a wage. But laborers get back only a portion of the value they 
create. They are alienated from the surplus value they produce. Meanwhile the 
capitalist seeks to build the loyalty of the worker to capitalism by creating a 
competitive (alienating) relation to co-workers and fragmenting the labor force 
along identity politics lines. The worker is estranged from his and her product 
as well as from nature and all other aspects of social life during the time of the 
labor contract and usually beyond (given the exhausting nature of the work). 
A state of deprivation and dispossession is internalized as a sense of loss and 
frustration of creative alternatives foregone.
 The political problem for the alienated, as Berardi notes, is to shift from 
the passive to the active (estranged) form of alienation. The concepts of socialism 
and communism have traditionally rested on the premise that alienation is 
recuperable and redeemable and that class struggle should seek to build a world 
in which alienation is either eradicated or reduced to reciprocal forms. Ruling 
(capitalist) class power, on the other hand, strives always (whether consciously 
or not does not matter) to resist or coopt alienation in its active expressive 
forms and to push it back into passivity by use of various forms of repression 
(legal, military, political, of whatever) and a variety of other tactics. What we 
have seen in the anti-austerity movements of southern Europe, for example, 
has been a long drawn out and, some would say broadly successful struggle on 
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the part of capitalist class power via its command of the state apparatus and 
its superior command of economic and police power to squash the active forms 
of struggle and to reduce protest to a passive mass of alienated, discouraged 
and therefore more easily ignored and manipulable populations. But this form 
of alienation is consistent with occasional irruptions of violent rage. Political 
power typically waits on such irruptions in order to immediately crush them, 
to depict them as terrorism and to justify the further strengthening of state 
repressive laws and powers.
 Are the recent uprisings in cities around the world a response to 
a widespread and deepening sense of alienation and to what degree do they 
indicate a social order that for all its geographical differences and particularities 
is perpetually on the cusp of an oscillating movement from the passive to the 
active forms of alienation and back again? 
 I think this offers an interesting perspective to understand the forms 
that political revolts are now typically taking and how the dynamics of class 
struggle are being constructed in our times.
 I recently undertook a study of the contradictions of capital from the 
standpoint of the universal alienation that is pervasive to capitalism. (Harvey, 
2014) This may be helpful in unravelling the diverse sources of alienation at the 
same time as it speaks to the question of how, as Brecht once put it, “hope is 
latent in contradictions”. For example, the tactile contact with the commodity—
its use value—is lost and the sensual relation to nature is occluded by the 
domination of exchange value and the spread of alien commodification to all 
aspects of social life. The social value and meaning of laboring gets obscured 
in the representational form of an alienating monetary system. The capacity 
to arrive democratically at collective decisions gets lost in the perpetual battle 
between the conflicting rationalities of isolated private interests and of state 
powers. Social wealth disappears into the pockets of private persons (producing 
a world of unequal private wealth and public squalor). The direct producers of 
value are alienated from the value they produce. Class formation creates an 
ineradicable gulf between people that is masked by all manner of contortions of 
social relations and confusions within divisions of labor. All prospects for social 
equality or social justice are lost even as the universality of equality before the 
law is trumpeted as the supreme bourgeois virtue. Accumulated resentments at 
accumulation by dispossession in the field of the realization of capital (through 
housing displacements and foreclosures, for example) boil over. Freedom 
becomes domination.
The catalytic political problem that derives from all this is to identify, confront 
and overcome the many forms of alienation produced by the economic engine 
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of capital and to channel the pent-up energy, the anger and the frustration 
they produce, into a coherent anti-capitalist opposition. Dare we hope for an 
unalienated (or at least less alienated and more humanly acceptable) relation to 
nature, to each other, to the work we do and to the way we live and love? 
 The problem begins with the evolution of work and the division of 
labor under capitalism. “The economic rationalization of work” that occurs 
with the capitalist development of technological powers, writes Andre Gorz, 
produces “individuals who, being alienated in their work, will, necessarily be 
alienated in their consumption as well, and eventually, in their needs. Since 
there is no limit to the quantity of money that can be earned and spent, there 
will no longer be any limit to the needs that money allow them to have or to 
the need for money itself. These needs increase in line with social wealth. The 
monetarization of work and needs will eventually abolish the limitations which 
the various philosophies of life had placed on them” (22). This concomitantly 
“sweep(s) away the ancient idea of freedom and existential autonomy” . 
 Recent polls in the United States, for example, indicate that some 70 
per cent of those employed in wage labour either hate their jobs or are totally 
indifferent to the work they do. This is not that surprising given that class 
struggle considerations have dictated paths of technological and organizational 
change designed to eliminate or routinize jobs. Technologies whose effect and 
aim are to eliminate or routinize work cannot, at the same time, glorify work as 
the essential source of personal identity and fulfillment. Meaningless work is 
exhausting and demoralizing.
 The contemporary technologies of working and consuming likewise do 
“violence to Nature and to our own and other people’s bodies. The culture of 
everyday life is a culture of violence, or, in its most extreme form, a systematic, 
thought-out, sublimated, aggravated culture of barbarism”. This penetrates to 
the very core of daily life by way of the instruments we daily use to live that 
life, including all those we handle in our work. Gorz continues: “Persuading 
individuals that the consumer goods and services they are offered adequately 
compensate for the sacrifice they must make in order to obtain them and that 
such consumption constitutes a haven of individual happiness which sets 
them apart from the crowd is something which typically belongs to the sphere 
of commercial advertising”. But such “compensatory goods and services” 
are “neither necessary nor even merely useful. They are always presented as 
containing an element of luxury, of superfluity, of fantasy, which by designating 
the purchaser as a ‘happy and privileged person’ protects him or her from the 
pressures of a rationalized universe and the obligation to conduct themselves 
in a functional manner. Compensatory goods are therefore desired as much—if 
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not more—for their uselessness as for their use value; for it is this element 
of uselessness (in superfluous gadgets and ornaments, for example) which 
symbolizes the buyer’s escape from the collective universe in a haven of private 
sovereignty”. This consumerism of excess, this uselessness, comprises much of 
urban life. Alien consumerism occupies the city, leaving us drowning in a wealth 
of compensatory goods, the ownership of which is taken as a sign of freedom of 
choice in the market place of human desires.
 The progress of alien or compensatory consumerism has its own 
internally destructive dynamics. It requires what Schumpeter called “creative 
destruction” to be let loose upon the land. Daily urban life in the city, settled 
ways of living, relating and socializing, are again and again disrupted to make 
way for the latest fad or fancy. Demolitions and displacements to make way 
for gentrification or disneyfication break open already achieved fabrics of 
urban living to make way for the gaudy and the gargantuan, the ephemeral and 
the fleeting. Dispossession and destruction, displacement and construction 
become vehicles for vigorous and speculative capital accumulation as the figures 
of the financier and the rentier, the developer, the landed proprietor and the 
entrepreneurial mayor step from the shadows into the forefront of capital’s logic 
of accumulation through alienation and dispossession. The economic engine 
that is capital circulation and accumulation, gobbles up whole cities only to spit 
out new urban forms in spite of the resistance of people who feel alienated 
entirely from the processes that not only re-shape the environments in which 
they live but also re-define the kind of person they must become in order to 
survive. The coalition of the unwilling in relation to this forced redefinition 
of human nature constitutes a pool of alienated individuals that periodically 
erupts in riots and revolutionary movements.
 Money supplants all other values notes Gorz. Along with this goes 
“an incentive to withdraw into the private sphere and give it priority, to the 
pursuit of ‘personal’ advantages”. This then “contributes to the disintegration 
of networks of solidarity and mutual assistance, social and family cohesion 
and our sense of belonging. Individuals socialized by (alien) consumerism are 
no longer socially integrated individuals but individuals who are encouraged 
to ‘be themselves’ by distinguishing themselves from others and who only 
resemble these others in their refusal (socially channelled into consumption) 
to assume responsibility for the common condition by taking common action”. 
Affections and loyalties to particular places and cultural forms are viewed as 
anachronisms. Is this not what the spread of the neoliberal ethic proposed and 
eventually accomplished?
 Many people likewise find themselves with less and less time and space 
for free creative activity in the midst of widespread time-saving technologies in 
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both production and consumption. How does this paradox come about? It takes 
a lot of time, of course, to manage, run and service all the time-saving household 
paraphernalia with which we are surrounded and the more paraphernalia we 
have the more time it takes. The sheer complexity of the support apparatus 
embroils us in endless telephone calls or e-mails to service centers, credit card 
and telephone companies, insurance companies, and the like. There is also no 
question that the cultural habits with which we have surrounded the fetish 
worship of technological gizmos captures the playful side of our imaginations 
and has us uselessly watching sit-coms, trawling the internet, or playing 
computer games for hours on end. We are surrounded with “weapons of mass 
distraction” at very turn. But none of this explains why time flies away from 
us in the way it does. The deeper reason lies, I think, in the structured way 
capital has approached the issue of consumption time as a potential barrier to 
accumulation. 
 “If savings in worktime do not serve to liberate time, and if this 
liberated time is not used for ‘the free self realization of individuals,’ then 
these savings in working time are totally devoid of meaning” (184). Society 
may be moving towards “the programmed, staged reduction of working hours, 
without loss of real income, in conjunction with a set of accompanying policies 
which will allow this liberated time to become time for free self-realization for 
everyone”. But such an unalienated emancipatory development is threatening 
in the extreme for capitalist class power and the resistances and barriers created 
are strong. “The development of the productive forces may of itself reduce the 
amount of labour that is necessary; it cannot of itself create the conditions 
which will make this liberation of time a liberation for all. History may place the 
opportunity for greater freedom within our grasp, but it cannot release us from 
the need to seize this opportunity for ourselves and derive benefit from it. Our 
liberation will not come about as the result of material determinism, behind 
our backs, as it were. The potential for liberation which a process contains can 
only be realized if human beings seize it and use it to make themselves free”.
 Confronting collectively the multiple alienations that capital produces 
is a compelling way to mobilize anti-capitalist politics. Universal alienation calls 
for a full-blooded political response. And there is much that goes on in the city—
in the streets and parks, in places of sociality and of living and working—that 
is marked by a desperate longing to construct islands of unalienated activity 
in the midst of the sea of necessarily alienated relations required to sustain 
endless accumulation of wealth and power on the part of the privileged classes. 
The city is a fertile field in which to study such conflicts. But the difficulty is 
that so far at least no way has been found to turn this turmoil of conflicts into 
an anti-capitalist movement. So what are the barriers to turning the alienation 
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characterized by passive if smoldering resentment against endless capital 
accumulation into the alienation productive of vigorous organized action?
 The functionalist thesis I want to propose here is that any dominant 
mode of production and its particular mode of political articulation defines the 
spaces and the forms of its own opposition and does so in such a way as to 
guarantee its own reproduction. In the era generally referred to as Fordism, 
the large factories serviced by an industrial working class gave rise to trade 
union forms of organization, social democratic-oriented political parties (and 
in much of Europe communist parties that had significant mass support). 
This oppositional configuration was rarely revolutionary precisely because it 
was tightly embedded within the logic of the then-existing capitalist order. 
The hegemonic practices of neoliberalism that came to dominate after the 
crisis of the 1970s weakened and in some instances destroyed the redoubts 
of traditional working class power in both the economic and the political 
arenas. All of this gradually (and in a few instances precipitously) gave way to 
decentralised and networked oppositional forms animated by a deep distrust 
of the state and by the assertion of individual rights or an identity politics that 
fragmented oppositional movements. Yet in the United States it was Ronald 
Reagan who proclaimed that government was the problem and not the solution 
and it was the libertarian right wing that most vociferously proclaimed the 
virtues of individual liberty and freedom. These neoliberal positions have 
been embraced by anarchists and the autonomistas who concur with Reagan 
that government is the problem. Does this make them Reaganite even though 
oppositional? NGOs (many cast in the rhetoric of progressive redistribution) 
have become the cutting edge for the privatization of state welfare functions. 
By definition NGOs, being under the patronage of corporations and wealthy 
individuals, cannot challenge the accumulation of wealth. All they can do is to 
seek to remedy the worst and most glaring forms of injustice. The effect has 
been to encourage narratives of personalized victimization as the basis for a 
remedial politics that cannot challenge the amassing of immense corporate 
power and personal fortunes nor build large scale anti-capitalist movements. 
Narratives of victimization are a weak base upon which to construct solidarious 
anti-capitalist movements, but this is what much of organized left politics is 
reduced to.
 A functionalist exploration of this sort is useful in the sense that it 
generates a whole series of propositions about the contemporary ways of doing 
politics that might usefully be explored. When, for example, Ronald Reagan 
famously argued that government is not the solution but the problem, when 
Margaret Thatcher also famously argued that there is no such thing as society 
Alienation and urban life
203ATHENS AND BEYOND
only individuals and their families, were they not setting the stage for anti-state 
individualism and localism to assume the core position defining oppositional 
ambitions? 
 The result is the production of civil society movements that are diverse, 
fragmented, individualized and oriented largely to mandating remedies and 
claims of specific injustices in which it is crucial to be able to show not only 
individual harms to individual parties but also either direct intent or culpable 
negligence on the part of the supposed perpetrators of these harms. Much 
of the progressive left is confined to rights questions and discourses and no 
matter how effective they may be this cannot challenge (indeed it helps sustain) 
capitalist class power.
 There is one further point of some significance. This relates to 
the phenomena of rapidly increasing indebtedness. Debt has long been an 
instrument of social control for ruling elites. “Debt encumbered homeowners 
do not go on strike” it was said in the 1930s and so the promulgation of the 
dream of homeownership via the assumption of debts performed double duty 
in stabilizing popular political support for capitalism. But indebtedness also 
has an important impact, as Lazzarato points out, on political subjectivity 
more generally. “The debt economy is an economy of time and subjectification… 
All financial innovations have but one sole purpose; possessing the future in 
advance by objectivizing it… (This) means subordinating all possibility of choice 
and decision which the future holds to the reproduction of capitalist power 
relations. In this way, debt appropriates… each person’s future as well as the 
future of society as a whole”. This is as true for corporate and sovereign state 
debt as it is for individual long-term indebtedness. This explains why it is that 
so many people, as the saying goes, find it “easier to imagine the end of the 
world than the end of capitalism”. The future of capitalism is already foretold 
through its indebtedness. The grasp this has upon our political imaginations is 
incalculable.
 Once it is clearly acknowledged that political power has broadly 
dictated the terms of its own opposition and once we recognize how much 
our oppositional stances have been circumscribed by these terms, then it 
becomes both possible and imperative to find ways to go beyond these terms 
as a condition of revolutionary change. There are movements that clearly do so 
(and often suffer greatly for it). What this means for politics requires deeper 
discussion. And that is the issue I want to put on the table for this conference.
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n today’s Athens we can indeed trace the devastating effects the paroxysmic 
financialization of capitalist economy has on processes of urban and 
social reproduction. We can also however discover emerging new forms of 
resistance to the policies of capitalist crisis, which are connected to acts that 
transform public space. Such acts shape urban space as a means to create new 
social bounds and to build forms of collective struggle and survival. 
 Two crucial tasks are laid before a necessary return to politics for 
the governing elites which imagined that they, at last, could do away with 
the obstacles labor creates to profit (Midnight Notes 2009). The first one is 
to ensure that social bonds continue to constitute individuals as economic 
subjects, as subjects whose behavior and motives can be analyzed, channeled, 
predicted upon and, ultimately, controlled by the use of economic parameters 
and measures only. The second one is to ensure that people continue to act and 
dream without participating in any form of connectedness and coordination 
with others. It is against these dominant policies that people gropingly re-
discover the importance of taking their lives in their hands. Creating common 
spaces is an essential step in this direction. 
 Emerging practices of urban commoning in Athens may be connected 
to two crucial events that catalyzed processes of dissident awareness. The 
December 2008 youth uprising (Stavrides 2010a) and the Syntagma square 
occupation. Both events produced collective experiences that reclaim the city 
as a potentially liberating environment and reshape crucial questions that 
characterize emancipatory politics. In this context, the city becomes not only 
the setting but also the means to collectively experiment on possible alternative 
forms of social organization.
by Stavros Stavrides
(NTUA, Athens)
I
Emerging Common Spaces as a Challenge 
to the City of Crisis
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For some, the project of autonomy may be described as a process that creates 
completely independent socio-spatial entities which become capable of 
reproducing themselves with no recourse to their hostile social and political 
surrounding. Autonomous areas, thus, are meant to create their own rules of 
self regulation and people inhabit them by following those rules. 
 The Greek state wanted and still wants to sustain the myth of a 
locatable marginal “outside” of dissent because it can “surgically” intervene 
when it chooses to crush paradigmatically and emblematically any dissident 
behavior by giving, at the same time, the impression that these behaviors only 
exist in secluded enclaves. What the December youth uprising has done was to 
shift the media and police focus from the allegedly anomic Exarchia enclave to 
many other Athens’ neighborhoods, and to other major Greek cities (Stavrides 
2010a). The state could not present the December uprising as one more Exarchia 
centered incident of “rioting hooliganism”.
 Autonomous spaces can be represented as separated spaces, spaces 
which are fantasized as liberated enclaves surrounded by a hostile capitalist 
environment. Through a powerful spatial metaphor, autonomy is equated 
to spatial distinctness, to circumscribed areas which are defined by their 
exteriority to the rest of the city-society.
 The Occupied Navarinou park project, however, (as well as many 
neighborhood initiatives after Syntagma occupation), hints towards a different 
imaginary of emancipating autonomy. Always porous and open to new 
potential users, Navarinou park may support a spatial experience as well as a 
spatial metaphor which is beyond and against the experience and metaphor of 
the enclave (Marcuse and Van Kempen 2002, Atkinson and Blandy 2005 and 
Graham and Marvin 2001). The park’s porous perimeter is defined by spatial 
arrangements which acquire the characteristics of a threshold rather than those 
of a boundary. Actually, the park itself may be considered as a multileveled and 
multiform urban threshold.     
 Threshold spatiality may host and express practices of commoning 
that are not contained in secluded worlds shared by secluded communities 
of commoners. Thresholds explicitly symbolize the potentiality of sharing by 
establishing intermediary areas of crossing, by opening inside to outside. As 
mechanisms which regulate and give meaning to acts of passage, thresholds 
may become powerful tools in the construction of institutions of expanding 
commoning. Many societies strictly and boldly control symbolic and real 
thresholds because people may “lose their way” and discover potential common 
worlds that are beyond the corresponding society’s established hierarchies. 
But, in the process of expanding commoning which directly defies capitalist 
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society’s enclosures, thresholds may become both the image and the setting 
of emancipating experiences of sharing. Thresholds are potential socio-spatial 
“artifices of equality” (Rancière 2010: 92).
 Maybe we need to abandon a view of autonomy that fantasizes 
uncontaminated enclaves of emancipation (Stavrides 2009: 53 and Negri 
2009: 50). The prevailing experiences of urban enclosures and the dominant 
imaginary of recognizable identity enclaves colonize the thought and action 
of those who attempt to go beyond capitalist hegemony. Threshold experience 
and the threshold metaphor offer a counter-example to the dominant enclave 
city (Stavrides 2010b). Rather than perpetuating an image of the capitalist city 
as an archipelago of enclave-islands, we need to create spaces that inventively 
threaten this peculiar urban order by upsetting dominant taxonomies of spaces 
and life types. Those spaces-as-thresholds acquire a dubious, precarious perhaps 
but also virus-like existence: they become active catalysts in the presence of 
potentially explosive chemical compounds. 
 This is where the problem of the “institutions of commoning” (Roggero 
2010: 369) arises. By its very constitution as a tool of social organization, an 
institution tends to circumscribe a community as a closed world of predictable 
and repeatable social practices. Thus, institutions of commoning may be 
employed to define specific commoning practices and the corresponding 
community of commoners as a closed self reproducing world too. But this may 
- and often does - lead to forms of enclosure (Angelis and Stavrides 2010: 12). 
For commoning to remain a force that produces forms of cooperation-through-
sharing commoning has to be a process which overspills the boundaries of any 
established community, even if this community aspires to be an egalitarian and 
anti-authoritarian one. Emerging subjects of commoning actions transform 
themselves by always being open to “newcomers” (Rancière 2010: 59-60), by 
becoming themselves newcomers.
 For commoning practices to become important pre-figurations of 
an emancipated society, commoning has to remain a collective struggle to re-
appropriate and transform at the same time a society’s common wealth (Hardt 
and Negri 2009: 251-253). Collective experiences as those of Syntagma square 
self managed tent city and the after-December experiments of neighborhood 
assemblies and initiatives (including the Navarinou park occupation) may 
construct an inspiring example of a culture based on equality, solidarity and 
collective inventiveness, only when they remain “infectious”, osmotic and 
capable of extending egalitarian values and practices outside their boundaries.  
 Dominant institutions legitimize inequality, distinguishing between 
those who know and those who do not, between those who can take decisions 
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and those who must execute them, between those who have specific rights and 
those who are deprived of them. Thus, dominant institutions focused on the 
production and uses of public space are essentially forms of authorization which 
stem from certain authorities and aim at directing the behaviors of public space 
users (Stavrides 2012: 589).
 There also exist dominant institutions which appear as grounded 
upon an abstract equality: real people with differentiated characteristics, needs 
and dreams are reduced to neutralized subjects of rights. Thus, in public space 
general rules appear as being addressed to homogenized users, users who can 
have access to a specific place at specific hours of the day (or who are not allowed 
to “step on the grass” and so on).  
 In both cases, dominant institutions classify and predict types of 
behavior and deal with only those differences which are fixed and perpetuated 
through the classifications they establish. Institutions of commoning 
established in a stable and well-defined community may very well look like the 
dominant institutions in the ways they regulate people’s rights and actions. 
There are obviously differences in terms of content: an institution that aims at 
guaranteeing a certain form of equality (no matter how abstract) is different 
from an institution that openly imposes discriminations. Institutions of 
expanding commoning, however, differ from the dominant ones not only 
in terms of content but also in terms of form. This makes them potentially 
different “social artifices” which are oriented towards different social bonds. 
Such institutions establish, first of all, the ground of comparisons between 
different subjects of action and also between different practices. Subjects of 
action and practices themselves become comparable and relevant: what is at 
stake is to invent forms of collaboration based not on homogenization but on 
multiplicity (Hardt and Negri 2005:348-349). 
 However, comparability is not enough. Institutions of commoning 
need to offer opportunities as well as tools for translating differences between 
views, between actions, and between subjectivities, one to the other. If 
comparability is based on the necessary and constitutive recognition of 
differences, translatability creates the ground for negotiations between 
differences without reducing them to common denominators. “An emancipated 
community is a community of narrators and translators” (Rancière 2009: 22 
and 17-20). Obviously, this is quite difficult, since dominant taxonomies tend 
to block those processes of establishing a socially recognizable common ground 
that are not based on the predominance of the ruling elites. Translation seeks 
correspondences but cannot and does not aspire to establish an absolute 
unobstructed mirroring of one language to the other. So does or should do an 
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institution which keeps alive the expanding potentiality of commoning. Indeed 
“...the common is always organized in translation” (Roggero 2010: 368). 
 A third characteristic of institutions of expanding commoning has 
very deep roots in the history of human societies. Social anthropologists have 
very well documented the existence of mechanisms in certain societies which 
prevent or discourage the accumulation of power. Depending on the case, these 
mechanisms were focused on the equal distribution of collected food, on the 
ritual destruction of wealth, on the symbolic sacrifice of leaders, on carnivalistic 
role reversals etc.
 If institutions of commoning are meant to be able to support a 
constant opening of the circles of commoning they need to sustain mechanisms 
of control of any potential accumulation of power, either by individuals or by 
specific groups. If sharing is to be the guiding principle of self-management 
practices, then sharing of power is simultaneously the precondition of 
egalitarian sharing and its ultimate target. Egalitarian sharing, which needs to 
be able to include newcomers, has to be encouraged by an always expanding 
network of self-governance institutions. Such institutions can really be “open” 
and “perpetually in flux” (Hardt and Negri 2009: 358-359) but in very specific 
ways connected to the practices of expanding commoning. Power is first and 
foremost the power to decide. If however the power to decide is distributed 
equally through mechanisms of participation, then this power ceases to give 
certain people the opportunity (legitimized or not) to impose their will on 
others. 
 Perhaps what the collective experiments on space commoning in 
Athens during this crisis modestly gesture towards, is the possibility of 
reclaiming the city as a collective work of art (Lefebvre 1996: 174). To devise 
common spaces means, thus, something a lot more than to succeed in re-
appropriating small pieces of still available open space. It means, explicitly or 
implicitly, sometimes in full conscience sometimes not, to discover the power 
to create new ambiguous, possibly contradictory but always open institutions 
of commoning.  Space, actual physical space, but also metaphorical, imaginary 
space, becomes not only the ground which is necessary in order to see those 
institutions function: space shapes institutions of commoning and is shaped by 
them.
 In the contemporary capitalist city people have to invent forms of life 
in order to survive. To help release the power of doing (Holloway 2010: 246-
247), which capitalism continuously captures and traps in its mechanisms, 
we need to participate in the creation of spaces and institutions of expanding 
commoning. If autonomy has any meaning as an anti-capitalist venture, then 
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it must be constructed in-against-and-beyond the metropolis, by upsetting 
dominant taxonomies of urban spaces as well as dominant taxonomies of 
political actions.
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Crisis-scape is a collective research project that traces the effects of the 
current crisis on Athens’ public space. The rise of a state of emergency, 
of racism, of impoverishment, along with other unprecedented forms 
of physical and political violence are traced through the city’s everyday: 
Athens’ metro, its airports old and new, its highways, its squares and 
streets become points of departure for the analysis of a new condition 
of existence that the crisis gives birth to. 
The project combines urban theory, anthropology, geography as well 
as visual research methods and digital design to read the enormous, 
oftentimes devastating social and political change 
playing out before our eyes.
This volume—Crisis-scapes: Athens and Beyond—acts as an 
accompaniment to the conference of the same title that took place at 
the Athens Polytechnic in early May 2014.
